JPRS 75529

21 April 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1511

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 75529

21 April 1980

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1511

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80
pp 3-60, 63-92, 94-96

CONTENTS

CONTENTS (Continued)

MORAL-POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING METHODS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 3-12

[Article by Prof, Dr Phil Sci, Maj Gen D. Volkogonov: "Moral-Political and Psychological Training for Soldiers, and the Ways of Improving It"]

[Text] This article is recommended for use in preparation for the seminar "Ways for Raising the Effectiveness of Troop Moral-Political and Psychological Training".

The Soviet Armed Forces are persistently working on a task of historical importance, posed to them by the 25th CPSU Congress, of "being the guardsman of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the bulwark of universal peace."[1] Maintenance of constant high combat readiness presupposes continuous improvement of all elements of fighting power, to include the spiritual strength of army and navy personnel. The military-technical revolution is not abating; on the contrary it is intensifying the manifestation of one of the most important laws, according to which not only the course and outcome of a war but also preparedness for it depends on the moral-political state of the public and the army. This is all the more important to emphasize because there are still militarist aggressive forces in the world which have not abandoned the idea of "replaying" the battles they lost in the 20th century. As L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech in Berlin on 6 October 1979, proponents of the arms race are utilizing all excuses, even fabricated ones, to aggravate the situation and spur on military preparations. Naturally this means that the forces of socialism must display heightened alertness. The ideological and psychological preparedness of the personnel is acquiring special significance in the face of the real threats.

The moral-political and psychological training of the soldiers of our army proceeds with a consideration for the accumulated experience of the past, as well as the requirements that a modern war may impose upon the individual, were potential aggressors to risk starting it.

I. The Historical Experience and the Requirements Imposed by Modern War on the Spiritual Strength of the Soldiers

Basing itself on V. I. Lenin's most important methodological directive that "in any war, victory depends in the end on the morale of the masses which are shedding their blood on the field of battle,"[2] our party has always devoted special attention to ideological and psychological training of soldiers in the socialist army. During the Civil War, when new military regulations had not been fully written yet, many units and formations of the Red Army published "Revolutionary Memos," "Battle Commandments," and "Red Oaths," which formulated not only the moral-political requirements on the soldier but also the ways for developing the needed combat qualities. The "Red Army Soldier's Booklet",[3] approved in 1918 by V. I. Lenin and Ya. M. Sverdlov, had a great deal of significance in this respect. In addition to presenting the first RSFSR Constitution, the Red Army soldier's commandments, and the text of the oath, it also discussed some of the methods of troop moral-political training, and of developing high class consciousness, bravery, and hatred of enemies in the soldier.

Early in the history of the party, in those years long ago, it was by nurturing the revolutionary warrior that the party also shaped the citizen of society, the patriot and internationalist. Military service, read a resolution of the Eighth RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress, is "the basis of not only military training in and of itself, but also general education and political indoctrination."[4] This idea was subsequently reconfirmed several times and strengthened in a number of party documents. It was discussed at the 25th CPSU Congress, and it was once again emphasized in the party Central Committee's decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination." Ideological and psychological preparedness of the Soviet soldier is an important inherent part of his development as a citizen of the socialist society.

By as early as the 1920's the party tried to create a well-organized system of indoctrination in the army, one insuring its high effectiveness. Thus a decree on strengthening the Red Army, adopted by the 11th RKP(b) Congress, pointed out the need for establishing a correct and clearly organized regimen of military service, training, indoctrination, and administration as a means for improving the army's combat capabilities.[5] Systematic and integrated solution of the troop training problems was seen as an important prerequisite for effective spiritual preparation of the personnel for all trials of war.

During those years the party published a number of important decrees with the purposes of improving the combat and political training of the soldiers, and strengthening their ideological and psychological preparedness. Among others, they included "On the Political-Moral State of the Red Army" (1928) and "On the Command and Political Staff of the Workers and Peasants Red Army" (1929). Interest in research on troop moral-political and psychological training grew noticeably during this period. Journals such as POLITRABOTNIK, VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA, VYSTREL, KRASNAYA PRISYAGA, and VOYENNYY VESTNIK published many articles revealing the methods of preparing soldiers for

active operations, and the ways for eliminating negative manifestations in combat--fear, panic, and so on. The task of peacetime indoctrination of soldiers, the Infantry Combat Regulations stated, was to "develop those moral-political qualities which would insure success in combat (unanimity, enthusiasm, an awareness of the need for winning, alertness, and decisiveness in surmounting all obstacles that may arise)."[6]

Indoctrination practice, which relied upon the Civil War experience and on new forms and methods of personnel training, showed that the political and ideological resources at the disposal of political organs and party organizations play the dominant role in it. Only mastery of Marxism-Leninism can create that ideological platform within the individual's consciousness which could serve as the basis for all of his moral-combat qualities. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. N. Tukhachevskiy wrote in one of his articles about spiritual training that the full proportion of volitional power, boldness, discipline, and energy could be revealed only on the basis of a study of Marxism-Leninism.[7]

From the first days of the armed forces' creation, our party developed and improved the system for thoroughly preparing the personnel for armed defense of the socialist fatherland. The Great Patriotic War and the postwar decade fully confirmed the validity and vitality of the ideas and premises suggested by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party in this area.

In addition to utilizing the invaluable experience of the past, as it was written down in party and state documents and in military-historical works and studies, army and navy political organs based their practical work of troop moral-political and psychological training on a thorough consideration of the new requirements imposed by modern times.

The capability of the people and army for enduring the hardest trials of modern war and not losing the will to fight and win depends on many factors. In addition to the dominant ones--social, economic, and ideological, much influence is exerted upon the spiritual strengths of the people by the successess (or defeats), by the combat experience of the personnel, by the quality of the equipment and weapons, by the maturity of the command, and by resistance to ideological sabotage and "psychological warfare." It is also important to account for the exponential growth of the moral-psychological influence of modern war upon the fighting spirit of soldiers; this is why the personnel must be prepared for its severe trials beforehand--that is, today, right now. A surprise attack by an aggressor possessing the most sophisticated weapons may deal a severe "moral blow" to the minds of the personnel. Therefore they must be tempered and trained beforehand, and high spiritual mobilization and moral endurance, as well as the capability for overcoming moral setbacks and for acting confidently and resolutely in combat, must be developed in each soldier.

Today, even when the troops do not come into direct contact with the enemy, the danger of the latter's influence upon any point and upon any region is

not precluded. This situation may produce long-lasting nervous tension. It would be important for commanders and political workers to find the ways to release psychological tension. This may be done by distracting the personnel from anxious thoughts by encouraging them to participate in active combat preparations, checking the readiness of the equipment and weapons, and so on. Emboldening, encouraging words, and the confident behavior of commanders, political workers, and communists in the most complex situations mean a great deal.

The fact that the loads imposed upon the mind by combat operations will be extremely large is another unique feature of the moral-psychological influence of modern war upon the personnel. Swift changes in the situation, the fluidity of events, and constant danger will require high endurance and cool-headedness. We should add to this that in modern combat, actions by individual subunits and detachments apart from staff and from the main forces, and sometimes without adequate information and communication, will become frequent phenomena. The possibilities of various sorts of chance occurrences, numerous conflicting tendencies in the course of combat, and the threats of radioactive, bacteriological, and chemical injury will grow dramatically. All of this makes it necessary for the soldiers to display exceptional steadfastness, and the capability for enduring long-term moral-psychological loads.

They must also be morally ready for possible use of fundamentally new types of weapons by the enemy. The experience of past wars teaches us that surprise use of previously unknown weapons always has an intense psychological influence upon the enemy. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. I. Yeremenko recalls the first time rockets were used in July 1941 at Rudnya: "The frequent and powerful explosions astounded the hearing and vision with the intense thunder and blinding flashes. The effect of simultaneous explosion of 320 rockets in 10 seconds surpassed all expectations. Enemy soldiers retreated in panic. Even our soldiers at the forward edge near the explosions fell back...."[8] In modern war, a similar influence upon the minds of the personnel may be significantly more intensive. This is why it is important to predict the moral consequences of the most unexpected situations possible in the course of armed conflict.

Reading Napolean's book "Thoughts," V. I. Lenin noted down one of the passages of interest to him: "...in each engagement there comes a time when the bravest soldiers, following extreme stress, feel the desire to run; this panic is generated by an absence of faith in one's courage; a negligible incident, any sort of excuse is sufficient to return this faith: There is great art in creating such incidents."[9] The historical experience we have at our disposal demonstrates that "faith in one's courage" may be returned to soldiers through the personal example of a communist, and through the capability commanders and military leaders have for taking hold of the situation in the most critical moment and infusing the personnel with an unshakeable resolve to complete their mission. A sharp jolt from without--the confident behavior of a commander, a firm command, personal example--

would be necessary to free some soldiers from the temporary confusion they may possibly experience. The goal of this energetic influence by commanders and political workers is to make every crewmember, crew, and subunit ready in will, thoughts, and spirit for continuous performance of one's responsibilities, military duty, and the mission. Speaking in V. I. Lenin's words, we must not allow ourselves to become demoralized and disorganized in a highly complex situation; we must continue to evaluate the situation soberly, and maintain our readiness to act and our firmness of spirit.[10]

It is important for every soldier to possess sufficient experience in moral-psychological control over his own behavior, and to know how to suppress or block some feelings (fear, confusion) and strengthen others (hatred of the army, the sense of military honor, aggressiveness in combat, and so on). A special role belongs in this to commanders and political workers, who can dependably control the morale of the people by various means of influence.

Control of morale presupposes a good knowledge of the moods, opinions, and strong and weak sides of the people, and the ability to influence their consciousness, such that they would be dominated by feelings of unshakeable confidence, calmness and optimism, and the resolve to enter into the most savage fight, and to win over the enemy. Control of spiritual processes also means prompt revelation and elimination of negative manifestations in the moral-psychological state of the personnel.

II. Essence and Content of Moral-Political and Psychological Training

We know that moral-political and psychological training involves purposeful formation of the steadfastness of the soldiers, and of their constant readiness to endure the most severe trials of modern war without losing the will to fight and win. Moral-political and psychological training is provided within the system of political and combat training, and military indoctrination, through an integrated package of ideological, moral, and organizational measures, through which the soldiers develop qualities such as bravery, steadfastness, valor, preparedness for self-sacrifice, and others. This is what makes up the principal content of troop indoctrination and serves as its "backbone", promoting preparation of the personnel for that which they will need in war.

The measures of troop moral-political and psychological training are implemented on the basis of a number of fundamental principles, among which we should emphasize: a communist orientation; a unity of ideological and psychological influences; maximum utilization of the achievements of science.

A communist orientation in moral-political and psychological training means expression of a class and political content. The requirements of this principle stem from the need for developing communist convictions in the soldiers, and for their realization of their patriotic, international duty to protect the fatherland and the entire socialist fraternity against the

transgressions of all aggressors, on the basis of a deep realization of the essence of a possible war, and its class content, goals, and consequences. The significance of communist conviction cannot be overstated. "Conviction in the justice of war," V. I. Lenin emphasized, "and the conscious need for sacrificing one's life for the good of one's brother raises the spirit of the soldiers and compels them to endure unheard-of trials."[11]

Political training, ideological preparation of the soldiers is the central element of moral-political and psychological training. After all, only a communist outlook and high ideological maturity can modify and neutralize the instinct of self-preservation, and force the individual, at a critical moment, to "cross the threshold of the impossible, to fully subordinate his thoughts, feelings, and will to one goal--fulfillment of one's military duty. Communist conviction reveals itself in many ways in Soviet soldiers: as deep devotion to the socialist motherland; as social activity (as a person who seems to have the energy to do everything); as high moral responsibility (as, for example, when pledges adopted by a crew or subunit are taken as one's own). High ideological conviction means constant faithfulness to social and military duty. As with military duty, the strength it bears permits the soldier to endure daily trials that may sometimes seem more difficult to the individual than short-term tests in extremely complex conditions.

A communist orientation in troop moral-political and psychological training also makes it possible to successfully withstand the enemy's spiritual sabotage and his psychological pressure in peacetime and in the course of combat activities. Without a doubt the struggle between ideas, which has assumed such tremendous scope today, will become even more savage in wartime. Much attention is devoted by imperialist armies to this side of "psychological warfare". A book by Nord, a bourgeois specialist in subversive psychological activities, confirms that in combat conditions, "misinformation may become the decisive weapon of intellectual action, a terrible means of aggression against the human reason, capable of predetermining the success or failure of a battle and a war."[12] Utilizing all of the numerous resources of "psychological warfare" at their disposal--misinformation, lies, slander, rumors, provocations--imperialist propaganda organs will try to undermine the fighting spirit of the soldiers in socialist armies, and infuse them with a lack of confidence and a sense of confusion. However, these attempts would be fated to failure. The historical analogs in our past political and combat experience as well as today's concrete results of ideological indoctrination confirm that communist conviction and the ideological steadfastness of each Soviet soldier are the best means of fighting the enemy's ideological and psychological sabotage.

Unity of ideological and psychological influences in troop moral-political and psychological training is an expression of the basic practical approach to concrete solution of the problem. This principle is expressed most fully in drills conducted in conditions as close to real combat as possible--in exercises, during cruises, flights, and gunnery practices, and in missile launchings. In such situations, soldiers receive a possibility for materializing

their realized duty, responsibility, honor, and courage. During practical field exercises, commanders, staff, and political organs carry out a twofold task: They develop and reinforce the necessary moral-combat qualities, and they reveal concrete weaknesses in individual soldiers (sluggishness, indecisiveness, low aggressiveness, and so on), which could be eliminated by raising the individual's awareness, and by subjecting him to specially selected exercises. In exercises, experience shows that it would be suitable to create situations carrying a certain element of risk. But this risk must be controlled by the commander in all cases. Parachute jumps, actions at night and in bad weather, and introduction of "emergency" situations in trainers all prepare the soldier for "moral overloads". The soldier gradually becomes accustomed to the sense of danger as a necessary, unavoidable element of combat which, should war arise, would no longer be something completely unexplored and new. The entire system of political, combat, and special training is aimed at making the personnel of the army and navy ready to surmount such trials. Soviet soldiers have demonstrated this many times on the battlefield in defense of the socialist fatherland.

Today's generation of the motherland's defenders is preserving and multiplying this invaluable legacy. Bourgeois military theorists are compelled to recognize this fact as well. Thus the West German author F. Viner notes in his book "Soldiers of the Eastern Bloc": The way of thinking of the Soviet soldier is such that collectivism, discipline, and faithfulness to communist ideals and traditions define all of his behavior. In combat, therefore, such a soldier finds it easier to endure a situation of mortal danger. Many other statements by bourgeois specialists also contain high evaluations of the quality of the "human material" making up the socialist armies. Firm communist conviction combined with occupational proficiency and combat skill will suppress all of the possible negative manifestations of the human mind, and insure conscious, courageous, and decisive action by the personnel on the battlefield, until the enemy's total defeat.

Successful moral-political and psychological training would be impossible without broad and deep invasion of science into this process. This is why, speaking in V. I. Lenin's words, we must constantly see that "science would truly pervade into the warp and woof, transforming into an inherent component"[13] of our daily activities in troop training and indoctrination. The achievements of science are used to create conditions as close to those of real battle as possible; to check the effectiveness of certain resources of indoctrination upon the consciousness and will of the people; to improve the occupational selection system; to analyze what is possible in modern war, and so on.

"Familiarizing" the personnel to the greatest extent possible with what may happen in war is an important task in moral-political and psychological training. The purpose of such familiarization is to make sure that the individual would not be caught completely by surprise by the trials of war in a critical moment. It has long been known that arbitrariness does significant harm to troop training. To keep its level low in training practice,

we continue to use techniques tested by previous combat experience: competent simulation of a combat situation, subjection of the personnel to direct tank attacks, firing over the heads of friendly troops, actions in an emergency situation, and so on. But even this is no longer enough today. The present level of scientific and technological development permits us to impart a fuller understanding of the possible conditions of modern combat, particularly the sharp changes in the situation, elements of the unknown, and physical overloads, and it allows us to test (together with other methods) the moral-psychological preparedness of the soldiers for battle, and to help them develop and strengthen this readiness.

Whether or not the troops can be constantly maintained combat ready depends in many ways on the efficiency and dependability with which soldiers of different specialties work, especially those dealing with sophisticated equipment. The important functions they perform are sometimes monotonous and tiring, requiring the individual to display extreme attention, and the ability to concentrate himself completely. An important problem arises--the individual must know how to surmount fatigue in all of its manifestations; full coordination must be achieved among all crewmembers, as must broad mutual exchangeability. Technology basically imposes identical requirements upon each member of the combat collective (the same work rhythm, rate, load, and so on), but the type of nervous system, psychological properties, moral traits, and thinking of the people differ. This is why it is very important to achieve full moral-psychological compatibility of crewmembers, silent understanding of each other, a knowledge of the strong and weak sides of each person, and so on. Efforts aimed at unifying military collectives, at creating an atmosphere of comradeship, mutual exactingness, support, and benevolence have inestimable value to moral-psychological training in this sense. Thus improving the moral relationship within the subunits is one of the most important prerequisites of the wholeness and unity of the personnel, and their capability for completing the most complex missions of modern combat. The moral principles of each member of the collective depend on the moral strength of the collective.

Thus maintaining the capability for working error-free for a long time is a problem of the individual's moral-psychological dependability. In turn, this problem is associated with factors such as time, information, the number of sources of the latter, how critical the situation is, the interference present, and so on. Therefore many commanders usually create "unforeseen" situations, "unexpected difficulties," and "critical" moments in exercises, surmounting of which promotes development of independence, decisiveness, and initiative in the personnel.

These unique features, which have their roots in the new phase of development of military affairs, naturally impose even higher requirements on the soldiers, and on the quality of their moral-political training. In addition to other sciences, military engineering psychology, which can raise the dependability of the man-machine system by "adapting" machines and equipment to man, can offer a great deal here. After all, even supposedly little things such as cabin illumination and color, temperature, and noise influence

the results of labor. But further improvement of the occupational proficiency of the soldiers and the effectiveness of their actions would be possible only if professionalism is multiplied by high responsibilty, self-discipline, and courage. Therefore formation of these moral strengths is inseparable from constant improvement of military technical competence, which is what is strengthened to a significant degree in moral-political and psychological training.

III. Some Problems Concerning Improvement of Moral-Political and Psychological Training

As was stated above, Marxist-Leninist officer training and political lessons for warrant officers, enlisted men, and sergeants are the central component of moral-political and psychological training. Mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory helps to shape a scientific outlook in the people, and to arm them with the most accurate class compass, permitting them to think and act correctly.

Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, proceedings of the CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the party's decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" reveal new broad possibilities for upgrading the quality of personnel political training, and nurturing the individual in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, and intolerability of class enemies. Fulfilling the requirements of this decree and the tasks posed by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, recently the army and navy commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations attained new successes in ideological and moral training of Soviet soldiers. Interest in Marxist-Leninist theory and in the pressing problems of military developmenthas risen, and moral issues are becoming more and more a part of socialist competition. New possibilities for raising the ideological-political level of the soldiers have appeared in connection with universal introduction of the Unified Political Day. Efforts aimed at indoctrinating the personnel in the spirit of intolerability of imperialism and all enemies of socialism have grown noticeably more active. Better use is being made of combat traditions and the historical experience of combat in the defense of socialist achievements. All of this is going a long way to promote better quality of troop moral-political and psychological training. The high competence of commanders, the efficient work of staffs, and the mobilizing role of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in this matter are creating the decisive prerequisites for insuring success in combat and political training. The main thing to which attention is being turned and upon which the main efforts are being concentrated is development of ideological conviction in Soviet soldiers and limitless devotion to the motherland, party, and people, since the foundation of the moral strength of troops and naval forces lies in deep adherence to Marxism-Leninism, and to the ideals of communism; it is in this that our indisputable superiority over all potential aggressors lies.

One of the most important prerequisites of better moral-political and psychological training is firm observance of army life as it is today, of military traditions, and of customs. Scientifically grounded, strict regulation of troop activities imparts punctuality, diligence, and composure to the personnel, and teaches them to value time. The regular rhythm of army days is occasionally interrupted by surprise missions and the most diverse input followed by marches, gunnery practices, missile launchings, and so on. It is only in this way that we can make the soldiers ready for a swift transition from peacetime to combat conditions.

Examining other aspects of moral-political and psychological training, we should note that in field exercises, it would be suitable to perform the tasks of tactical and moral-psychological training in integration. For example when soldiers must cross a water obstacle, it would make sense for the officers to make a special effort to reveal the degree of courage and decisiveness exhibited by subordinates, determine the level of their moral endurance and their initiative, and so on. During exercise critiques, it would be suitable to evaluate actions not only from the tactical side but also from the moral-psychological point of view (did the soldier complete his task independently, did he vacillate, did he do his work cooly or feverishly, how did he react to sudden changes in the situation, and how did he act in complex conditions, in a time deficit, in the presence of a high emotional load, and when highly tired?). As a result the commander might gain a fuller impression of how capable a particular soldier is, what his weak and strong sides are, and what should be given special attention in subsequent training. Sometimes it still happens that a driver, a radio operator, a wind graph operator, or a dosimetrist does excellent work in the classroom in a calm situation, and is said to be a master of his specialty, but we do not always check to see how he would operate in complex conditions.

Thus personnel moral-political and psychological training proceeds in all drills, as well as in special measures implemented during combat training, and in all day-to-day service. The entire process of communist troop indoctrination, and its most important aspect--moral-political and psychological training--promotes formation of the citizen soldier, the soldier-patriot, the soldier-internationalist. The central quality in his social countenance is communist conviction, which is the basis for development of many other moral-combat qualities in the soldiers, ones having special importance to combat. Let us examine some of them.

Let us look at the serviceman's acuity and flexibility of thinking. Today, both the commander and the soldier must instantaneously perceive the most diverse information, evaluate it accurately, and make the right decisions. To do so, it would be important to have facility with particular techniques and methods of dialectic thinking, which is founded on sound knowledge and exercise of the mind. It reinforces the soldier's spiritual strength, and it permits him to evaluate occurring events with maximum speed, foresee possible events, and make an optimum decision in the most complex situation. Persons devoid of such thinking try to keep their thoughts from meeting

"obstacles", attempting to utilize ready-made decisions and learned stereotypic patterns in all cases. But the high moral-psychological load of modern combat may paralyze the conservative mind. This has been confirmed by the many centuries of war history. If we are to achieve flexible thinking, we must create situations offering possibilities for making many different decisions in relation to different tactical and other missions, decisions which would be best made at maximum speed.

Modern combat demands daringly decisive actions, and the capability for making a suitable decision independently, without vacillation in all situations, and implementing it. Negative moral traits such as fear of responsibility, lack of confidence in one's strengths, and doubts are the enemies of decisiveness. People with such qualities usually make their decisions late, and thus they fail to make full use of their knowledge, experience, and the possibilities of the combat equipment. Decisiveness may be developed only when the soldier meets difficulties and dangers head-on, and when he knows how to surmount them.

Another quality that is no less important is moral-psychological "endurance", which we define as the individual's capability for withstanding lengthy physical and psychological loads and moral perturbations without losing the will to win. As long as the nerves hold out, the individual is able to endure physical pain and fatigue, and he is able to suppress his fear. His legs may be turning to lead, but the soldier does not leave his post, and it may be difficult to breathe, but he does not tear his gas mask away from his face. These are manifestations of not so much physical as moral endurance. The appropriate lengthy exercises and drills have important significance to developing this quality.

The combined-arms battle imposes new, higher requirements on discipline and self-discipline, which are among the most important characteristics of the moral strength of the troops. High ideological conviction permits the soldier to perform his responsibilities not only as a response to compulsion and orders but also as a will of his reason and his heart. Self-discipline is the soldier's capability for controlling his own behavior and his own actions. As with other qualities, these are shaped in the personnel throughout all of their service.

Despite the tendencies toward relaxation, the modern international situation is complex and contradictory. Imperialism and its Maoist accomplices have not abandoned their practice of achieving their goals from a position of strength, and through military threats and provocations. This is why improvement of troop moral-political and psychological training has such tremendous ideological and practical significance. The spiritual readiness and the capability of the troops for protecting socialism against all aggressors is one of the most important components of the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces, insuring favorable external conditions for successful development of socialism and communism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 83.

2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 121.

3. See "Knizhka krasnoarmeytsa" [Red Army Soldier's Booklet], Moscow, 1918.

4. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 63.

5. See "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh...", Vol 2, p 367.

6. "Boyevoy ustav pekhoty RKKA" [Workers and Peasants Red Army Infantry Combat Regulations], Part 2, Moscow, Izd-vo Voyennyy vestnik, 1927, Article 273.

7. See Tukhachevskiy, M. N., "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 1, Voyenizdat, 1974, p 101.

8. Yeremenko, A. I., "V nachale voyny" [At the Start of the War], Moscow, Izd-vo Nauka, 1964, p 227.

9. "Leninskiy sbornik XXI" [Lenin Anthology XII], Izd. Instituta Lenina pri TSK VKP(b), Moscow, Leningrad, 1930, p 383.

10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 229.

11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, p 121.

12. Nord, P., "L'intoxication--arme absolue de la guerre subversive," Paris, 1978, p 6.

13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 45, p 391.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

WARTIME OPERATIONS: TROOP CONTROL DURING REGROUPING

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 13-19

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Candidate of Military Sciences Maj Gen L. Korzun: "Some Aspects of Troop Control During Regrouping in the Third Period of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL began a discussion of an important problem of the art of war with an article by Lieutenant Colonel N. M. Ramanichev, "From the Experience of Army Regrouping During Preparation for the Berlin Operation."[1] Developing the premises suggested in the article, it would be suitable to dwell in greater detail on troop control during preparation for and in the course of troop regrouping, using the third period of the Great Patriotic War as the basis, in order to reveal those traits which continue to be significant in modern conditions.

As the Great Patriotic War showed, troop control during regrouping entailed an entire complex of measures implemented with the goal of insuring prompt arrival of men and equipment in their appointed areas in full combat readiness. Such regroupings were conducted by commanders, staffs, and political and other control organs. Organization of regrouping entailed development of the most suitable concept, planning of forthcoming actions, announcement of the mission to subordinated troops, and organization of the coordination and control of all forms of support. Continuity of control was insured during a regrouping by: constant awareness of the situation; prompt adoption or refinement of decisions, and prompt announcement of the missions to the subordinates; presence of uninterrupted communication with subordinates, with interacting troops, and with the senior commander (chief); competent and prompt redeployment of control posts. Control over the accuracy with which orders (instructions) were fulfilled was an inseparable part of troop control.

Serious attention was turned to the importance of organizing the march (movement) of troops back in the prewar regulations. Thus Article 676 of the 1940 Field Regulations stated: "Success of the march depends on the ability of the commanders and staff to organize and support the march, and on the degree of involvement of the troops. A meticulously conceived and artfullyorganized march is one of the most important responsibilities of

commanders and staffs. Arrival of the troops on time, in the appointed area and in full readiness for combat, must be insured."

Unfortunately the directives on how to organize the march were extremely general in nature in those days. The regulations examined organization of movement in column ("march" in the terminology of that time) and the planning of motor vehicle and rail travel on their own, essentially separate from one another. The operational regroupings performed in the Great Patriotic War meanwhile, especially in its third period, were combined as a rule--that is, some of the personnel moved on foot, while others traveled in motor vehicles, and heavy equipment and armament was often shipped by rail. Naturally under these conditions the requirements on regrouping organization, to include planning, on the methods used in the work of commanders and staffs, and on troop control during advance of the troops to the indicated area increased. The reason for this lay in the fact that the volume and complexity of the measures implemented increased, as did the complexity of setting up the traffic control service and insuring continuous control. The success of regrouping became dependent to a greater degree upon the carefulness and validity of all computations, and on the coordination achieved on command decisions at different levels of authority and in the interacting troops in relation to the use of different forms of transportation. All of this was complicated by the limited quantity of travel routes that could be allocated to the armies, corps, and divisions, especially when large branches of troops had to be regrouped simultaneously. In this connection we can clearly discern a tendency toward constant growth in the degree of centralization of troop control during the operational regroupings of the third period of the war.

The regrouping experience of the second period of the war revealed, in particular, the important role of corps directorates. Because the generals and officers of a number of corps directorates did not have the ability to organize the march, loss of control sometimes resulted.[2] This is precisely why the Supreme High Command General Headquarters demanded in an 18 May 1943 directive that "regrouping be performed as a rule at the level of entire corps."[3] It should be noted that this principle was basically adhered to in the operational regroupings of 1943-1944. A tendency to regroup entire armies as well made its appearance in the concluding operations of the war. Growth in the scale of regroupings necessitated a significant increase in centralization of their control, especially their preparations. Greater centralization of control was also the product of a number of other factors: time restrictions, the complexity of providing full support to operational regroupings, the need for maximum covertness of the preparations and especially their conduct, and so on. Decision making and planning associated with regroupings became even more complex because the work often had to be done in the course of intense combat activities.

Thus the time available to regroup armies varied within the limits of just a few days: The 28th Army was given less than 1.5 days to organize a regrouping from the vicinity of Brest to Mariampol' in September 1944, and 3.5 days to organize a regrouping from the vicinity of Tsinten (south of Konigsberg) to the vicinity of Zagan at the beginning of April 1945.

In the third period of the war, despite reduction of the total time allocated to regrouping preparations, a tendency to leave as much time as possible to subordinated troops for their organizational and preparatory measures became typical. Thus out of 3.5 days allocated to the 65th Army, a day and a half were spent at preparations at army level, and 2 days were allocated to preparations at subordinated levels.[4] On the eve of the Debrecen operation the staff of the 6th Guards Tank Army spent only 4 hours on regrouping organization, leaving the rest of the time to the formation and unit commanders. Experience confirms that when an orientation was assumed beforehand toward the nature of the forthcoming mission, and when preliminary fragmentary orders were issued, owing to which it became possible to plan the forthcoming actions in parallel at different levels of authority, resulted in the most sensible distribution of regrouping organization time. Thus for example the 28th Army performed its regrouping in April 1945 at three levels simultaneously--army, corps, and division.[5] This required the commanders and staff to study the enemy and the terrain within a broad zone, and to maintain a constant awareness of the state and potentials of their troops. It was only in this case that the staff could effectively help commanders to make grounded regrouping decisions quickly, supplying them promptly with the needed computations, grounds, and proposals. Submission of preliminary instructions also made it possible to scout out the routes ahead of time, perform reconnaissance, and prepare the routes as necessary.

As the scale of regroupings increased, the work that had to be done by commanders and staffs to insure maximum covertness of the regrouping preparations and their conduct became more complex. To maintain covertness, only the corps commanders, their deputies, chiefs of staffs, and the chiefs of political and operational sections were acquainted completely with the missions. As an example the staff of the 2d Belorussian Front demanded in its April 1945 regrouping, that the corps commanders set missions for their divisions covering a period not longer than 2 days' march, and the division commanders spell out their objectives for a single day's march.

Other steps were also taken to keep regrouping covert and to deceive the enemy. Troops could be moved only at night. Movement of motor transportation in false directions was intensified. Use of radio equipment was categorically prohibited during regroupings, the prohibition going as far as sealing radio sets shut. The only exception allowed was communication with reconnaissance patrols, and antiaircraft warnings. In this case some of the radio resources continued operating according to the old schedule in the previous areas of deployment. During rail shipments made at the eve of the Belorussian operation, for example, special passwords were established for each day for telephone conversations having to do with train traffic control, and the train chiefs were prohibited from showing their documents even to station military commandants.

The 1942 Red Army Staff Field Service Manual recommended drawing up a number of planning documents when organizing a march: the order for the march, figures in support of the march (taking the form of tables or a graph),

antiaircraft, antitank, and chemical defense instructions, instructions to advance detachments and security organs to move out, traffic control organization instructions, and the table of radio signals. Rail shipments required development of rail traffic data, the general or particular unloading plan, and a travel order, while motor vehicle shipments required a march schedule, a chart explaining formation of the columns of march and traffic control, a combat order, a shipment planning table, a communications plan for the loading, march, and unloading periods, a rear services order, and fragmentary orders on combat and logistical support to motor vehicle shipments. Thus organization of regroupings, especially by a combined method, necessitated an extremely large volume of documents.

Following the experience of operational regroupings, in the third period of the war the emphasis was placed mainly on regrouping plans (graphical or textual) with separate attachments.

Thus in the beginning of January 1945 the 2d Strike Army conducted its regrouping on the basis of a plan taking the form of a table showing the way in which its troops were to reach the forming-up place. The routes of travel for each of 7 days of the regrouping were specified in this table for all divisions, and the time to begin travel, the start point, the day's march in kilometers and hours, the region of concentration, and the time of arrival there were indicated. A map of the regrouping, showing the routes of movement, the forming-up places, the army and corps traffic control points, the areas for the day's halt and concentration after regrouping, and the locations and order of movement of army and corps command posts was attached to the table.[7] The 65th Army wrote out a textual plan when organizing its regrouping at the start of April 1945. This plan spelled out the commander's decision, indicated the task of the corps and army units, and defined the steps to be taken in engineering the logistical support, and in organizing control and communications.

To support regrouping of the 28th Army out of the composition of the 3d Belorussian Front into the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front (April 1945), the army staff developed a plan of the march in the form of a table specifying: the route of travel to be taken by the troops, the march formation, the start points and the time to start, the areas of concentration and the time they were to be occupied, and the fragmentary orders calling for regrouping of army troops.[8]

On the whole, regrouping planning was typified at the end of the war by a tendency toward less written documentation. One of the reports of the 1st Belorussian Front written in 1945 stated: "Written documents associated with regroupings and troop concentrations are to be minimized with the goal of insuring the greatest covertness in preparations for operations. On order of the frontal troop commander, management at all levels was to be based on personal instructions to subordinates, in the volume required by the executors...."[9]

Mention has already been made of the especially important role played by preliminary fragmentary orders which usually indicated: the tentative time to start movement, the direction (route) of movement, the proposed length of the day's march, and the time and method of announcement of the order. Sometimes these instructions suggested measures that would promote a reduction in preparation time.

In order to achieve covertness, as a rule the troops tried to stay away from technical communication resources as a means for bringing orders to the awareness of all levels. The commander or staff executives issued their instructions orally. These missions were backed up by written operation orders (fragmentary orders), which were delivered by signal officers. Commanders and chiefs of staff often summoned their subordinates to higher headquarters, where following a statement by their commander they were acquainted with the operation order and signed a statement indicating that they had seen it; such an order was not sent out subsequently in such a case. This was what was done by the 28th Army during preparation for its regrouping at the end of September 1944.

Sometimes in order to keep the regrouping preparations secret more dependably, a higher level of command did a large part of the planning for subordinate levels. In these cases the mission and all the computations were brought to the awareness of subordinates in the form of excerpts from a regrouping plan, from the appropriate tables and schedules, and from specially prepared maps. The advantage of such planning centralization lay in the possibility of making sensible use of the travel routes, especially when their number was limited (for example during regrouping of the 2d Tank Army in the Korsun'-Shevchenko operation, 4-5 February 1944, and the 3d Guards Tank Army in the L'vov-Sandomierz operation, 22-23 July 1944. This improved the timing with which columns surmounted water obstacles, mountain passes, and so on, and it improved the effectiveness with which the traffic control service and the provost service were organized.

The importance of meticulous planning and of maintaining high accuracy in all computations also stemmed from the extreme complexity of troop control during regrouping itself, including from the point of view of organizing control posts and the communication system.

The system of control posts that had evolved during the war in the major formations and the formations was generally preserved in the regroupings as well. It included main and back-up command posts. One improvement made in this system in the third period of the war was that auxiliary control posts were created as necessary. The staff's (directorate's) back-up echelon performed the functions of a rear control post, in the modern sense of the term. Sometimes it was called the rear echelon or the rear control group. The main control over the regrouping troops was exercised by command posts, at which the commander and the staff were located.

The order of movement of control posts was always made dependent upon the concrete conditions. In many cases army command posts moved in discrete intervals behind the corps of the assault echelon. When regroupings involved relatively small distances (up to 150-200 km), meanwhile, the army command and staff often went straight to the new area of concentration and occupied a command post there, from which they managed the moving troops, organized their reception, and planned the forthcoming offensive operation. Such was the case in the 8th Guards Army during its regrouping to the front line at the beginning of the Lublin-Brest offensive operation from the vicinity of Sarny and Rafalovka, where the army had concentrated after being shipped by rail from the 3d Ukrainian Front in June 1944. When regroupings occurred in the rear of their troops, division commanders and staffs usually traveled at the head of the column of the main forces, while the regimental commanders and staffs traveled at the head of their units.[10]

When troops were shipped by rail, as a rule the army commanders and staffs moved in one of the first trains. The practice of having them fly together with a small operational group to the appointed area of concentration, where a unique forward control post was created, became a new phenomenon of the third period of the war. When the main contingent of the army staff arrived by rail, it deployed itself in the command post.

Army staff operational groups usually performed the role of auxiliary control posts. They managed rail and motor transportation loading, and they were sent out to control posts in the most complex moments of the regrouping and reception of formations (units) in new areas of concentration (at the unloading points when moved by rail). Their role and functions are examined quite thoroughly in N. M. Ramanichev's article. They were used in similar fashion in other regroupings of the third period of the war. Operational groups did a great deal of work, they possessed the necessary authority as a rule, and they played an important role in supporting effective control of the troops during regroupings. Thus the example of the 28th Army's operational group presented in that article should be viewed as an exception. In addition to performing other tasks prior to the arrival of the army commander and staff, this group organized reconnaissance of the new area of concentration and the routes of advance to it from the unloading areas, it planned the forward movement of the corps and army units, and it prepared the fragmentary order drafts. This, as an example, is what was done in that same 28th Army.[11]

In the third period of the war the operational groups formed out of the command post staffs often performed other functions as well. Thus during the regrouping of April 1945, operational groups representing armies of the 2d Belorussian Front advanced ahead of the moving troops, checked all the columns as they marched by, and then moved to points further forward. They maintained telephone communication with the army command posts.[12] This is also evidence of improved organization of troop control during regrouping.

Let me say a few things in passing about the evaluation given to different forms of communication. Sometimes the military-historical literature exaggerates the significance of mobile communication resources and belittles the role of wire communication, the proportion of which was extremely large.

Thus in the regrouping performed by the 2d Strike Army of the 2d Belorussian Front at the beginning of January 1945, each route was outfitted with wire communication, which made it possible to determine the location of every unit at any moment.[13] Before the 2d Belorussian Front began its regrouping in April 1945, two wire communication arteries were set up through frontal resources along the zone of advance of the regrouping armies. These arteries were joined together by lateral lines at points where the army operational groups and command posts were to halt.[14] Telephone communication down to regimental command level inclusively was deployed as a rule in the XLVII Rifle Corps, 70th Army in areas of major day and night halts.[15]

Army commanders, their deputies, formation commanders, and the chiefs of staffs, arms and services, and special troops often traveled directly to the routes, to the areas of day and night halts, so as to personally check the promptness and covertness of movement and disposition of the troops, to evaluate their state, and to provide the necessary assistance in the course of regroupings. Special visual signals were arranged and signal observers were appointed in order to maintain control within columns of subunits.

The experience of the third period showed that as the regroupings became more complex, the role of the provost service, which was organized right away for the entire depth of the regrouping, or in stages, increased. Marches were controlled usually from tactically important lines. These lines were designated and the times of their passage were determined during the regrouping planning. A commandant was appointed to each route. In some cases, for example in the 2d Strike Army in January 1945, an army commandant was appointed for the entire regrouping area. He was a deputy commander.

The routes were broken down into commandant sections up to 50-60 km long, and sometimes more. Major road junctions, cities that could not be detoured, crossings over large water obstacles, mountain passes, and so on were treated as separate commandant sections. Traffic control posts were set up at turns in roads, intersections, and bridges. They were headed by officers in the most critical places. Transportation and personnel were allocated to the route and section commandants. However, because the corps and divisions did not possess organic traffic control subunits, organization of the provost service was extremely complex.

Various sorts of signs, signposts, and symbols were extensively used to control traffic in the third period of the war. Organization of traffic control was doubtlessly responsible in many ways for the greater effectiveness of troop control during regroupings. At the same time the experience of the regroupings persuasively demonstrated the need for

commanders and staff officers having the ability to lead the columns on the basis of a map both day and night, which is especially important in modern conditions.

Experience of the past war provided a number of examples where in view of changes in the situation, the direction of troop movement had to be changed drastically during operational regroupings. This was especially typical of tank and mechanized formations and major formations. The direction of travel had to be changed during regroupings of the III and XVI Tank Corps and the 2d Tank Army in the Korsun'-Shevchenko operation, 2-4 February; the IX Mechanized Corps, 3d Guards Tank Army in the L'vov-Sandomierz operation, 28-30 July; the III Guards and XXIX Tank corps, 5th Guards Tank Army, 28-30 September 1944; the VIII Guards Mechanized Corps, 1st Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder operation, 3-4 February 1945, and so on. Missions were completed successfully in such conditions owing to prediction, by commanders with adequate lead time, of the probable development of the strategic situation, through study of the enemy and terrain within a broad zone, due to presence of a necessary reserve of reconnaissance and communications forces and resources, maintenance of continuous, dependable control during regrouping, and so on.

Despite fundamental changes in the nature and content of combat activities, including in the preparations for and conduct of operational regroupings and in equipment availability and troop organization, much of the invaluable experience of the Great Patriotic War is still significant in modern conditions. CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov emphasizes: "It is only on the basis of a thorough analysis of the mutual relationship between events of the past and present that we can establish dialectic continuity in military affairs, and on this basis creatively improve them, raising them to a new qualitative level."[16] This is why meticulous analysis and thorough disucssion of different aspects of operational regroupings in the Great Patriotic War, including the problems of control, has important theoretical and practical significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1979, pp 9-16.

2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 5871, op. 6681, d. 4, ll. 186-187.

3. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1976, p 60.

4. "Armeyskiye operatsii. (Primery iz opyta Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny)" [Army Operations. (Examples From the Experience of the Great Patriotic War)], Voyenizdat, 1977, p 243.

5. Ibid., p 246.

7. "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of War Documents of the Great Patriotic War], Issue 29, Voyenizdat, 1956, pp 98-112.

8. "Armeyskiye operatsii," pp 241, 245.

9. TsAMO, f. 233, op. 208493, d. 1, l. 132.

10. "Sbornik boyevkykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny," Issue 29, p 174.

11. "Armeyskiye operatsii," p 246.

12. TsAMO, f. 237, op. 32286, d. 1, ll. 41-54.

13. Ibid., op. 31398, d. 60, ll. 15-16.

14. "Armeyskiye operatsii," p 243.

15. "Sbornik voyenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Military-Historical Materials of the Great Patriotic War], Issue 7, Voyenizdat, 1952, p 108.

16. Ustinov, D. F., "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 389.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

WARTIME OPERATIONS: IMPROVING CONTROL OF NAVAL FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 20-26

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by HSU Flt Adm G. Yegorov: "Improving Control of Naval Forces in the Second and Third Periods of the War*"]

[Text] Control of naval forces continued to improve at all levels--strategic, operational, and tactical--in the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War.

As in the first period of the war, strategic leadership was exercised over the navy via directives from the Hq SHC [Supreme High Command Headquarters], and through its representatives. There was also the practice of summoning fleet commanders to Headquarters.

One of the decisive factors that made it possible to raise control of the navy to a new level was the transfer of strategic initiative into the hands of the Soviet command.

In the second period the fleets remained operationally subordinated to the commanders of the maritime fronts, who posed missions to them in accordance with directives from Headquarters. When the fleets were to conduct separate offensive operations, their missions were also spelled out in Headquarters directives themselves.

Conditions permitting offensive operations in the Northern Caucasus were prepared on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front by as early as the second period; the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla participated. Together with their refinements made by Headquarters, the plans for these operations had already been written up by the first days of January 1943, which made it possible to prepare the forces early.[1]

---

* See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1979, pp 24-31 for a discussion of experience in controlling naval forces during the first period of the war. [Translation published in JPRS 73874, 20 Jul 79, pp 35-44].

Clear coordination between the army and navy was achieved in the strategic offensive operation. Thus the plan for the breakthrough operation in the Crimea, which Headquarters liaison officer Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy reported to Headquarters on 22 September 1943, required the navy to assist our army's penetration into the enemy's rear and to interdict the ground and sea lines of communication. The troops were also given the mission of capturing Skadovsk and Tendrovskaya Spit sooner than planned before, so that naval forces could be redeployed closer to the area of operations.[2] On 4 November 1943 the Headquarters gave the navy the mission of making preparations to foil the enemy's evacuation from the Crimean Peninsula. The plan called for using aviation, submarines, and torpedo boats.[3] All of this made it possible to prepare ahead of time for joint actions together with the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Maritime Army in the Crimean operation.

Reconstitution of the naval flotillas (Dniepr, Danube), which were formed to support the advancing troops, can serve as an example of preplanning.

In the second period of the war the fleet on the Baltic, which was operationally subordinated to the Leningrad Front, covered the approaches to Leningrad from the sea, and the flanks of the ground troops. One of the first frontal offensive operations in which the fleet and the Ladoga Naval Flotilla participated was the operation to penetrate the Leningrad Blockade (12-30 January 1943). Special attention was turned in this case to the use naval artillery. It was controlled by the fleet commander through the artillery chief.[4] In September 1943 the Headquarters placed a significant part of the naval artillery into the front's counterbattery artillery corps. Such centralization was a further step in improving artillery control in behalf of defense, and then in relieving the blockade of Leningrad.[5]

In the second and third periods the Northern Fleet performed independent missions predominantly, implementing the State Defense Committee's decision to support externaland Arctic lines of communication. The organization of command and control remainedthe same as in the first period. A well-ordered system of coordination with the English Navy in joint escort of convoys and in strikes against enemy ships and aviation continued to operate.[6] When the strategic initiative passed to the Soviet Armed Forces the fleet's main efforts were directed at interdicting the enemy's sea lines of communication, protecting friendly lines of communication, and landing the naval assault parties.

The navy's extensive participation in strategic missions necessitated further improvement of naval control at the top level. On 9 December 1943 Peoples Commissar of the Navy Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov submitted proposals to the Supreme Commander in Chief to improve leadership of the fleets. He laid special emphasis on the need for informing the fleets and the Main Naval Headquarters about forthcoming operations beforehand.[7] The Headquarters' decision on this question was spelled out in one of its directives published in March 1944. A centralized system of fleet subordination to the

Peoples Commissar of the Navy, who now became the concurrent commander in chief of the navy, was introduced. The steps taken were an important factor in improving control of the navy in the concluding stage of the war. Setting missions for the fleets for the duration of a campaign became the most important element of control. Thus directives spelling out the mission and prospects for participation of naval forces in the operations of 1944 were sent to the Northern, Red Banner Baltic, and Black Sea fleets as well as to the Ladoga Naval Flotilla.

The Headquarters directives had a positive effect on organization of fleet control on the strategic scale. The Peoples Commissar of the Navy, who in February 1945 was once again made a member of the Headquarters staff as commander in chief of the navy, was afforded more independence. This facilitated more-purposeful use of naval forces. Problems concerning joint actions of ground troops and fleets began to be reflected in documents of the Headquarters and the front with greater completeness. The General Staff made sure that the fleet control would be in line with the new system of organization. Thus it directed the commander of the Leningrad Front to amend the frontal directives, which set missions for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet that were in conflict with the Hq SHC directive, and to report its ideas about the fleet's use to the commander in chief of the navy.[8] Subsequently the Headquarters spelled out the subordination of fleets, flotillas, and some naval formations more specifically. For example on 14 April 1944 the Headquarters operationally subordinated the Onega Flotilla to the Karelian Front. In this case, however, the front was ordered to set the missions to the flotilla with adequate lead time. Through its liaison officer Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, who coordinated the actions of the 1st and 2d Baltic and the 3d Belorussian fronts, in October the Headquarters directed the Baltic Fleet to use aviation and submarines in the operation to destroy enemy troops surrounded northeast of Libava and Memel' (Liyepaya, Klaypeda). And at the end of November, considering that interdicting enemy sea traffic in the central and southern Baltic had become the fleet's main independent mission,[9] the Headquarters took the Red Banner Baltic Fleet out of operational subordination to the Leningrad Front and subordinated it directly to the Peoples Commissar of the Navy so that the fleet could execute missions set by the Headquarters liaison officer--interdicting the sea lines of communication of Germans pressed against the coast.

In all strategic offensive operations of the third period of war in which naval forces participated[10], the navy's missions were thoroughly examined by the General Staff, the commander in chief of the navy, and the Main Naval Headquarters, and they were approved by the Hq SHC.

The Hq SHC and the front dealt with the problems of using the fleets in joint actions together with ground troops in their own directives concerning a number of operations, for example, the actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to destroy the enemy grouping on Syrva Peninsula.

On the whole strategic leadership of the fleets was exercised in the second and third periods of the war on the basis of the experience of the first period, and it was oriented at comprehensive utilization of the combat capabilities of the fleets in the execution of missions jointly with other branches of the armed forces, and independent missions. This was promoted by greater centralization, determination of missions for entire campaigns and operations with adequate lead time, and formation of naval flotillas, which took part in strategic missions.

Control at the operational level, which was based on the strategic objectives, concerned itself with the navy's missions of cooperating with the ground troops and conducting independent operations. This control was achieved through timely and purposeful planning of operations, preparation of forces, and organization of their coordination. In the second and third periods of the war naval control climbed to a new level. The naval commander in chief, the Main Naval Headquarters, and the fleet commanders devoted constant attention to improving this control. The scientific activity of the Naval Academy and of a special section of the Main Naval Headquarters responsible for studying the war experience was oriented upon this problem. Problems associated with control were analyzed at meetings and scientific conferences attended by naval and fleet executives, and they were generalized in directives published by the naval commander in chief and the Main Naval Headquarters,[11] which doubtlessly promoted improvement of the work of the command and staffs.

Organizational measures promoted improvements in control: creation of new naval bases and restoration of previously operating ones (Pechenga, Libava, Pillau, Sevastopol', Odessa, Ochakov, and others), creation of naval defense areas (Kola, White Sea, Kronshtadt, Tallin, Riga, Crimean, Caucasian, and others), and deployment of auxiliary command posts.[12] This brought the control organs closer to the areas of combat activity, and it raised the efficiency and flexibility of control.

Problems associated with control in operations were considered in the plans of operational and combat training for fleet major formations and formations. Special attention was turned to maintaining purpose in missions, to correctly determining the place of the commander and his staff in operations, and to organizing the work of subordinated staffs.

Implementation of a number of manuals on independent operations by naval forces and joint actions together with ground troops played a significant role in the improvement of control. As an example we can cite the "Manual on Joint Actions of the Ground Troops and the Navy and Naval River Flotillas" written by the General Staff and the Main Naval Headquarters at the beginning of the second period of the war. It thoroughly regulated the organization, forms, and methods of control in joint actions, especially in assault landing operations, it completely clarified problems associated with control in all phases of assault landing operations, and it had a favorable effect on their successful conduct.

Significant changes occurred in control over the submarine forces of the fleets.[13] In the first period of the war all operational issues concerning the use of submarines were wholly within the competency of military councils and the headquarters of the fleets. The fleet commanders assigned missions to them, filled positions, and controlled them by radio at sea; in a number of cases they even controlled them at the tactical level. As experience accumulated and the missions of the fleets broadened, it became necessary and possible to delegate a significant part of submarine control to the command and staffs of the submarine formations. The navy's submarine directorate, which began publishing its own bulletin, and the submarine sections created in the fleets at the start of 1943, the activities of which were analyzed by the Main Naval Headquarters, played a significant role in improving control over submarine formations and antisubmarine forces. Instructions on improving their work were published in directives of the Peoples Commissar of the Navy.[14]

Let us examine the improvements made in submarine control using the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet as the example, since the conditions in which this fleet's submarines had to operate were the most complex. In summer 1943 the enemy managed to destroy several of our submarines on his antisubmarine lines, and so we had to abandon their use on the open sea. But as soon as Finland was pushed out of the war by blows from the Soviet troops, a brigade of submarines rebased itself at Helsinki, Hango, and Turku, and in late September 1944 Baltic submarines rejoined the fight against the enemy's lines of communication. The fleet's military council took charge of the missions of the submarines, and it set missions of the commander of the submarine brigade[15], who wrote up all of the documents for the operation and controlled submarines at sea from a command post deployed on a floating base in Helsinki. By this time some of the submarines of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, and of other fleets, were equipped with antennas permitting them to maintain communication from periscope depth not only with the coast (floating base) but also with airplanes. Communication also improved owing to provision of higher-power radio transmitters to the fleets.[16] The effectiveness of control increased in the campaign of 1945, when a brigade remote control post was created in Palanga under the fleet's air force remote control post.[17] On the whole, the organization of submarine control promoted greater effectiveness of submarine actions.

Creation of mixed air divisions was an important step in improving control over naval air forces in actions against Baltic and Black Sea lines of communication, where since the beginning of 1943 this mission was one of the main ones. This made it possible to concentrate control and communication organs at a single command post. While directing the main efforts of aviation toward missions at sea, the fleets did use their aviation (especially strategic) in coordination with frontal aviation to support ground troops. In a number of cases special air groups controlled by fleet air commands were created, or naval air formations were transferred together with their staffs to major ground formations. In order to bring fleet aviation closer to areas of combat activities, remote control posts were created

and air units were redeployed at new airfields: the Black Sea Fleet--in Northern Tauria, and then in the Crimea; the Red Banner Baltic Fleet--in the vicinity of Panevezhis and Palanga, and Pyarna; the Northern Fleet--on Sredniy Peninsula.

Adequate attention was devoted to improving control over naval forces supporting our sea lines of communication. In order that military and national economic shipments of operational and strategic significance could be made successfully, they were often conducted in the form of operations. The decision for conducting such shipments was made by the Peoples Commissar of the Navy, the fleet commanders exercised general leadership, and special commands and mobile staffs maintained immediate control over forces participating in such operations. In this case remote control posts and mobile communication centers were deployed. It was in this way that, for example, control of the Northern Fleet's forces was organized for the transfer of four ice breakers and one ice cutter from the White Sea to the Kara Sea in June 1943, for the transfer of ice breakers from the Laptev Sea to the White Sea to support seagoing convoys in October-November 1943 on order of the State Defense Committee, and for transfer of Convoy AB-15 from the Kara to the White Sea in November 1944.

Development of communication systems and resources was an important factor of control improvement at the operational level. As a supplement to the stable radio and wire communications the central naval organs had with the fleets, with fleet flagships and alternate command posts, and with a number of naval bases, in August 1943 the Main Communications Directorate established the order of naval telegraph communication based on the communication systems of the appropriate fronts and military districts. Mobile communication centers created in the fleets in response to directives from the Main Naval Headquarters played a major role in maintaining control over the forces during operations.[18] All of this made it possible to provide communication support to the command and staffs, and to eliminate shortcomings existing in the first period of the war.

Control improvements at the operational level were supplemented in the second and third periods of the war by development of the methods of control at the tactical level. One of the distinguishing traits of control at this level was that of playing through the tactics to be used in missions at sea by the formation, unit, and ship. It should be emphasized that an efficient wartime combat training system had evolved in the fleets. Tactical games and exercises promoting growth in combat proficiency were conducted more and more frequently. The results of combat training and the conclusions made on control improvements were published in directives of the Peoples Commissar of the Navy. Staffs underwent training, ships participated in exercises, and personnel trained in conditions close to those of real combat, in specially outfitted practice ranges offering conditions similar to those in which the units were to subsequently operate.[19] Problems associated with control in combat were reflected in new regulations written by the Main Naval Headquarters and approved by the Peoples

Commissar of the Navy in the second and third periods of the war for each of the naval arms. In December 1943, after M-8-M and M-13-M naval rocket launchers were adopted,[20] interim regulations on the use of rocket armament aboard naval boats were introduced.

The regulations and directives of the naval command contained the following requirements: control forces by the method of setting missions promptly and monitoring their fulfillment without going over the heads of immediate supervisors to control individual ships, airplanes, or units; practice combat activities at sea as tactical groups of formation strength, and then in tactical interaction with formations of different kinds.[21] This requirement was implemented most fully in the combat activities of submarines, torpedo boats, and fleet aviation.

In the first period submarines operated by the static method of lying in wait for enemy convoys, and as a rule as single boats in restricted areas. Holding their positions, these submarines performed their missions in accordance with directives furnished before setting out to sea. The possibilities for controlling them from coastal command posts were extremely limited. In the second and especially in the third periods the conditions were created for controlling them during combat activities as well; moreover the forms of control grew more complex: Strikes by several submarines against a discovered convoy became more the rule; the submarines were concentrated in a single area, and they were controlled on the basis of air reconnaissance data and messages from the submarines.[22] This is precisely the way four submarines interacting with reconnaissance aircraft struck enemy convoys on the Black Sea in April 1943, and two Northern Fleet submarines operated, on the basis of data from reconnaissance aircraft, in the vicinity of Verde in July 1944.[23]

Introduction of significant quantities of radar resources, radio stations (permitting radio exchange at periscope depth and in all other modes, to include direct telephone conversations), and sonar stations into the fleets had a positive influence upon improvements in the forms and methods of combat control. These technical resources promoted transition to new, more-sophisticated submarine tactics, and to control of submarines in all conditions, day and night.

The new tactics (attacking on the basis of sonar information without raising the periscope, firing torpedoes in a "fan") raised the effectiveness of submarine use and minimized the losses.

Improvements in control of naval air forces were based on the principle of meticulously working out all problems associated with preparation for and conduct of combat activities, especially coordination of different aviation services among each other and with other branches of forces. This was achieved through personal communication of commanders with their subordinates and with commanders of interacting units. The regulations on combat activities of different branches of naval aviation (torpedo, attack, and

so on) foresaw personal participation of air unit commanders in the combat sorties. Radio communication (radio-telephone) served as the principal control resource in the air. Control through airplane evolutions, which was broadly employed in the first period, became an ancillary resource. The command and staff of the fleet aviation efficiently controlled subordinated formations and units in their interaction with other branches of forces,[24] and in the performance of various tactics: bombing at topmast level; group diving; group attack by torpedo carriers from different directions; strikes against convoys by the joint efforts of groups consisting of torpedo carriers, bombers, and attack aviation, under fighter cover. Combined strikes by different branches of aviation assumed the greatest scope. One of the new methods of aviation's combat activities was cruising flights by mixed groups consisting of torpedo carriers, dive-bombers, and fighters, which more than doubled the effectiveness of combat sorties.[25]

Improvements in submarine and aviation control went a long way to raise the effectiveness of the combat activities of the fleet. Just on the Baltic Sea alone, they annihilated about 400 enemy ships and vessels in the third period of the war.

In the second and third periods of the war the navy evolved a control system at the strategic, operational, and tactical level that completely justified itself. This laid a sound foundation for further development of the control of naval forces in the postwar era.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1974, p 22.

2. TsAMO SSSR, [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], f. 48-A, op. 1691, d. 235, ll. 33-39.

3. Ibid., f. 132-A, op. 2642, d. 33, l. 195.

4. Renamed the Coastal Defense Directorate as of 25 January 1943.

5. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], f. 9, d. 17060, ll. 1-6.

6. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of the Second World War], Vol 8, Voyenizdat, 1977, p 139.

7. TsVMA, f. 2, d. 36724, ll. 1-10. See also VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1976, pp 66-69.

8. TsAMO, f. 217, op. 1227, d. 95, ll. 16-16ob; f. 48-A, op. 1795, d. 10, l. 349.

9. The Peoples Commissar of the Navy ordered the fleet to deploy forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet for action against lines of communication on 18 November 1944 (TsVMA, f. 79, d. 19437, ll. 1-6).

10. Leningrad-Novgorod--Red Banner Baltic Fleet; Crimean--Black Sea Fleet; Vyborg-Petrozavodsk--Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Ladoga Naval Flotilla, Onega Naval Flotilla; Belorussian ("Bagration")--Dniepr Naval Flotilla, Iassi-Kishinev--Black Sea Fleet and Danube Naval Flotilla; Baltic--Red Banner Baltic Fleet; Petsamo-Kirkenes--Northern Fleet; East Prussian--Red Banner Baltic Fleet; Vienna--Danube Naval Flotilla; Berlin--Dniepr Naval Flotilla.

11. TsVMA, f. 398, d. 34700, l. 58; f. 1, d. 40251, ll. 3, 5, 10, 53; d. 2445, ll. 1-50; f. 79, d. 23917, ll. 98, 99; f. 10, d. 23877, l. 41; f. 105, d. 32685, l. 44; f. 9, l. 17060, ll. 198-200.

12. TsVMA, f. 9, d. 17060, ll. 1-6.

13. Problems concerning control of large surface ships, air defense and coastal defense forces, and marine infantry are not examined in this article.

14. TsVMA, f. 79, d. 39015, ll. 153, 154.

15. Commander, Rear Admiral S. B. Verkhovskiy and, as of 18 April 1945, Captain 1st Rank L. I. Kurnikov.

16. TsVMA, f. 79, d. 39015, ll. 6-8; f. 224, d. 35840, l. 4.

17. Ibid., f. 9, d. 33038, ll. 106, 107, 114.

18. TsVMA, f. 7, d. 34888, ll. 19-27, 242; f. 10, d. 34577, ll. 41-46.

19. Ibid., f. 79, d. 23917, ll. 16-18, 75-76; f. 9, d. 17060, l. 197; f. 10, d. 34577, l. 20.

20. Ibid., f. 9, d. 39811, l. 158.

21. Ibid., f. 79, d. 40296, l. 23; f. 2, op. 16, d. 89, l. 248.

22. Ibid., d. 39015, l. 154.

23. Ibid., f. 1, d. 40249, ll. 47-51; f. 10, d. 17714, ll. 310, 311.

24. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1977, pp 13-17.

25. TsVMA, f. 1, d. 40249, ll. 3, 23, 27; f. 9, d. 33038, ll. 91-97.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

AIRBORNE TROOPS' TACTICS: POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 27-33

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Chief of Staff of Airborne Troops Lt Gen P. Pavlenko: "The Development of the Tactics of Airborne Troops in the Postwar Period"]

[Text] During the time of their existence (they will celebrate their 50th anniversary in August 1980) the airborne troops have transformed from a small detachment of paratroopers into a modern branch of troops with its own organization, specific armament intended basically for close-in combat, and their own tactics tailored for actions in the enemy rear. These tactics are constantly developing and improving on the basis of the experience of using airborne troops in the past war, and in postwar exercises, in accordance with changes in the resources of armed conflict.

The present article examines the basic trends in the development of airborne tactics in the postwar period.

Our airborne troops as a rule performed limited missions during the Great Patriotic War: capture of objectives (lines) and their retention until the approach of the main forces. Defense was the principal form of combat activities. The maneuverability of airborne units and subunits was extremely low, and they operated on the battlefield mainly on foot. Moreover there were not enough resources to fight enemy tanks.

In the first few postwar years no significant changes occurred in the ways airborne troops performed their missions. And this is quite natural, since neither their equipment nor the assault party delivery vehicles changed. The fundamental principles of their use remained the same: an assault landing in a limited area, capture of objectives (lines), and their retention until the approach of the front's advancing troops. Thus the missions were passive. The depth of the assault landing did not exceed 20-100 km and the duration of independent combat activities was relatively short.* The airplanes available at that time in military airlift aviation--the IL-12 and IL-14--were only capable of landing personnel with light armament, to include 82-mm mortars.

* VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1977, p 56.

Fundamental changes occurred in the use of airborne troops following the advent of nuclear weapons. The dramatically greater possibilities for suppression of the enemy, especially his air defense system within the area of troop landing, created favorable conditions for the landing of large airborne assault parties. Use of nuclear weapons insured a high rate of advance for the ground troops and reduced the time they needed to reach the area of operations of the landing party. This made it possible to land airborne units and formations deeper.

Now the goal of assault landing parties was to capitalize immediately upon the results of nuclear strikes deep in the enemy rear in order to complete the defeat of his groupings, or to capture objectives having important significance at the given moment. These missions necessitated fundamental reequipment of airborne troops with modern weapons and combat equipment, so as to impart new combat qualities to them. Owing to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government they received the resources they needed for war.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's the units and subunits received new infantry weapons (automatic rifles, machineguns), ASU-57 airborne self-propelled guns, 85-mm guns, and other equipment.* GAZ-67 and, later, GAZ-69 motor vehicles were used as gun prime movers and as personnel transporters. In the late 1950's new AN-8 and AN-2 aircraft appeared in military airlift aviation. Having a loading capacity of up to 10 tons and capable of long-range operation, they made it possible to land a significant quantity of personnel together with their organic combat equipment and armament.

Reequipment of airborne units and subunits resulted in change in the methods of their combat activities as well. The main trend in the development of tactics in this stage was abandonment of passive defense of limited areas (lines), and transition to maneuverable actions over an extensive area. It was believed that airborne units (subunits) were able to annihilate the enemy's nuclear strike resources and control posts, disrupt the work of the rear, and seize crossings, mountain passes, and road junctions, and hold onto them. All of these missions were performed by landing parties in behalf of our troops, making a high rate of advance possible for them. Airborne units and subunits could now maneuver within the area of combat activities and work successively toward one goal after another. However, the maneuvering possibilities of the airborne troops were still extremely limited, since the motor transportation provided, to include gun prime movers and the ASU-57 self-propelled guns, could carry only a small proportion of the personnel. Paratrooper battalions and companies moved over the battlefield basically on foot. Objectives were attacked on foot as well, with the support of ASU-57's, recoilless guns, and 82-mm mortars. In order to strike the enemy's flank and rear, paratrooper subunits maneuvered themselves by riding on self-propelled guns.

---

* "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voyenizdat, 1968, p 488.

The landing party had limited firepower. Steps were taken to eliminate this shortcoming. Airborne armament was supplemented by 120-mm mortars, 122-mm howitzers, modern antitank resources, and rocket artillery. As a result the firepower of airborne subunits grew significantly.* Thus in the postwar period there was a clear trend of increasing firepower of airborne units and subunits.

The possibilities for supporting the fighting of airborne troops with the resources of the senior chief also increased. IL-28 frontal bombers could strike the enemy to a significant depth and fight enemy tank units advancing toward the area of the airborne party's combat activities. In some cases fighter-bombers were used to provide direct support to airborne units and subunits.

In subsequent postwar years the airborne troops underwent further rearmament, and an active search was made for new tactics for the units and subunits. In the 1960's they received a fundamentally new combat resource--a tracked high-speed amphibious BMD airborne combat vehicle that could be landed with a parachute (or parachute-rocket) system.

The combat vehicle weighed little, and it could carry a detachment of airborne troops. It was armed with a gun, an antitank guided missile launcher, and machineguns.** The vehicle was outfitted with a radio set, navigation apparatus, and night vision instruments.

Together with the combat vehicle, the subunits received guided antitank rockets and hand-operated grenade throwers with better combat characteristics. The landing resources were improved, and new military airlift aircraft were successfully assimilated, to include the AN-22 "Antey", which was characterized by greater loading capacity and longer range.***

The high maneuvering possibilities and fire capabilities of airborne landing parties also had, and continue to have, an influence on the nature of their combat activities in the enemy rear. They became more decisive, dynamic, maneuverable, and swift.

The way in which airborne subunits enter into combat depends today mainly on the situation that has evolved in the landing area. If the enemy is present at the landing site, the airborne troops strike him while still dropping by parachute, firing automatic weapons and throwing hand grenades. On landing, the airborne troops are joined together into troops by their commanders, after which they approach the enemy and annihilate him with a decisive attack. Artillery and combat vehicles open fire on the enemy from the landing site when ready. Subsequently they are advanced to the attackers, whom they support by direct sighting fire.

* Ibid., p 508.
** VOYENNYI VESTNIK, No 5, 1979, p 39.
*** "Krylataya gvardiya" [The Flying Guard], Moscow, Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1978, p 100.

The total time required to make subunits ready for combat depends on the proficiency of the airborne troops, their skill in using the landing resources, and on the established order and the timing of the drop. During the Great Patriotic War, when airborne troops were landed predominantly by single airplanes over great intervals, the subunits needed several hours and sometimes days to convene and to become combat ready. In the first postwar years landing parties were dropped in exercises in more-compact combat formations by military airlift aviation, and in relatively short time. This was necessary so that the enemy would be unable to organize defense of the objectives being captured, or make effective use of his reserves.

Thus appeared a trend of reducing the time required to prepare subunits for combat after landing in the enemy rear. This was achieved by finding the most suitable combat formations in which to organize military airlift aviation (VTA) for the landing, by reducing the time intervals between airplanes and the length of the rows of paratroopers dropping from the airplanes, by increasing the rate at which paratroopers left the airplane, which resulted in a more-compact landing, by developing better ways to find heavy equipment and armament dropped at the landing site, by using controllable parachutes which permitted crews (gun crews) to land as close as possible to their weapons, and so on.

Further efforts at finding the most suitable landing methods and the best ways to use all of the equipment finding resources, and at simplifying the devices used to secure the equipment to pallets helped to reduce the time required to become combat ready. As an example a parachute landing battalion landed by Captain A. P. Rudyuk came together and entered into combat in just a few minutes during an exercise in 1978.

The essence of an offensive waged by an airborne landing party is as follows: It makes sudden, short, powerful fire strikes at the enemy, attacks him swiftly from several directions, surrounds the defenders of the objectives, and annihilates them. The principal form of maneuver used in seizing objectives within the landing area is that of reaching the flanks and rear of enemy troops defending the objective with the purpose of surrounding them and striking the most vulnerable places simultaneously from different directions.

In the course of the offensive and when capturing the objectives, battalions and companies equipped with combat vehicles are able to perform the most active part of the airborne mission in shorter time than in subunits operating on foot.

Enemy objectives are attacked by the subunits usually with the personnel still in the vehicles. If the antitank defenses are not suppressed reliably enough or if operations must proceed on terrain encumbering vehicle travel, the troops attack on foot. In this case the combat vehicles follow behind the line of troops or in line with the subunits, supporting them with gun and machinegun fire.

in the east part of the city. There was an especially large number of barricades and obstructions here. Losing up to 40 percent of their personnel, these subunits finally captured the eastern part of the city and began bypassing it on the north.

Having cleared the Germans out of the city center, the 1st, 2d, and 3d rifle companies (their respective commanders were Lieutenant Ye. S. Agabekyan, Captain Yu. A. Sporov, and Senior Lieutenant I. N. Molyavkin) reached the city's northern outskirts; moving along the riverbank, the 4th, 5th, and 6th rifle companies (their respective commanders were senior lieutenants I. F. Spitsyn, P. G. Klimenko, and A. V. Markin) attained an area containing three churches, where they were met by stubborn enemy resistance.

In these battles the Soviet soldiers displayed high military proficiency and heroism. Lieutenant I. I. Sychev, platoon commander of the 7th Rifle Company, was the first to rise to the attack in the battle for Station No 3, inspiring his soldiers to complete their mission by personal example. He annihilated five enemy soldiers with fire from his automatic rifle. And when the company commander was knocked out of action, the valorous lieutenant assumed command. Under his leadership the soldiers knocked the fascists out of the station building.[8]

On approaching Station No 2 the 5th Rifle Company met stubborn resistance from Germans who had dug in inside the terminal buildings. Estimating the situation, company commander Senior Lieutenant P. G. Klimenko bypassed the station on the left rather than attempting a frontal attack. It was not until combat engineers blew up the building that the assault group broke into it from the flanks and rear, and annihilated the Germans inside. P. G. Klimenko personally killed eight enemy soldiers with automatic fire. Private M. S. Shirikov also distinguished himself in this battle. When fascists began running out of the burning building of Station No 2, he dispatched seven of them with accurate automatic fire and captured one.[9]

Senior Sergeant V. S. Surikov, the senior telephone operator of the signal company, acted valorously during the night battle for the city. Despite intense artillery fire, at the risk of his life he went out twelve times to repair damage to the communication network, which he did in short time.[10] Senior Sergeant B. S. Korochkin, an orderly of the 3d Rifle Battalion, performed his duty just as selflessly. He rendered medical aid to 30 wounded soldiers and commanders in battles at the approaches to Oppeln, and he carried 18 of them from the battlefield to the battalion medical center.[11]

During the battle of Oppeln the 543d Rifle Regiment honorably completed its mission. By 0400 hours on 24 January the enemy had been cleaned out of the city completely. And by as early as 0600 hours the 5th and then the 4th and 6th rifle companies crossed the Oder and seized a bridgehead on its west bank. The enemy suffered significant losses. He lost more than 800 killed and wounded. In the city, our soldiers captured 10 storage depots

was extremely low; fire from the subunits was dangerous to airplanes flying at low speed and at altitudes on the order of 200-500 meters.

Swift development of aviation in the postwar period and appearance of jet aircraft typified by high speed and powerful rocket armament, as well as helicopters intended to strike ground targets, necessitated creation of effective antiaircraft resources for airborne landing parties. Improved antiaircraft guns were adopted as a means for improving the possibilities of fighting the airborne enemy. The range of altitudes at which the landing party could strike airborne targets increased correspondingly.

Concurrently with qualitative improvements, antiaircraft resources enjoyed quantitative growth. Now every battalion has its own highly effective resources for striking airborne targets.

Concurrently with outfitting airborne subunits and units with modern antiaircraft resources, a search was started for the most sensible ways of using them in combat. Antitank guided missiles, guns mounted on combat vehicles, and even 122-mm howitzers also began to be used against combat helicopters.

To hold captured objectives (lines), airborne parties engage in defensive actions. The methods of the latter were constantly improved as weapons underwent modernization. Growing aggressiveness of defense is the main trend of this process. While during the war or in the first postwar years it was believed that an airborne landing party must occupy defenses and hold strongpoints (positions) stubbornly, no matter what the losses, until the main forces arrived, later, as the possibilities the subunits had for maneuvering increased, the landing party began to operate more actively. Sending forward detachments out toward the approaching enemy, the landing party utilized its reserves and subunits in back-up echelons for counterattacks. It is no longer necessary, as had been the case in the past war, of passively awaiting the approach of the enemy in defensive positions before striking him. Now the landing party is capable of effectively operating against the enemy's travel and combat formations long before they reach the defense area.

The composition of these detachments is usually from company to battalion strength, reinforced by artillery and engineer subunits. They organize ambushes from which they strike enemy columns, artillery, and nuclear resources, retard the enemy's advance, and disrupt his control by raiding headquarters and communication centers. Detachments make broad use of minefields, they set up obstructions on roads, and they destroy road structures.

Operating as a detachment on the approach route of enemy reserves to the assault party's defense area in a 1977 tactical exercise, the parachute landing battalion commanded by N. P. Vasil'yev began striking the enemy subunits from a line several kilometers away from the main forces. Capitalizing on forested terrain, the commander organized two ambushes with the strength of a reinforced company each. The distance between them was not great. Striking from the ambushes, the battalion inflicted losses upon the simulated

enemy motorized infantry column, swiftly retreated to a line along a river bank, and organized defenses there. Forcing the "enemy" to deploy and to invest time into organizing an attack, the battalion retreated further to the next line, which crossed a narrow passage between lakes. By its actions the detachment foiled the "enemy's" attempt at reaching the landing party's defense area as planned, having delayed his initiation of an offensive by 5 hours.

Counterattacks are the highest manifestation of aggressiveness in defense. They are performed by airborne subunits to annihilate enemy troops wedging themselves into the defense area when the objective (or line) must be held for a particular amount of time or until friendly troops approach. Counterattacks may be made by the back-up echelon or by the battalion's reserve. The high mobility of airborne troops permits them to use part of the landing forces in counterattacks from areas not subjected to enemy attack.

But when defense is not associated with mandatory retention of an objective or line, the airborne subunits may maneuver, avoid the enemy's blow, and occupy another strongpoint (defense area) to continue their mission.

Airborne troops conduct combat activities in the enemy rear in coordination with troops advancing from the front, providing them every sort of cooperation possible. They seize and hold crossings, mountain passes, and important road junctions until the main forces arrive. In some cases airborne troops strike enemy defenses from the rear, toward the advancing troops, and they perform reconnaissance in their behalf. The command actively supports the landing party's actions with strikes by missile units and subunits, aviation, and artillery. All problems associated with coordination between the assault landing party and troops on the front are sorted out beforehand to insure success of the overall mission.

Improvements in the tactics of airborne troops and of the methods of controlling them during the preparations for the assault landing and in the course of combat activities require a search for more-sensible methods to be employed by commanders and staffs, and constant improvement of the technical control resources, mainly the communication resources. The main goal of all of this work is to reduce the time required by units and subunits to prepare for the landing and for combat operations, achieve surprise, and insure swift transmission of information on the course of the landing party's combat activities in the enemy rear.

The method of parallel and joint work by senior commanders and staffs together with subordinated commanders and staffs when planning assault landings and combat activities has now achieved broad recognition in the airborne troops, making it possible to economize on time significantly.

In one exercise a staff headed by Major V. A. Bogdanchikov used preprinted documents in its work. Thus it economized on the time required to draw up the combat documents, and to transmit them to the executors via technical communication resources. Broad use was made of personal communication by commanders and transmission of orders by radio.

The experience of troop exercises showed that continuous and firm control of subunits is insured when we create a communication system affording the commander the possibility for acquiring information on the situation on the preparatory period, while in flight to the landing area, during the parachute drop, and literally within the first few minutes after landing. Competent use of small portable radio sets and radio sets installed in combat vehicles and armored transporters permits the senior commander to call subordinated subunits at any time and transmit the necessary information or orders.

The communication systems organized in the exercises of recent years permit the landing party commander and the commander of the battalion and company to assign missions to any platoon and detachment and transmit the needed commands in the critical moments of combat.

Thus the trends in the development of airborne tactics in the postwar period are part of an objective process occurring in the armed forces under the influence of scientific-technical progress. These trends attest to continuous growth in the battleworthiness and combat readiness of units and subunits intended for complex missions deep in the enemy rear.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144 /0817

WARTIME OPERATIONS: INFANTRY REGIMENT BATTLE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 34-38

[Article, published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Lt Col S. Lazutkin: "Battle of the 543d Rifle Regiment for Oppeln"]

[Text] Pursuing the retreating enemy (scattered subunits of the 173d, 712th, and 304th infantry divisions)[1], by 1700 hours on 23 January 1945 the 120th Rifle Division (commander, Major General I. P. Govorov), CXVII Rifle Corps, 21st Army reached the Oder in an area 3 km south of Oppeln and began crossing its main forces over the river on the move. At 1830 hours its 543d Rifle Regiment (commander, Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Sirota) was given the mission of advancing northwest and capturing Oppeln with a night attack, after which he was to utilize crossings within the city limits to force the Oder and seize a bridgehead on its west bank.[2]

The 44th Rifle Regiment, 15th Rifle Division advanced on the right, and the 538th Rifle Regiment, 120th Rifle Division advanced on the left.

According to the intelligence the enemy defenses consisted mainly of strongpoints and centers of resistance. The bulk of the fire weapons were located in first-story embrasures, basements, and semibasements. A center of resistance consisted of several reinforced buildings, usually an entire block. Most of the garrison's fire weapons were deployed in corner homes, and the flanks were covered by barricades. Thus the regiment had to make a night attack upon a city adapted for a lengthy and stubborn defense.

It should be noted that subunits of the 543d Rifle Regiment were well prepared for successful combat activities under these conditions. Before the Vistula-Oder operation began, from 1 to 11 January 1945, units of the division that were not in direct contact with the enemy underwent a number of company and battalion night exercises together with reinforcement and support resources, in which a great deal of attention was devoted to orientation at night, maintenance of a prearranged direction, and organization of coordination during combat within a city.[3]

Nine assault groups (each a reinforced rifle platoon) and three assault detachments (each a reinforced rifle company), prepared for independent activities, were created in the regiment for combat in the city.[4] They were reinforced by tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery, and combat engineers with the job of destroying thick-walled masonry structures and

barricades, and clear minefields. Attached and supporting artillery could maintain fire both by direct sighting and from covered positions. The regiment's commander and staff devoted special attention to organizing communication and light signals necessary for control of the subunits at night, to protecting the flanks, to keeping the combat formations from crossing each other's paths, to illuminating the terrain and the objects of attack, and to furnishing ammunition, especially tracer bullets.

Very little time was allocated for the offensive's organization (according to an order from the division commander the city was to be taken by the end of 23 January 1945).

In order to achieve a powerful initial strike, regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Sirota decided to form his combat formation into a single echelon and capture Oppeln by a night assault.

The battalions were given the following missions: The 3d Rifle Battalion (commander, Major A. V. Burkov) was to attack the east part of the city together with a battery of 45-mm guns, and then bypass it on the north and reach the Oder (see diagram); the 1st Rifle Battalion (commander, Captain N. S. Rozanov) was to capture the Oppeln suburb of Bol'ko together with a battery from the 1403d Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, and then attack the central part of the city. The 2d Rifle Battalion (commander, Captain N. I. Sobko) was to attack along the river bank together with a battery of 76-mm guns from the 1033d Artillery Regiment and annihilate the enemy in the western part of the city. The commander and staff of the regiment organized interaction and arranged the common signals.

The subunits occupied their start positions for the attack by 1900 hours. The 3d Rifle Battalion situated itself 500 meters north of Groshovits, the 1st Rifle Battalion situated itself in the vicinity of Station No 1, and the 2d Rifle Battalion deployed 200 meters south of Marker 162.3. At 2000 hours Lieutenant Colonel Sirota ordered open fire by artillery from covered positions and guns by direct sighting. The subunits went over to the attack under the cover of this fire.

By 2030 hours the 3d Rifle Battalion reached the railroad intersection at Marker 176.3, the 1st Rifle Battalion captured a sand quarry and was fighting for a church, and the 2d Rifle Battalion was pinned down by the enemy's intense machinegun fire in the vicinity of the quarry. Germans defending Bol'ko met the attackers with massed intense fire from basements, windows, and attics. The streets were barricaded. But our soldiers, operating in small groups, pushed the enemy out story by story and building by building. Many soldiers distinguished themselves at this time. Thus Sergeant A. F. Grigorovskiy, commander of a 45-mm gun, annihilated six enemy fire positions and up to 15 soldiers in the vicinity of Marker 176.3. Private 1st Class Yu. A. Akhmetzhanov, detachment commander in the 3d Rifle Company, displayed boldness and resourcefulness in the battle for the church. Bypassing it through holes in buildings, he reached the rear of the German machinegunner in the bell tower, and knocked him down with an accurate shot, thus permitting his company to continue forward.



Battle of the 243d Rifle Regiment for Oppeln (23-24 January 1945)

Key:

1. Groshovits
2. Rifle regiment
3. Rifle battalion
4. Station No 1
5. Vinau
6. Fogtsdorf
7. River Oder
8. Bol'ko
9. Subunits of the 10th Infantry Regiment, 173d Infantry Division
10. Security battalion, 304th Infantry Division
11. Station No 2
12. Rifle company
13. Oppeln
14. Subunits of the 745th Infantry Regiment, 712th Infantry Division
15. Station No 3
16. Brick plant
17. Zakrau
18. Security battalion, 304th Infantry Division
19. North

Master Sergeant A. M. Loginov, commander of a 76-mm gun battery, 1033d Artillery Regiment, was ordered to annihilate an enemy 81-mm mortar which was inflicting considerable losses upon the 2d Rifle Battalion in the vicinity of the quarry. Rolling his guns forward for direct sighting, with two shots Loginov brought down the wall of the masonry barn in which the enemy mortar men were located, and annihilated them. The master sergeant needed only one shot to lay forever silent a heavy machinegun that had opened fire from the attic of a multistory home.[6]

After knocking the enemy out of the center of Bol'ko, the 1st Rifle Battalion captured a railroad intersection near two plants. In this engagement the Germans lost more than 300 enlisted men and officers, as well as two armored transporters and two trains carrying military supplies.[7] Without reducing the rate of advance, the battalions knocked down the obstructions and barricades across the streets by direct sighting fire from their guns. By 2300 hours they captured the southern outskirts of Oppeln.

The tactics of our assault groups are interesting. Thus the assault groups of the 1st Rifle Battalion were subdivided into several subgroups for an attack on a reinforced building. Breaking into the house, one subgroup blocked the exits from the basement and annihilated the Germans in the latter with grenades and Molotov cocktails, while another immediately began mopping up the enemy automatic riflemen, antitank gunners, and snipers in the upper stories. The actions of these subgroups were supported by artillery and a group of medium machineguns. The company commander left some of his forces and equipment in reserve. Consisting of five to seven of the bravest and most resourceful soldiers, these reserves were often the first to break into a building stubbornly defended by the enemy, creating panic and thus facilitating the building's capture.

Other methods were employed as well. As an example groups of the 3d Rifle Battalion captured one house beginning with the upper stories. The daredevils made their way up to the roofs and attics by fire escapes and weakly defended stairwells, and then cleaned out the buildings story by story all the way down to the basement.

Combat engineers attached to the attacking groups forced passages through obstructions, punched holes through building walls and ceiling-floors, and blew up isolated gun positions, permitting the subunits to maneuver. Pack flamethrowers required several charges to smoke the enemy out of armored pillboxes, and especially out of basements.

Moving toward the city center, the battalions met enemy fire of growing intensity. By 2400 hours the 7th Rifle Company (commander, Senior Lieutenant V. I. Kudryashov) captured Station No 3 and, after knocking out individual groups of automatic riflemen holding positions behind a railroad fill, it successfully advanced in the direction of Zakrau. The 8th and 9th rifle companies (their respective commanders were Senior Lieutenant A. N. Baronenko and Lieutenant G. Ya. Kharisov) fought stubborn battles

Enemy tanks and combat helicopters offer the greatest danger to an airborne landing party. This is why airborne subunits undergo special training in fighting these weapons. Another important trend should be noted in this case--qualitative and quantitative growth of the resources for fighting tanks, and sharp growth in their densities in antitank defenses. During the Great Patriotic War antitank grenades and mortar shells, 37-mm guns, and later 45- guns not employing mechanical traction were the principal means of fighting enemy tanks. The density of antitank resources at the battalion level was one or two units per kilometer of front at that time. This density was raised significantly in tactical exercises of the first postwar years (for the most part the antitank resources employed remained the same). Later, after the airborne troops received the ASU-57, self-propelled 57-mm guns and, later, 85-mm guns, recoilless guns, hand-operated grenade throwers, and antitank guided missiles, the density of antitank resources at the battalion level grew even more. The possibilities for fighting tanks broadened significantly.

Antitank resources are located in a company (platoon) strongpoint or on the deployment line of an antitank reserve in such a way that enemy tanks would be hit not only as they approached the forward edge but also deep within the strongpoint (defense area). Moreover antitank resources intended for close-in combat are advanced together with the forward detachments operating on the approach routes of enemy reserves. These annihilate tanks by ambush fire. In battalion defense areas and company strongpoints, combat vehicles and antitank resources cover sectors offering a tank threat, antitank obstacles, and natural obstacles. On occupying a strongpoint, a parachute landing company equipped with combat vehicles could successfully repel an enemy attack.

Antitank guided missile launchers are the first to open fire against the combat formations of advancing enemy tanks, at their maximum range.

As the tanks approach the company's forward edge of defense the 73-mm guns of the combat vehicles open fire, after which the grenade throwers enter into combat. During the time the attacking enemy approaches the forward edge of defense, the organic resources of the company could hit several tanks and armored personnel carriers. Tanks wedging themselves into the strongpoint are annihilated by surviving resources, to include hand-thrown antitank grenades.

The next no less important trend in the development of airborne tactics is growth in the possibilities of the subunits for fighting enemy airplanes and combat helicopters.

During the Great Patriotic War airborne troops fought low-flying airplanes mainly by volley fire from infantry weapons. The companies and battalions appointed guard subunits, while the rest of the subunits allocated weapons that were constantly ready to open fire in the event of the sudden appearance of airplanes. The effectiveness method for fighting airborne targets

containing military and other supplies, eight loaded trains, six locomotives, 80 motor vehicles, 50 motorcycles, 78 medium and light machineguns, and over 300 rifles.[12]

Analysis of the results of this battle showed that the success of the regiment's night attack upon the city stemmed from correct use of assault groups, which were characterized by high independence of action and the capability for destroying individual strongpoints and centers of resistance. The assault groups advanced on the streets under the cover of houses, making use of yards, gaps in walls, and basements to reach the flank and rear of strongpoints and to attack them from several directions. Of special significance was the fire support given to them by artillery, machineguns, and other infantry weapons in the time preceding capture of buildings by the assault subunits, as well as extensive use of lighting resources and target indication by tracer bullets.

The experience of the battle demonstrated the suitability of direct-sighting artillery fire against urban facilities defended by the enemy, and the need for preceding the attack with short but powerful fire strikes by artillery from covered positions.

The courage, heroism, and great military proficiency of soldiers of the 543d Rifle Regiment in the battle of Oppeln were given a high assessment by the motherland. Many of them earned government awards.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 1327, op.1, d. 23, l. 36.
2. Ibid., f. 7188, op. 69241, d. 1, l. 68.
3. Ibid., f. 1327, op. 1, d. 25, l. 1.
4. Ibid., f. 7188, op. 69241, d. 1, l. 69.
5. Ibid., f. 33, op. 690306, d. 804, l. 202.
6. Ibid., op. 690155, d. 3516, l. 22.
7. Ibid., f. 7188, op. 69241, d. 49, l. 69.
8. Ibid., f. 33, op. 690155, d. 72371, l. 14.
9. Ibid., f. 1327, op. 1, d. 51, l. 39.
10. Ibid., f. 543, sp, op. 69241, d. 5, l. 22.
11. Ibid., f. 543, sp, op. 69241, d. 5, l. 13.
12. Ibid., f. 7188, op. 69241, d. 49, l. 73.

[8144/11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

WARTIME OPERATIONS: BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 38-42

[Article, published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Lt Col V. Volkov: "Reconnaissance in Force by a Rifle Battalion"]

[Text] In the first half of December 1944 the 302d Rifle Division was defending an area southeast of Dembitsa (Poland). According to observations manpower and equipment had been highly active for several days deep within the enemy defenses. Our command hypothesized that the Germans were conducting a regrouping, and replacing units in this sector of the front. In order to determine the enemy grouping better and find out the unit designations of the opposing enemy troops, the 302d Rifle Division was given the mission of conducting reconnaissance in force and capturing prisoners for interrogation.

The division commander decided to perform reconnaissance in force within the sector of the 825th Rifle Regiment in the direction of Hill 460. The 3d Rifle Battlion, 827th Rifle Regiment, which was in the regiment's back-up echelon at this time, was called up for this purpose. It consisted of three rifle companies (of 70 men each), a machinegun company, a mortar company, and a platoon of 45-mm guns. The total strength was 300 men. An engineer company was attached to the battalion for the time of reconnaissance in force. Two battalions of the 865th artillery regiment, two 120-mm mortar batteries, and two 76-mm gun batteries of the 825th and 827th rifle regiments, and a battery of 45-mm guns from the 232d Separate Tank Destroyer Battalion were to support its actions. The total expenditure of gun and mortar shells was set at 7,856 rounds.*

Reconnaissance in force was planned to occur in the second half of 14 December. An area of trenches on the northeast slopes of Hill 460 was selected as the object of attack. Prior to the attack the plans called for a 15-minute artillery strike, after which fire was to be transferred to the enemy's second line of trenches and a defensive fire screen was to be created along the first line of trenches on the flanks of the battalion.

* TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 1608, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 464-466.



Reconnaissance in Force by the 3d Rifle Battalion, 827th Rifle Regiment in the Vicinity of Hill 460 (14 December 1944)

Key:

1. Symbols
2. Positions of the sides
3. Globikova
4. Fusilier Battalion, 78th Infantry Division
5. Kamenets
6. Rifle company
7. Observation post
8. Rifle regiment
9. 302d Rifle Division
10. Mala
11. North

In order to divert the attention of the Germans from the area intended for reconnaissance in force, subunits defending neighboring sectors were to open rifle, machinegun, and artillery fire 15-20 minutes before the start of the attack, and to create smoke screens.

The terrain over which the battalion was to act was open. In certain directions our troops could be seen to a depth of 2-3 km from Hill 460. The first line of enemy trenches crossed the hill's northeast slope, and the second, which was 300-400 meters behind the first, was on the western and southern slopes. The trenches were joined together by communication trenches. There were machinegun platforms with log roofs in the first line of trenches. These trenches were covered from the front by wire entanglements consisting of two rows of barbed wire. Metallic objects were suspended from the wire to serve as acoustic alarms. There was a continuous minefield consisting of three rows of antitank and antipersonnel mines in front of the wire. The enemy provided continuous cover to all engineering obstacles with rifle and machinegun fire from the first line of trenches.

Presence of a large number of obstacles in front of the enemy's forward edge and the unfavorable terrain necessitated meticulous preparations for the forthcoming battle. On 10 December the division commander conducted reconnaissance together with the commanders of the 827th Rifle Regiment, the 3d Battalion of this regiment, and the attached and supporting subunits, and while out in the field he explained the mission to the commander of the 3d Battalion, 827th Rifle Regiment, Major V. V. Yatskevich. The forming-up place for the attack was the first line of trenches of defending subunits of the 825th Rifle Regiment, 300 meters from the first enemy trenches.

On 11 December Major V. V. Yatskevich performed reconnaissance together with the commanders of the rifle companies and the attached and supporting subunits. It was at this time, in the field, that he made the decision to form the battalion combat formation as two echelons, with the 7th and 9th rifle companies advancing in the first and the 8th advancing in the second. Each company was given a specific route of advance to the object of attack (see diagram).

Subunits of the first echelon were given the mission of breaking into the first line of enemy trenches with a swift attack, capturing some prisoners, and then withdrawing to the position of friendly troops. Groups were created in each company to seize prisoners and provide cover; the most experienced and boldest warriors were placed in these groups. The 8th Rifle Company was to support the attack of the first echelon with fire and be ready to repel an enemy counterattack.

The division's engineer company was ordered to clear the minefield in front of our forward edge within the battalion's sector of operation, and to create passages through German minefields on the northeastern slopes of Hill 460. Artillery was to support the attacking companies of the first echelon and cover their withdrawal after the mission.

Questions concerning coordination between the rifle companies and artillery were resolved there in the field, the gunners were shown the targets they were to suppress or annihilate during the artillery attack, and all commanders were shown the common landmarks and given tables of signals to call in and stop artillery and mortar fire.*

Twenty-four-hour observation of the portion of the enemy's forward edge of defense in which the attack was to occur was established after reconnaissance. The observers were to reveal new gun positions, analyze the enemy's daily routine, and make a special effort to determine the number of infantry in the first line of trenches.

Between 11 and 13 December the battalion underwent combat training in the rear of its regiment together with the reinforcements. On 13 December an exercise with the theme "Attack of Enemy Trenches by a Rifle Battalion With the Objective of Capturing Prisoners" was conducted on terrain bearing simulated enemy defenses. The battalion was drilled according to a plan drawn up by division headquarters. The commander of the 827th Rifle Regiment provided overall leadership to preparation of the personnel for the forthcoming combat activities. In this case a great deal of attention was devoted to the swiftness of the attack of the subunits, and to their interaction among each other and with artillery. The rifle companies practiced attacking the enemy efficiently and in organized fashion, maintaining rifle and machinegun fire on the move, breaking quickly into enemy trenches, and fighting in the trenches. Groups intended to capture prisoners practiced capturing prisoners and delivering them to friendly troops. After each drill the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel B. K. Keronov, held a critique, noting the positive and negative sides of the actions of the subunits and individual enlisted men and officers. Division commander Colonel N. P. Kucherenko attended almost all of the drills, personally giving instructions on eliminating shortcomings and determining the readiness of the subunits and of the battalion as a whole.

Test drills conducted in the subunits and the battalion exercise demonstrated that the officers had resolved the problems of coordination and combat control well, and that the enlisted men and sergeants had become sufficiently well versed in running, crawling, and throwing hand grenades into pillbox embrasures. Groups of scouts and automatic riflemen that were to capture prisoners demonstrated their ability to act correctly in various situations during the performance of their mission.

A great deal of political work was conducted in the preparatory period under the guidance of Captain A. V. Zelenov, battalion deputy commander for political affairs, with the goal of mobilizing the enlisted men and officers to perform their mission better. On the eve of the day of battle all subunits held party and Komsomol meetings, in which the tasks of communists and Komsomol members in the forthcoming combat activities were discussed.

* TsAMO, f. 1608, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 464, 465.

One of the forms of political work employed was discussions in the detachments and platoons, in which veteran enlisted men and officers spoke about their personal experience with reconnaissance in force. They told the troops how to capture prisoners, and what to do as an individual in this short but very intense battle. Much attention was devoted in the discussions to mutual assistance, and to constant use of one's weapon.

As a result of all the steps taken, the personnel were prepared for their important combat mission within a short time.

On 14 December at 0700 hours the battalion assumed its forming-up place. By 1500 hours the soldiers were given their mission, and the objectives of the attack were shown to them on the terrain. All documents were collected from the warriors and commanders so that they would not get into enemy hands.

In the night of 14 December combat engineers Master Sergeant P. S. Syatishev and Private 1st Class G. P. Litvin began clearing passages through friendly and enemy obstacles. The Germans maintained sparse rifle and machinegun fire, and from time to time they illuminated the terrain in front of their forward edge with flares, but they did not spot our engineers. During this time the latter stopped their work and took cover, resuming their work when the coast was clear. By 0300 hours two passages, each 8 meters wide, were cleared through the enemy's wire entanglements; inaddition, six bangalore torpedoes were laid. After this the engineers returned to their own trenches. All of the cleared passages were marked by arbitrary signs and placed under the security of the rifle companies.

In order to divert the enemy's attention intense rifle, machinegun, and artillery fire was opened at 1530 hours in the neighboring sectors on the right and left, and soldiers of the 215th Separate Chemical Company created four smoke screens. At 1545 hours 54 guns and mortars supporting the 3d Battalion began a fire strike upon the object of attack. Under its cover, the 7th and 9th rifle companies quickly advanced to the first line of enemy trenches. As soon as the artillery strike began, combat engineers detonated the bangalore torpedoes laid in the enemy wire entanglements. As soon as our soldiers reached them, in response to a signal from the battalion commander the artillery transferred its fire into the defenses, and the attackers, firing their rifles and machineguns on the move, decisively broke into the first line of trenches. Warriors of the 9th Rifle Company under the command of Lieutenant N. V. Zatruskin were the first to reach the enemy dugouts.

Lieutenant Ye. A. Yushkov's covering group began mopping up the Germans in the trenches. Moving through the trenches, Private A. I. Maksimov (1st Company of the division's 601st Separate Combat Engineer Battalion) collided with a German automatic rifleman after turning a corner. A dirty face and the barrel of an automatic rifle aimed right at his chest flashed before his eyes. The warrior did not lose control. He crouched down quickly and pressed the trigger. Enemy bullets whistled over his head, but the combat engineer's shot was accurate. Looking around the corner,

Maksimov noticed another four fascists running toward him. He lobbed grenades at them one after another. In that same second two deafening explosions occurred. When the smoke cleared, Maksimov could see the bodies of the Germans, riddled by grenade fragments. During this time Lieutenant B. M. Stepan'yan and Junior Sergeant I. S. Krutisvet of the capture group rushed forward at the head of their subunits after the retreating fascists, and gunners and mortarmen cut off the German's retreat from Hill 460.

Sergeant A. P. Klochay and privates I. N. Kulik, G. Ya. Burin, P. I. Yatsyshin, D. I. Dubinyak, and P. D. Khoma caught up to a group of enemy soldiers led by a noncommissioned officer, destroyed it quickly in hand-to-hand combat, and took the noncom prisoner.

Soldiers of the 7th Rifle Company acted just as boldly and decisively. On reaching the second line of trenches, two fascists caught V. I. Sorok by surprise. Privates V. I. Grinyuk and P. I. Pilipenko hastened to his aid. Pilipenko brought one down with an accurate shot, and Grinyuk disarmed the second and took him prisoner. During this time, enemy infantry of up to company strength attempted to counterattack the 7th Rifle Company's flank with the support of mortar fire. The battalion commander realized what was going on in time. He called in the fire of supporting artillery and mortars against the enemy as he concentrated for the counterattack; concurrently the 8th Rifle Company was ordered to make preparations to repel the enemy counterattacks. Coordinated fire from the gunners, mortars, and riflemen scattered the Germans in several minutes. The signal for retreat was given at this time. Under the cover of artillery and mortar fire the rifle companies began withdrawing to their own position. By 1730 hours the entire battalion was back in the first line of trenches of our defenses.

As a result of this battle our troops annihilated 37 enemy enlisted men and officers, took 2 soldiers prisoner, and captured 40 rifles and automatic rifles, 2 light machineguns, and a large quantity of shells and grenades.* The prisoners, who belonged to the fusilier battalion of the 78th Infantry Division, confirmed our intelligence that the fascist troops were undergoing regrouping in front of the 302d Rifle Division. In particular it was established that the region of Hill 460 was being defended by the fusilier battalion of the 78th Infantry Division, which had replaced the 1084th Infantry Regiment, 544th Infantry Division here on 10-12 December. Moreover the prisoners provided information on the composition of units of the 78th Infantry Division, their mission, and the locations of gun positions and engineering obstacles within the defenses. All of this intelligence was taken into account in the preparations for the offensive of our troops.

The 3d Battalion, 827th Rifle Regiment completed its mission successfully. Meticulous preparations had been made for reconnaissance in force in the vicinity of Hill 460, and organization was careful. Subunits allocated for this purpose had sufficient time to train, and to study the object of attack,

*TsAMO, f. 1608, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 140, 141.

the nature of the terrain, the defensive structures, and the enemy's behavior. The rifle, artillery, and engineer subunits participating in the action worked out their combat coordination in joint exercises. The officers and enlisted men clearly understood their mission, and they performed it boldly and decisively.

The reconnaissance in force was well supported by artillery fire, which made it possible to suppress a significant part of the enemy's fire weapons. In addition the successfulness of the operation was significantly promoted by competent utilization of rifle weapons by the subunits. Intense fire from automatic rifles, machineguns, and rifles kept the enemy hugging the ground, preventing him from counterattacking in organized fashion.

Surprise played an important role in the attack. It was achieved mainly through the covertness of all preparations for the battle, through the active operations of rifle platoons in neighboring sectors to distract the enemy's attention from the main sector, through effective control of the subunits by the battalion commander, and through the boldness and courage of the Soviet soldiers. Thirty-seven of them earned government awards for their successful combat activities in the vicinity of Hill 460.*

* TsAMO, d. 48, l. 196.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CHINA IN THE 1930's DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 43-46

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Maj Gen Tech Trps (Ret) I. Artem'yev: "Soviet Radio Operators in China"]

[Text] Restoration, in December 1932, of diplomatic relations with the USSR, which were broken in 1929 at the fault of the Kuomintang, had extremely important significance to China. After this the Soviet government immediately raised the issue of signing a Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact, which in those conditions would not only have strengthened China's international position but also promoted development of ties with the Soviet Union. However the Kuomintang government, which was following a policy of "appeasing the aggressor", was not really trying to improve relations with the USSR, and it refused to sign such a pact. And it was only an attack by militarist Japan upon China in July 1937 that forced Chiang Kai-shek to alter his position. On 21 August 1937 the Nonaggression Treaty was signed. The Soviet Union would not leave the Chinese people, struggling for liberty and independence, in the lurch. On request of the Chinese side the USSR government sent military advisors and specialists to China in fall 1937, and in December it sent volunteer pilots. Without waiting to formalize an agreement offering Soviet credit to China for the first time, our country began providing material assistance to China as well. It was decided to deliver combat equipment, armament, ammunition, medicines, and petroleum products to the Chinese troops by motor transportation and by air, since Japan had completely blockaded the Chinese coast in the beginning of the war.

Being the director of radio communication with Soviet military advisors and marine transporters delivering armament and volunteers to republican Spain, I was ordered to organize radio communication on the motor and air routes used to ferry cargo to China. This decision was probably associated with the fact that I had a rather powerful radio center and a reserve of the needed radio sets and radio operators at my disposal. We began working on our assignment as soon as we received the order. I devoted special attention to selecting highly skilled radio operators who would be able to set up communication centers outside the motherland in the shortest time possible, and deploy radio stations at points along the route.

The motor route, which began in Alma-Ata, passed through the city of Dzharkend, the border station of Khorgos, and then on through population centers in the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu into the central and southern provinces. The air route, which was intended for flights by cargo aircraft and for ferrying of warplanes, also began in Alma-Ata and passed over the cities of Kuldja, Urumqi, Guchen, Hami, Ansi, Suchzhou, and Lanzhou, and then into the center and south of China. Major I. G. Danilov,* commander of a separate radio battalion of the Peoples Commissariat of Defense, who had experience in organizing communication with Spain, was appointed as the first chief of communications for both routes. I knew him well, having worked with him since January 1932. He was an outstanding specialist who knew how to quickly organize things in his area of responsibility.

On 18 October 1937 Ivan Gerasimovich Danilov left Moscow for Alma-Ata together with a group of radio operators. He was ordered to deploy radio stations mainly at those points of the air route near which airfields to be used in refueling warplanes and transporters were being created. At first the radio specialists installed a transmitter at the radio center in Alma-Ata and tested the communication link between Moscow and Urumqi, where our radio center had already been set up. Then Major Danilov's subordinates set up low-power radio stations serviced by specially trained radio operators at all of the other air and motor vehicle bases along the routes. Thus the administration and staff of the routes, which were responsible for monitoring deliveries of Soviet military cargo to China, were able to effectively control transportation. The main radio station in Alma-Ata was used to maintain constant communication with bases along the route; it made it possible to determine where a motor vehicle column or airplane was located at any moment, to change the schedule and rate of movement of cargo, to assign additional missions to representatives of the Soviet side, and to monitor the execution of these missions. With time, growth in the deliveries of armament and combat equipment made it impossible for the communication system of that time to completely satisfy the greater requirements. An acute need for developing it arose. New radio centers and radio stations had to be set up at intermediate airfields and motor vehicle bases, as did a radio network to transmit weather information to the main airfields and to every airplane traveling along the air route. For these purposes radio stations were additionally deployed in Shikho and Dzin'kho, at the Urumqi and Hami airfields, and at the Pichan motor vehicle base. The route radio centers in Alma-Ata, Urumqi, and Lanzhou provided communication not only within China but also with Moscow.

The radio center in Alma-Ata was serviced by five radio specialists who maintained communication with correspondents strictly according to a schedule, at specific times. However, additional communication sessions often had to be scheduled. This was associated with the evolving operational situation

---

* Subsequent route chiefs were Colonel P. V. Makhovikov in 1939-1940 and Lieutenant Colonel A. N. Sal'nikov in 1940-1942.

either on the motor vehicle and air routes or within the zone of combat activities. As a result the center worked around the clock, and the volume of radio messages was rather high.

Mutual assistance was a typical manifestation of the selflessness exhibited by the center's radio operators. Having rested 2 or 3 hours after their shift (lasting 8-10 hours), each operator once again returned to his workplace on his own initiative and helped out a friend. It is no accident that radio messages were received by the administrative staff from Moscow and from stations along the routes without delay, distortions, and other defects.

In 1937-1942 the radio center in Alma-Ata was operated in different times by I. I. Shulyak, F. I. Pariychuk, K. P. Ivanov, G. A. Malykhin, I. F. Matviyenko, V. D. Udovenko, V. A. Tyurin, A. P. Stretovich, A. N. Rodionov, and others.

Almost all of the radio specialists of the center in Alma-Ata were subsequently sent to radio centers and stations deployed on Soviet and Chinese territory, where they successfully executed missions posed by the command. Thus in 1940 a radio station was deployed at a border station in the vicinity of the town of Burunday to maintain communication with the airfield at Kuldja and with transporters flying on the air routes. A. P. Stretovich, a former colleague of the center in Alma-Ata, who worked 12-14 hours a day without a break, was appointed chief of the radio station.

The radio center in Urumqi was created sooner than the rest. Its chiefs included S. P. Pavlov, B. N. Cherstvyy, F. I. Pariychuk, K. P. Ivanov, and M. I. Petrov, and the radio operators were, among others, P. I. Vinnik, G. A. Malykhin, V. P. Kupriyanov, and V. I. Kuropatenkov. This radio center provided communication with Moscow, with radio centers in Alma-Ata and Lanzhou, and with radio stations along the routes in the Xinjiang area.

Everywhere in China the Soviet radio operators sensed the respect and support of the local public. Chinese laborers provided what help they could in deploying the radio stations and individual communication centers. They responded to all requests, trying to make the hard work of their friends from the Country of the Soviets easier in whatever way they could. For example when a 500-watt transmitter was installed at the radio center in Hami in 1939 and a mast had to be built for its antenna, the local authorities furnished the construction materials without delay.

Personnel of the radio center in Lanzhou--the capital of Gansu Province, had to work in difficult conditions. Between 1937 and 1942 A. N. Timokhin, L. N. Dolgov, R. R. Gonchar, and G. L. Likho served as chiefs of this radio center, while G. Kuznetsov, S. Dugin, V. Kozin, N. Popov, and others served as radio operators.

The center operated around the clock, since it had to maintain daily radio communication with 15 correspondents (including military advisors right

within the zone of combat activities), with the Soviet representative in the Special Region of China, with the main Soviet liaison officer at Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, with radio centers along the routes, and with Moscow. Moreover the radio center supported radio communication with a Soviet delegation in Ulan-Bator. The daily radio exchange volume exceeded 12,000 groups, with the bulk of the radio messages being transmitted in transit.

Rather frequent raids by Japanese bombers upon the city created the constant threat of the radio center's destruction. This is why after each air raid alert was sounded, some of the personnel had to travel together with the apparatus to specially prepared shelters in the hills. The remaining radio operators maintained radio communication with praiseworthy endurance, paying no attention to the bombing.

Work was especially difficult at those points along the route where a single person had to service a radio station. As an example radio operator I. A. Ugarov spent more than 6 months at the Suchzhou airfield without relief. The radio communication program (schedule) was very intense. He had to sit by the receiver from 0800 hours to 2000 hours, and sometimes even throughout the entire night. Moreover a great deal of effort had to be applied to keep the radio apparatus, the charging units, the storage batteries, and the small power plants working. And he had to do this for 6 long months. Later I. A. Ugarov was awarded the Order of the Red Star for this selfless labor. Radio operators A. N. Nikiforov, A. S. Delezha, and others also had to work under the same sort of conditions.

There were other difficulties as well. The problem was that the air and motor vehicle routes extended through the provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu through semidesert and desert terrain, particularly through the Gobi Desert. Sandstorms raged in the spring-summer and fall period within the zone extending from our border to Lanzhou. At these times the conditions of radio communication worsened dramatically: Electric charges built up in the receiving antennas, creating intense interference. The time required to receive even brief radio messages increased by five to ten times over the usual rate. It should be noted that the sandstorms sometimes raged for 3-5 days, and this naturally had a negative influence upon the work of the entire communication system.

In order to maintain radio reception during sandstorms the radio operators of the radio center in Alma-Ata proposed utilizing specially manufactured indoor antennas with the radio receivers. In short time all radio stations and radio centers were outfitted with these devices, and the amount of interference experienced during sandstorms decreased significantly. Radio communication became more dependable. Later the indoor antennas were successfully used with transmitters, since outdoor antennas were often put out of action by enemy saboteurs.

After Colonel F. P. Polynin, the Soviet deputy director of aviation, arrived at the administrative headquarters, all of the work of the aviation service

rose to a higher level. The airfields were staffed by weather specialists. A number of measures were implemented along the radio communication lines: Additional radio stations were set up at airfields; an aviation radio network was developed and introduced. The latter permitted transmission of weather data from all airfields along the route to Alma-Ata and to other airfields, as well as two-way communication between airplanes and airfields, and it made better control of flights by cargo aviation possible. It is entirely understandable that without dependable radio communication and meteorological support, it would have been impossible to solve the problems of aviation control. The communication chief of the administrative headquarters and his assistants had to do a lot of hard work to organize the aviation radio network. The major difficulty was that there were differences in the types of radio apparatus possessed by radio centers along the route, and the equipment installed aboard TB-3, DS-3, PS-9, DB-3F, LI-2, and other aircraft would not permit combination of radio channels without additional work. To solve this problem, rules were developed for radio exchange between airplanes and airfield radio stations, which required limited use of signals in international code, and working and back-up radio wavelengths most suited to commur cation were selected. Communication began to operate efficiently.

Large flows of incoming and transient radio messages dictated the need for constantly increasing the transmission rate. However, even the highly skilled radio specialists could not do better than 120-130 symbols per minute. This was explained by technical imperfections of the telegraph key. On the initiative of L. V. Dolgov, a member of a commission representing the Peoples Commissariat of Defense, a hand-made two-way key was installed in place of the conventional key; following a little training, its use raised the transmission rate to 130-150 symbols per minute. Workshops of Alma-Ata Railroad Station No 1 used the radio center's drawings to make 150 such keys. They were delivered to all radio stations and centers. As a result the radio message transmission rate increased dramatically. It is interesting to note that when the Great Patriotic War began, many radio operators joining the operating army took the two-way keys with them, used them successfully themselves, and taught their subordinates to use them.

Radio operators working at radio stations and radio centers on Chinese territory received messages from our long-range radio stations, recorded them, and reported them to the commanders and commissars. In turn, the latter visited the bases along the routes to provide information and transmit messages to, and hold discussions with enlisted men, sergeants, officers, and employees of the Soviet Army.

Soviet radio operators not only insured normal operation of the air and motor vehicle routes used to deliver military cargo to China, but they also provided help to the main military advisors in establishing communication with our motherland's capital.

Thus Soviet signalmen performed their international duty honorably and selflessly, and they made a worthy contribution to the Soviet Union's brotherly help to the Chinese people in their difficult time of struggle against the Japanese invaders.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

WARTIME OPERATIONS: KARELIAN FRONT ACTIVITIES 1941/1942

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 47-54

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by HSU Col Gen A. Zheltov: "On the Right Flank*"]

[Text] The first half year of the war, which was saturated by continuous battles in the diverse conditions of the northern theater of war, provided troops of the Karelian Front with the richest experience of defensive actions.

The Front Grows Stronger, and Defenses Become Stabilized

At first the defenses were spotty in nature. A regiment or a division was usually called in to hold a very important area. Control of the units and formations, which operated far apart in separate sectors, was extremely difficult. It was impossible to create strong combined-arms reserves. Maneuver of troops from one sector to another was often precluded, owing to which we were not always able to create an advantageous ratio of men and equipment in threatened sectors.

Capitalizing on the terrain and the available resources, the troops learned to gnaw their way into stony ground, and set up gun positions, observation posts, dug-outs and shelters out of stone and wood. Snow was used in winter to erect walls, slopes, and breastworks. Our defenses could now withstand infantry, tanks, and artillery.

The enemy usually had air supremacy in the main sectors. Naturally our troops unwittingly arrived at the opinion that his aviation was superior, and they developed a phobia about airplanes. The military council and the commanders and political organs of the formations took the necessary steps to eliminate this "phobia". The order of action to be taken during enemy air raids was explained to the warriors, and experience and examples of annihilating enemy airplanes by the forces and resources of rifle subunits and units were publicized. The power of our aviation grew meanwhile as well.

---

* For the beginning, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1979, pp 32-40. Translation published in JPRS 75400 dated 28 Mar 80, No 1508 of this series, pp 37-49.

The Germans used tank subunits for direct infantry support in the Petrozavodsk sector. Thus when we organized our defenses we turned special attention to reinforcing terrain permitting tank travel, and we allocated the forces and resources necessary for the fight against tanks. Very soon our warriors and commanders learned to create antitank strongpoints and to annihilate enemy vehicles by artillery, tank, and infantry fire. Creation of special tank destroyer detachments and groups in the units had great significance. Use of antitank rifles became widespread.

With the onset of winter, the length of the line of defense grew, inasmuch as frozen lakes and marshes that were impassable in summer now became accessible to lightly armed troops, especially detachments traveling on skis and reindeer-drawn sleds. Defensive areas had to be created in new sectors. Additional troops and combat equipment were required. And they began arriving in ever-greater quantities.

In December 1941 seven marine rifle brigades joined the Karelian Front. They were manned by remarkable sailor-soldiers, but they were not trained in combat activities on land. We were persuaded of this from the experience of one of the brigades, which was committed to battle in the Reboly sector. The seamen felt out of place in combat: They were not well versed in the use of infantry weapons, and they operated according to the naval principle of fighting close together. When attacking, they marched forward erect, in a continuous line, which resulted in unjustified losses. We did everything we could to teach the seamen to make war against the strong and insidious enemy according to all the rules of field tactics. In particular, experienced combined-arms officers were appointed brigade commanders. Thus the 77th Brigade was assigned to Colonel P. K. Saltykov, the 61st was assigned to Colonel S. M. Krivopalov, the 65th was assigned to Colonel F. I. Korobko, the 66th was assigned to Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Derzhavin, the 85th was assigned to Lieutenant F. I. Litvinov, and the 72d was assigned to Colonel V. N. Molozhayev.

In winter 1941/1942 the front received about 15 ski battalions, formed and trained in Arkhangel'skaya and Vologodskaya oblasts. These subunits, which were partially reorganized into maneuverable ski brigades, turned out to be extremely effective in the conditions afforded by the Arctic and the Karelian ASSR. During the winter several complements of soldiers trained in a 110-hour combat training program joined the front. A significant proportion of them were from republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The young soldiers were warmly clothed and shod, they were helped to adapt themselves quickly to the severe climatic conditions of the North, and what is most important, they were taught how to fight immediately after their arrival.

Considering the great significance of the railroad linking Belomorsk and Obozerskaya to the Northern Rail Trunkline, the front's military council transferred a significant part of the new complement to the Masel'sk Operational Group (two divisions, four marine rifle brigades, and eight separate ski battalions). Seven ski battalions were transferred to the Medvezh'yegorsk Operational Group.

Operational groups of frontal troops were gradually formed in the main sectors of combat operations; these groups later transformed gradually into major army formations: the 19th Army in the Kandalaksha sector (commander, Major General S. I. Morozov; military council member, Brigade Commissar A. P. Kaplunovskiy; chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Markushevich); the 26th Army in the Kesten'ga-Ukhtinsk sector (commander, Major General N. N. Nikishin; military council member, Division Commissar P. K. Batrakov; chief of staff, Colonel M. I. Malitskiy); the 32d Army in the Medvezh'yegorsk sector (commander, Major General S. G. Trofimenko; military council member, Brigade Commissar V. T. Pisklyukov; chief of staff, Major General G. M. Bragin).

Somewhat later all of the front's air units and formations were combined into the 7th Air Army (commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation I. M. Sokolov; chief of staff, Colonel I. M. Belov).

Thus owing to organizational improvements, to the arrival of fresh troops, and to stronger management of the front's troops, the effectiveness of subsequent combat activities of the formations and units in independent sectors increased. The evolved organization of the Karelian Front persisted until the end of military operations in the Arctic and the Karelian ASSR.

In addition to organizational improvements, the troops experienced qualitative improvements. Weapons and equipment arrived in greater quantities. We were given a battalion of tanks, two battalions of rocket artillery, 15,000 automatic rifles, 1,200 light machineguns, and 200 medium machineguns. This made it possible to create one company of automatic riflemen in each division, and to arm ski battalions with automatic weapons. Sniper teams were created in all units. At the beginning of 1942 troops of the 14th Army included about 400 snipers, while the Kem' Operational Group contained 221. Each day these snipers knocked dozens of Germans and Finns out of action.

We should not fail to mention that the Karelian Front was the first to receive combat equipment furnished by the Allies, to include Cobra fighters, and food. However, the quantity of this equipment was small, though it was precisely in the first period of the Great Patriotic War that we experienced the greatest need in armament.

Conferment of the Guards title to a number of formations and units was a significant event in the life and combat activities of the troops. The first to receive this honor were the 52d Rifle Division and the 88th Rifle Division, which became correspondingly the 10th Guards and 23d Guards divisions. The 145th and 147th air fighter regiments and several artillery units became Guards units as well, which attested to qualitative improvement of the front's troops.

Meetings of the personnel were called in the formations and units for presentation of the Guards pennants; the order of the Peoples Commissar of Defense and congratulations from the federal military council were read at these meetings. Military council members personally presented the Guards pennants. Our frontal press illuminated these events extensively.

Partisan detachments appeared in the Arctic and Karelia. A partisan movement staff was created to direct partisan activities in behalf of the frontal troops.

The front's military council and its rear services directorate did a great deal of hard work during the front's development to support shipment of personnel, weapons, and combat equipment, to arrange quarters for and locate the troops, to build airfields, and to prepare transloading bases in Murmansk to handle the cargo beginning to filter its way there from the USA and England. The Supreme High Command Headquarters authorized I. D. Papanin to organize all of this, which he did with his usual efficiency.

Rear services organs displayed a great deal of initiative in seeking out local resources with which to supplement the food ration of the troops, and in preventing outbreaks of scurvy. Fishing in local water basins, berry and deer moss picking, and seaweed harvesting were organized. These efforts were initiated by the front's medical service, led by General I. A. Klyuss (the military commissar was Lieutenant Colonel I. M. Kononov).

Problems associated with improving the moral-political status of the troops and military discipline occupied a significant place in the activities of the front's military council and political directorate. The front's political directorate and the entire party-political machinery believed its main task to be that of mobilizing the personnel to decisively repel the invading aggressor, and to create an insurmountable defense. We must not forget that we are talking about the first months of the war, the hardest for our troops. In a defensive situation, where our troops were forced to abandon Soviet land to the enemy, to withdraw from the blows of his superior forces, and when news from the other fronts was worse every day, it was especially important to organize and inspire the people with party words of truth and with personal example.

The concrete combat situation required high efficiency in the work, concrete knowledge of the people, weapons, and tactics, and study of the opposing enemy, his tactics, and his weak and strong sides. Most political workers already had experience in party-political work, but this was not enough. The Communist Party saddled commanders, staffs, and political organs with the task of organizing satisfaction of its requirements of waging a merciless struggle against the enemy, defending every inch of Soviet land, fighting down to the last drop of blood for the cities and towns, and displaying the boldness, initiative, and courage inherent to our people.

Being an eye witness and a participant of the events of the war's first year and having seen Soviet soldiers fighting hard, bloody, exhausting battles every day, I am able to confirm that the steadfastness of the troops increased constantly, and their hatred for the enemy and their indestructible desire to annihilate the invaders were nurtured unceasingly. As the enemy's blows ground to a halt in the face of our defenses, the troops became more confident that things would soon change.

Prior to the war I served as the commissar of the 24th Samar-Ul'yanovsk Division. All of its missions were practiced in peacetime with a consideration for the probable opponents. But now the enemy was before us, and we had to repel his onslaught, stop his forward movement, and defeat him. This is precisely where the military commissars and the deputy commanders for political affairs displayed their value to the fullest extent. In these difficult times they did not diminish the leading role and responsibility of the commander; instead, they provided all-out support to him, uniting the personnel about him. Mobilizing the soldiers to fulfill the commander's orders, they constantly strengthened his authority. The political workers established revolutionary order together with the commander, and they were always in the thick of the soldiers, in the decisive areas of combat, where by personal example of courage and selfless devotion to the motherland they nurtured the boldness and steadfastness of the soldiers, their valor and initiative, their defiance of death, and their readiness to fight until the total defeat of the enemy.

I should note that despite the combat losses, the number of communists in the front grew. This became possible in connection with the new party admission requirements spelled out in decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). The party organization began accepting soldiers who had especially distinguished themselves in combat upon their submission of three recommendations from party members with a term of membership of just one year. One of these recommendations had to be from the military commissar. Acceptance of applicants and issue of party documents in party organizations were streamlined, which helped to keep the party organizations viable in the companies and batteries, and to maintain their combat activity at a high level.

Political organs and party organizations did a great deal of work with replenishments. They acquainted the young soldiers with the unique features of combat in the North and in Karelia; warriors coming from southern republics were taught Russian. Republic organizations provided a certain amount of assistance in this regard. They sent newspapers, letters, and gifts, and their delegations visited the fronts.

The forms and methods of work used by the commanders and political workers in the troops were distinguished by diversity. They included meetings and discussions with the personnel, personal example in combat, briefings about war heroes, and much else.

The frontal newspaper V BOY ZA RODINU (editor in chief, B. P. Pavlov) as well as army and division newspapers played a great role. They were published regularly, and they carried useful information to the masses.

Propaganda intended for enemy troops was also believed to be important in the activities of political organs. Thus in October 1941 the front's political directorate held a special conference on this issue. In addition to members of the front's military council, comrades O. V. Kuusinen,

A. P. Taymi, and other workers of the Central Committee and government of the Karelian-Finnish Republic also participated in it. V. P. Tereshkin, chief of the political directorate's Seventh Section, reported on the political-moral status of German and Finnish troops. A decision was made to publish the newspaper GOLOS SOLDATA in Finnish especially for soldiers of the Finnish Army. Lieutenant Colonel T. I. Lekhenu, an old Bolshevik and former rector of Petrozavodsk University was appointed as its editor. Issues associated with the content and conduct of radio transmissions in Finnish, German, and Norwegian were also examined.

Thus the continuous, purposeful party-political work conducted by commanders, political workers, and political organs, work which affected all elements and directions of activity of the troops and strengthened the moral potential of the personnel of the units and formations, became an effective means of fighting the enemy in the hands of the organizers.

We Learn to Attack

The offensive conducted by our troops in January 1942 in the northwestern sector was an inherent part of the general winter offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was undertaken with the goal of defeating Army Group North and relieving the blockade of Leningrad. Troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov, and Northwestern fronts were assigned this mission. Troops on the left wing of the Karelian Front soundly defeated enemy forces in the vicinity of Medvezh'yegorsk.*

The frontal command brought in the Masel'sk Operational Group, consisting of four rifle divisions and four marine rifle brigades, and the Medvezh'yegorsk Operational Group, consisting of three rifle divisions and seven separate ski battalions, for the offensive north of Lake Ladoga, which began on 3-5 January. The greater part of the tanks we received were sent to this area as well.

On the eve of the offensive the personnel met to discuss a special appeal made by the frontal military council to the troops, in which the warriors and commanders were asked to defeat the enemy and liberate Karelia, despite the enemy's strength and insidiousness.

However, the offensive did not develop as expected. Meeting stubborn enemy resistance, our units and formations advanced just a few kilometers, occupied a number of population centers, and improved their positions. These were tactical gains only. Our troops were unable to reach the end goals of this operation. A shortage of forces and resources (the ratio of men within the zone of advance was about equal, but our artillery was inferior by a factor of 1.5, and our automatic weapons and aviation were inferior by several orders of magnitude) and, most importantly, the inability of our

---

* TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 214, op. 1437, d. 286, ll. 1-11.

troops to penetrate prepared defenses (by this time Mannerheim's troops had already created a deeply disposed system of defenses) had its effect.

Nevertheless important results were achieved. First of all we demonstrated to the enemy that we intended more than just defending ourselves. Captured prisoners admitted that the offensive of our troops was a surprise, and that it caughtnot only the staff of the Karelian Army but also Mannerheim's staff unawares.

Without a doubt our strike north of Lake Ladoga had a favorable effect upon the offensive by Soviet troops east and southeast of Leningrad: In early 1942, the Finnish command was unable to move a single regiment from the Medvezh'yegorsk sector to reinforce its troops on the River Svir', but perhaps the most valuable result for us was that the warriors, commanders, and staffs gained some experience in preparing for and conducting an offensive. For the first time they really sensed that the invading enemy could be beaten. We were happy to see that even though the January offensive operation had not come to its hoped-for conclusion, the political-moral state of the personnel remained high.

The results and lessons of our January offensive in southern Karelia gave us valuable experience to be used in preparing for an offensive operation to be conducted by the front in the Arctic, the planning of which was completed by the beginning of March. Our ideas about the offensive were reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The military council intended to make its main strike in the Murmansk sector with forces of the 14th Army. It is no accident that this sector was selected, since it did offer the most advantageous terrain: The flank of the advancing troops could be covered by the Northern Fleet. Were the operation to be successful, it could dramatically weaken the enemy's entire defense system in this sector.

The Headquarters approved the operation plan. Concurrently it recommended that forces of the 19th and 26th armies (formed out of the operational groups by this time) make partial strikes in the Kandalaksha and Kesten'ga sectors.* Starting the operation in mid-April 1942 was proposed.

The preparations for the offensive operation required a considerable amount of hard work. It was extremely difficult to resolve the problems of replenishing the units and formations with personnel, training them in the tactics of offensive combat, accumulating ammunition, armament, and food, and organizing lines of communication.

One of the most important tasks was to prepare the personnel for the offensive in the moral-psychological respect. As we went over from defense to offense, we had to inspire a decisive offensive spirit in the warriors. In the general political aspect, we naturally maintained their offensive spirit constantly, but in this case we were now dealing with covert preparations for an offensive.

* TsAMO, f. 214, op. 32272, d. 1, l. 3.

Meetings were held with the command of the Northern Fleet, in which coordination between frontal troops and seamen was organized. The order of action by allocated naval forces in different phases of the 14th Army's offensive operation, beginning from the Zapadnaya Litsa River line, were thoroughly discussed. In March and April the front's executives, political workers, and staff officers did their work in the 14th, 19th, and 26th armies, which were preparing for the offensive. Communication with the unit and subunit personnel afforded a possibility for deeply studying the state of affairs and the situation on the front and, what is most important, to gain a good understanding of the morale of the warriors and commanders.

Units and formations were partially regrouped from one sector to another during preparations for the offensive. Thus the 236th and 186th rifle divisions, two marine rifle brigades, and one ski brigade were transferred into the zone of advance of the 26th Army. A large volume of engineering operations was carried out. In particular roads and cross-country tracks were built and repaired at a swift pace. Thus a new road was built from the 35-kilometer post of the Loukhi-Kesten'ga highway leading to the disposition of the 19th Army's troops. Railroad tracks were restored (the branch from Loukhi almost to the forward edge of our defenses, east of Kesten'ga).

On 4 April the frontal military council issued a directive to the troops on conducting the offensive operation. The 14th Army was given the mission of destroying the XIX Mountain Rifle Corps in coordination with the Northern Fleet, and pushed its surviving elements beyond the state border. The 14th marine infantry and 6th ski brigades were additionally included in the army's strike grouping. The 12th Marine Infantry Brigade was landed on the south shore of Motovskiy Bay for a flank attack on the enemy. Strikes from the south by the land group against the enemy's right flank and by the marine assault landing party against his left flank were to merge together with the advance of army troops from the front. The army reserve consisted of the 152d Rifle Division and the 5th Ski Brigade.

Part of the forces of the 19th Army were to go over to the offensive from the Verman River line, destroy the main forces of the fascist German XXXVI Army Corps, and attain Alakurta.

According to the plan, the 26th Army was to penetrate the defenses of the XVIII Mountain Rifle Corps in the Kesten'ga sector, attain the Sof'yanga line, and organize defenses there in a narrow pass between the lakes.

Troops of the 26th Army went over to the offensive on 26 April. They broke through the enemy's defenses in individual sectors, and in 3 days of combat they advanced a few kilometers. Subsequent continuous attacks by advancing units of the 186th, 263d and 23d Guards rifle divisions as well as the 80th Marine Rifle Brigade were unable to increase the success. The 26th Army failed its mission of reaching the Sof'yanga line. The offensive was halted at the beginning of May.

Part of the forces of the 19th Army began their offensive on 27 April. Here as well the tactical results were insignificant. However, the command of Army Norway was unable to take a single unit out of the sector to reinforce its troops in the Murmansk sector.

In the last days of April a group of workers from the front's field directorate visited the 14th Army. They wanted to be together with the troops making the main strike. Army military council member Division Commissar A. I. Kryukov and chief of staff Colonel K. F. Skorobogatkin were present at Major General V. I. Shcherbakov's command post.

On the morning of 28 April, following 3 hours of artillery preparation, units of the 10th Guards Division went over to the offensive. The offensive developed slowly, since the enemy's strong reinforcements and gun positions had not been destroyed by artillery and aviation. Breaking enemy resistance with difficulty, our troops captured only a few isolated strongpoints on the forward edge in the first 3 days. The assault landing party landed on the shore of Motovskiy Bay was unable to attain the hoped-for success either: The seamen were halted by counterattacks of German reserves brought in from the deep rear. In order to intensify the strike and soften the defenses for the breakthrough, the commander decided to commit his reserve--the 152d Rifle Division--to the engagement. But it never reached the forward edge. On 3 May the weather changed drastically, the temperature dropped, snow started to fall, and a blizzard began. All road movement ceased, and deliveries of food and ammunition dropped to a minimum.

Some Lessons

An analysis of the offensive by the front's administration reveals a number of shortcomings in its organization, as well as in management of combat activities by individual commanders. Nevertheless from my point of view the offensive failed mainly due to the weather. I can well remember how terrible this snowstorm was. In places, the drifts were 2 to 3 meters deep. On 6 May I had to return to Murmansk from the forward edge on foot. Where the snow-covered road was could be determined only from the telephone poles. It took us an exhausting 8 hours to travel the 25 kilometers to the city.

The front's operation was not successful, but in certain sectors our positions were improved. The outline of the forward edge of defense became more advantageous. Conditions were created on the 14th Army's left flank for a strike from the vicinity of Lake Chapr. The active operations of our armies forced the enemy to temporarily postpone the offensive operation he was planning. In the course of the combat he suffered serious losses: Just counting the killed, the fascists lost about 5,000 enlisted men and officers.* The offensive actions of the Karelian Front's troops in spring 1942 forced the German command to once again take steps to reinforce its defenses, to transfer fresh forces from Germany and other regions to the North, thus weakening other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

* TsAMO, f. 214, op. 1437, d. 288, l. 7.

What was valuable to us was that commanders, staffs, and troops gained experience in preparing for and conducting an offensive. Something like this never comes easy, but otherwise it would be impossible to learn how to defeat the enemy. We did a great deal of diversified work to disseminate the combat experience among all units and subunits, which doubtlessly had favorable significance to the successful actions of the Karelian Front's troops later on, during preparations for and the conduct of the Petsamo-Kirkeness operation in 1944.

The Karelian Front was born in the harsh fall of 1941, when Soviet troops, which were fighting hard defensive battles against a strong and insidious enemy, were forced to retreat eastward. It gathered its strength, and it attacked in winter and spring 1942, when the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the battle of Moscow and the offensive being conducted on other fronts laid the foundation for a fundamental turning point in the Great Patriotic War.

Fighting savage defensive battles in a border engagement, troops of the Karelian Front foiled the aggressor's plan for seizing the Soviet North and Karelia by a lightning strike, and they helped the defenders of Leningrad to hold the city. They attended a great school of defensive art, and then they gained their first experience in preparing for and conducting an offensive. By July 1942 the foundation for a subsequent offensive and for defeat of Hitler's and Mannerheim's troops in the Arctic and Karelia was laid on the right flank of the Soviet-German front. Later, giving troops of the Karelian Front and forces of the Northern Fleet their due, in 1944 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet instituted the "For Defense of the Arctic" medal, awarding it to participants of the defensive and offensive actions.

Ten months of work in the military council of the Karelian Front was a great school for me personally. It was there that I became battle-seasoned and gained experience that was so useful later, when during the battle of Stalingrad I served as a member of the front's military council. During the war and after it, it was with a feeling of respect and gratefulness that I always recalled my comrades in arms, with whom I had fought at that time.

I learned many instructive and useful things from the front commander, General V. A. Frolov. By that time Valerian Aleksandrovich was already an experienced military leader. And his spiritual qualities made him a remarkable person: strict and cordial, demanding and just. He devoted all of his talent, energy, and strength to serving the motherland and the objectives of the Communist Party. His personal contribution to organizing defense of the Soviet North in the first year of the war was truly tremendous.

Being a member of the front's military council, I felt my primary responsibility to be that of creating and strengthening an effectively operating mechanism of frontal and army command and control. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the field directorate of the Karelian Front as

well as the field directorates of the 14th, 19th, 26th, and 32d combined-armed armies and the 7th Air Army were well organized collectives. Owing to the knowledge, energy, and talent of many officers and generals, the complex war missions of the North were completed.

Marshals of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov and S. L. Sokolov, Chief Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov, Marshal of Artillery G. Ye. Peredel'skiy, and many others who are famous military leaders today were seasoned, gained maturity, and accumulated combat experience in engagements of the Karelian Front in a difficult time for the motherland.

I will forever hold the warmest feelings for the soldiers and commanders of the Karelian Front, who displayed unequaled heroism and unprecedented steadfastness in combat against a savage enemy in the harsh conditions of the North. They were the main strength of the first battles and engagements that first halted the aggressor's advance and then destroyed him.

Photo caption [photo not reproduced]. Following a conference of the military council members of the Karelian Front, the Northern Fleet, and the 14th Army (December 1941). Left to right, first row: Frontal military council member Brigade Commissar G. N. Kupriyanov, fleet commander Admiral A. G. Golovko, front commander Corps Commander V. A. Frolov, front military council member Corps Commissar A. S. Zheltov; second row: 14th Army military council member Division Commissar A. I. Kryukov, fleet and 14th Army military council member M. N. Starostin, fleet military council member A. A. Nikolayev, 14th Army commander Division Commander R. N. Panin, and front political directorate chief Division Commissar A. G. Rumyantsev.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

NAVAL FLAGS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 55-60

[Article, published under the heading "Combat Traditions," by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Capt 1st Rank L. Roshchin: "The Naval Ensign - the Ship's Colors"]

[Text] Loyalty to the Battle Pennant is one of the most glorious traditions of the USSR Navy. By ancient custom, the Naval Ensign plays the role of the Battle Pennant for seamen.

The Naval Ensign of the Russian fleet was raised in 1668 aboard the first warship, the Orel, and it had three colors--white, red, and blue. Following several changes, in 1712 it became a white background with crossing blue diagonal strips, and it existed in this form until 1917. It was precisely under this ensign that Russian seamen glorified the fatherland in famous engagements at Gangut, Cesme, Sinop, and many other places.

Following the victory of Great October the color red--the color of the proletarian revolution--appeared on the background of the Naval Ensign. The mutinous crew of the battleship "Potemkin" was the first in the Russian fleet to raise the red banner in June 1905. Seamen of the cruisers "Ochakov" and "Pamyat' Azova", the destroyers "Svirepyy", Skoryy", "Zorkiy", and other warships fought in the course of the first Russian revolution under red banners. The red flag aboard the fleet's ships became a symbol of the approaching revolution. "...this flag," wrote V. I. Lenin, "will rise even higher, since this ensign is the ensign of all laborers and exploited peoples in the entire world."[1]

The overwhelming majority of ships of the Baltic Fleet, which were led by the Bolshevik party and V. I. Lenin, carried red flags by as early as the beginning of March 1917 . The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet and a seamen's meeting of the Gel'singforsk Council stated in their September decision that the raising of red flags in the Baltic Fleet "symbolizes unshakeable devotion and faithfulness to the revolution, and demonstrates its readiness to fight with all strength for transfer of power to the hands of revolutionary democracy, the proletariat, and the laboring peasantry."[2]

Baltic seamen displayed this unshakeable devotion to the revolution in October 1917 during the defense of Petrograd from the sea, when in the Moonzund engagement with the Kaiser's fleet they repelled the latter decisively.

The crews of the battleship "Slava", the destroyer "Grom", and the gunboat "Khrabryy" distinguished themselves especially. The "Grom" was seriously damaged in the battle of Kassarskiy Pool. Approaching it, the gunboat "Khrabryy" rescued the surviving crewmembers.[3] Minelayer Master Sergeant Fedor Samonchuk decided to remain aboard the destroyer and continue the fight: A German destroyer was approaching the "Grom". The master sergeant hit the enemy ship with a torpedo, and then he tossed a torch into the powder magazine so that other ships would not take the "Grom". The destroyer was sunk by the explosion, but it had not lowered its ensign before the enemy. F. Ye. Samonchuk was forced overboard by the shock wave, and he survived. In July 1955 he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this act of heroism.

Ships of the revolution took to the Neva in those October days of 1917 under red flags: the cruiser "Avrora", the minelayers "Amur" and "Khoper", the destroyers "Samson" and "Zabiyaka", and others. Revolutionary Baltic seamen made up one of the main forces in Lenin's plan for an armed rebellion in Petrograd.

After the victory of October the red flag played the role not only of the state flag but also the Naval Ensign. The first Soviet consitution, approved on 10 July 1918, stated that "the merchant, marine, and military flag of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic consists of a red (scarlet) background bearing, in its left upper corner by the staff, the gold letters RSFSR or the inscription Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic."[4] It was under this flag that Soviet naval seamen committed their many acts of heroism during the Civil War. Thus in May 1919 the destroyer "Gavriil" fought four English destroyers to victory. The gunboat "Vanya-kommunist" fought White ships on the Kama under the red banner, heroically, until the last minute.

Noting the services of the seamen to the Soviet Republic, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner to many ships. One of the first to earn this award was the destroyer "Karl Libknekht", which saw action in the Caspian Flotilla, and which distinguished itself many times in combat. Thus on 6 May 1919 it successfully captured the White Guards steamship "Leyla", forcing the enemy to lower his ensign. Valuable operational documents were present aboard the enemy vessel.

The same award was earned by Dniepr Flotilla gunboats "Grozyashchiy", "Geroyskiy", "Gubitel'nyy", and "Moguchiy", the courier vessel "Borets za svobody" of the Volga Naval Flotilla, and other ships.

To the seamen, the red flag embodied Soviet rule, and all disrespect to the ship's colors was justifiably interpreted to be a hostile action. A document stored in the Central Naval State Archives attests to one such case. It reports that one night two members of the crew of the minelayer "Sheksna" (former White officers) attempted to raise a besom (broom) up the mast which carried the Red Flag during the day. "Duty seaman Spiridonov kept the class enemies from doing this," the document states.[5]

In connection with formation of the USSR, a decision was made in 1923 to introduce a new national state flag bearing a five-pointed star, a sickle, and a hammer. The Naval Ensign was changed as well. On 24 August 1923 the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee approved the pattern and description of the new Naval Ensign. The center of the red background bore a white ring with rays of the same color fanning out from it, and inside the ring there was a red five-pointed star with a white sickle and hammer. This ensign was raised for the first time aboard ships in the 6th anniversary of October.

On 27 May 1935 the Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples Commissars published the decree "On Naval Ensigns of the USSR", in compliance with which USSR Peoples Commissar of Defense K. Ye. Voroshilov published Order No 148 on 8 July, making official the "Statute on Banners, Ensigns, Salutes, and Military Honors Aboard Ships of the Workers and Peasants Red Army Naval Forces." The USSR Naval Ensign that was introduced in 1935 exists to this day.

The white and blue colors of the USSR Naval Ensign are a reflection of its tie with the Russian Naval Ensign and the remarkable victories gained by seamen of our fatherland in the past, while the red star, the hammer, and the sickle represent its new, socialist content.

During the years of peaceful construction our navy grew, matured, and gained experience. Soviet naval seamen held the honor of their ensign high during long cruises and in battles against White Chinese provocateurs on the Chinese Eastern Railroad and against White Finns in the harsh winter of 1939-1940.

Naval personnel displayed their devotion to the motherland and to the ship's colors especially clearly in the hard struggle against fascist German invaders and Japanese aggressors. Both on land and at sea, seamen displayed mass heroism, steadfastness in defense, and decisiveness in offense. Out of the numerous examples of faithfulness to the Naval Ensign, we will present just a few. In August 1941 the escort vessel "Tuman" of the Northern Fleet, which was patrolling off the island of Kil'din, was attacked by three fascist destroyers. There were only two 45-mm guns aboard the escort vessel. Under the command of Senior Lieutenant L. A. Shestakov, the crew fought the superior enemy forces heroically. The vessel's steering was soon knocked out of commission, its engine was damaged, the side was punctured in several places, and the superstructure caught fire, but the ship continued to fight. When an enemy shell knocked down the ensign, Semenov, the wounded helmsman, raised it above his head. After he was wounded a second time, radio operator

Blinov came to his aid. The Naval Ensign continued to flutter above the ship until it disappeared beneath the water.

The Black Sea Fleet patrol boat SKA-065 commanded by Communist Senior Lieutenant P. P. Sivenko fought the enemy just as heroically. This boat was operational from the first to the last stage of the war, it cruised many thousands of nautical miles, it fought air raids more than 200 times, it annihilated three airplanes and damaged six, it sunk two German boats, it landed assault parties and scouts many times, and it evacuated more than 1,000 casualties.[6] On 25 March 1943 SKA-065 was escorting a transporter carrying cargo for the front. Enemy airplanes attacked. Almost all of the seamen were wounded, but they continued to fight. One of the bomb fragments cut the halyard of the ensign. The ensign fell to the deck. A wounded seaman, V. D. Potapov, quickly tied the halyard back together, and the ship's colors once again waved above the boat. In the heat of the battle Petty Officer 2d Class G. A. Kuropyatnikov, a young communist, lost his left arm below the elbow. But he would not abandon his battle station, and when smoke generators caught fire at the stern beside some depth charges, he applied all of his strength and began tossing them overboard, averting the boat's destruction.

For this act of heroism Petty Officer 2d Class G. A. Kuropyatnikov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, the entire crew was awarded USSR orders and medals, and the boat, the only one among 4th rank ships in our fleet, was presented the Guards Naval Ensign.



USSR Naval Ensign (Left). USSR Guards Naval Ensign

In August 1941 the gunboat "Vernyy" of the Pinsk Flotilla, which was commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. F. Terekhin, broke through from the vicinity of Kremenchug to Cherkassy along the Dniepr during the day. Fascists fired continuously from the shore. The "Vernyy" fought the Germans for 4 hours. Twice the ship's ensign was knocked down by fragments from bursting shells, and each time it was immediately restored to its place. The gunboat completed its mission, having passed through a fire screen. German tanks and armored vehicles, annihilated by its sharpshooting gunners, were burning on shore.[7]



USSR Red Banner Naval Ensign (Left). USSR Guards Red Banner Naval Ensign

More than 400,000 seamen were known to have fought on the land fronts during that Great Patriotic War. They distinguished themselves in the battles of Moscow and Odessa, Sevastopol' and Novorossiysk, and Stalingrad and Leningrad. The small garrison of the fortress of Oreshek, located on Orekhovyy Island, just 200 meters from Shlissel'burg, which was occupied by the enemy, fought courageously against the Germans from September 1941 to January 1943. Day and night the fascist German invaders shelled the fortress; they destroyed all buildings and historical monuments on the island, but they could not break its defender's will. Six times the Germans knocked down the colors of the fortress, and six times, under hurricane fire, it was returned to its place by Komsomol member K. L. Shklyar.

It is impossible to mention all of the heroic seamen and crews of ships that had distinguished themselves during the Great Patriotic War. Ships and formations awarded the lofty Guards and Red Banner titles have entered naval history in perpetuity. These included the submarines D-3, S-56, Shch-402, and M-172, the Baltic Fleet's 1st Minesweeper Battalion, the Dniepr Flotilla's 2d Separate Motor Gunboat Battalion, and others.

The Great Patriotic War ended almost 35 years ago. But as before, Soviet seamen hold that glorious tradition--faithfulness to the Naval Ensign--sacred. The basic statutes concerning ensigns are spelled out in a special section of the USSR Naval Ship Regulations adopted 10 January 1978. Article 608 of the Ship Regulations declares: "The USSR Naval Ensign, when raised aboard a ship of the navy, is that ship's Battle Pennant. It symbolizes the ship's state of registry and its inviolability, as well as the ship's readiness to defend the state interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the seas and oceans.

"The USSR Naval Ensign is a symbol of military honor, valor, and glory, and it serves as a remembrance to every serviceman aboard ship as to his sacred duty to devotedly serve the Soviet motherland, defend it courageously and competently, and protect every inch of native land from the enemy sparing neither blood nor life itself."[8]

Article 609 emphasizes: "Ships of the USSR Navy are not to lower their ensign before the enemy under any circumstances, preferring death to surrender to enemies of the Soviet Union."[9]

Article 610 declares: "Protection of the USSR state flag and Naval Ensign in battle is an honorable obligation of every ship's crew.

"All personnel aboard ship are obligated to selflessly and courageously defend the USSR state flag and the Naval Ensign in battle, and prevent its capture by the enemy.

"Immediate observation of the condition of the ensign and its protection in combat is entrusted to persons specially designated for this purpose by the combat duty schedule."[10]

If the ensign falls in combat, it must be immediately replaced by another, so that the enemy would never think for even a minute that the ensign had been lowered before him. If it is impossible to raise the ensign in its regular place, it is raised on a makeshift flagpole anywhere aboard ship. Not less than two back-up Naval Ensigns must be always ready aboard ship. The specific rituals associated with the Naval Ensign evolved a long time ago in the fleet and are presently practiced. Arriving aboard ship, every serviceman salutes the ensign. The Naval Ensign is raised aboard ship on a gaff (or on the aft flagpole) while cruising, and on the aft flagpole when standing at anchor or moored. When the ship is standing, the ensign is raised every working day at 0800 hours, and at 0900 hours on days off and holidays. The ensign is lowered at sunset and, on Arctic seas, by special order of the fleet commander. Ships cruising at sea keep the ensign up around the clock. The ensign-raising ceremony is an impressive sight on both work days and holidays--always. A minutes before it is raised, the duty officer commands: "Face the flag and jack. Attention!" Everyone on deck and on the superstructures freezes in solemn silence. At precisely the appointed time the officer commands: "Raise the ensign and jack!" The piper pipes, and all turn their heads in the direction of the ensign; officers and warrant officers raise their hand to their headwear in salute. At this moment every seaman is gripped by a deep feeling of responsibility for defending the fatherland, of his membership in a powerful Soviet fleet, a ship collective. "The ship.... How can I communicate...this concept, which is the seaman's entire world?" wrote Leonid Sobolev. "The ship--it is a home, the home in which he lives, studies, and rests. The ship--it is his family, people dear to him, people tied to him...by grief and joy, by a common, single goal....

"The ship--it is an arena of a seaman's combat deeds, his fortress and sanctuary, his weapon in attack, his strength, and his honor. It is the Naval Ensign, raised aloft on the gaff, waving above the world in proud grandeur.

"And most importantly, to the seaman, the ship is his motherland."[11]

Ships of the USSR Navy salute places of glorious victories and of the heroic death of ships of the Russian and Soviet fleets. When passing by these places during daylight hours, the crew forms up on deck, and the aft ensign is lowered to half-mast.

The Naval Ensign is carried today by our ships on all oceans, and each year Soviet ships visit friendly countries. Each day the seamen improve their combat readiness. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev gave a high evaluation to their activities. In a letter to the crew of an outstanding atomic submarine of the Red Banner Northern Fleet written on 25 January 1975, he stated: "High moral-combat qualities, collectivism, friendship and comradeship, and limitless devotion to our Leninist party and the Soviet people are typical of the fleet's seamen, as is true of all soldiers of our valorous armed forces. Continue to improve your combat proficiency and political maturity, raise the excellence of your naval tactics, and fulfill your duties as sons of the Soviet motherland in exemplary fashion under all conditions.... I am confident that personnel of the army and navy will hold sacred and multiply the glorious revolutionary and combat traditions of our people and their armed forces, alertly standing guard over the achievements of socialism."[12] Soviet seamen are proud of such a high evaluation. They are standing an alert guard over the fatherland's sea borders.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 12, p 58.

2. Zverev, B. I., "Zovushchiy k pobede " [Calling to Victory], Voyenizdat, 1966, p 38.

3. The gunboat "Khrabryy" not only saved the crew of the "Grom" but also annihilated an enemy destroyer with artillery fire. In 1922 it was renamed the "Krasnoye znamya". During the Great Patriotic War the boat's crew fought the fascists heroically. Many seamen were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

4. "Pervaya Sovetskaya Konstitutsiya (Konstitutsiya RSFSR 1918 goda) " [The First Soviet Constitution (The 1918 RSFSR Constitution)], Moscow, Yurizdat NKYu SSSR, 1938, p 439.

5. Central State Archives of the USSR Navy, f. R-34, op. 2, d. 19, ll. 1, 5, 6.

6. "Boyevoy put' Sovetskogo Voyenno-Morskogo flota" [The Battle Road of the Soviet Navy], 3d Edition, Voyenizdat, 1974, pp 375-376; Korniyenko, D. I., "Flot nashey Rodiny " [The Fleet of Our Motherland], Voyenizdat, 1967, p 367.

7. See Kuznetsov, N. G., "Na flotakh boyevaya trevoga " [Battle Alert in the Fleets], Voyenizdat, 1961, p 293.

8. "Korabel'nyy ustav Voyenno-Morskogo flota SSSR" [USSR Navy Ship Regulations], Voyenizdat, 1978, p 253.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., pp 253-254.

11. Sobolev, Leonid, "Sobr. soch. v 6 tomakh" [Collected Works in Six Volumes], Vol 3, Moscow, Izd-vo Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1973, p 454.

12. Brezhnev, L. I., "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Pressing Problems in the CPSU's Ideological Work], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp 76-77.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

MILITARY THREATS: A SOVIET VIEWPOINT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 63-71

[Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by Merited Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Maj Gen M. Monin: "The Lie of the Century and the Truth of History"]

[Text] No problem troubles mankind more in world politics today than that of insuring sound, universal peace and the security of nations, and prevention of nuclear missile world war. The path to the solution of this problems lies through further deepening of relaxation of international tension, and extension of this relaxation into the military area.

Beginning with the historic Decree of Peace declared by V. I. Lenin at the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets on 26 October 1917, our state has confirmed, in all of its foreign political activities, not in word but in deed, that socialism and peace are inseparable. It has always guided itself and continues to guide itself by Lenin's directive that "peace will open a road for our influence which is a hundred times greater and broader."* And in fact, the efforts of the Soviet Union to maintain and consolidate peace in the prewar years and especially following World War II earned it tremendous authority and influence among the peoples of the globe.

Soviet foreign policy, which is directed at consolidating universal peace and achieving disarmament, has always been a stumbling block to imperialism, inasmuch as it has hindered its deceit of the masses, and concealment of its aggressive essence. Trying to make the USSR look like the aggressor and thus justify the arms race and the preparation for war against it, the bourgeoisie created the myth of a "Soviet military threat," of a "danger from the East," and so on.

Beyond the myth of a "Soviet military threat" stand highly influential political forces, the military-industrial complex being the main one of them. In addition to knowingly distorting the essence of the USSR's foreign policy course, all of these forces are trying to weaken, if not reverse, relaxation

* Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 247.

of international tension, and achieve unilateral concessions from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist fraternity in the most important military-political issues.

Considering the long time the myth of a "Soviet threat" has persisted in the arsenal of the West's propaganda resources, and most importantly, the immensity of the goals pursued in this regard by imperialist reaction, we cannot but agree with the assertion made by (Gerkhard Kade), a prominent West German scholar and vice president of the International Institute of Peace in Vienna, that "The insistently spread legend of a 'danger from the East' has become the lie of the century."* The leaders of China recently assumed an active part in this campaign; arming themselves with the big-power, chauvinist ideas of Mao Tse-tung, they have taken a course of open hostility toward the Soviet Union and world socialism, collaborating more and more with the most reactionary imperialist circles in preparations for war against the USSR in an alliance with the USA, Japan, and the European countries of NATO. The myth of a "Soviet military threat" is entirely a part and parcel of Chinese diplomacy and propaganda.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev unmasked the insidious plans of international reaction, dangerous to universal peace. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Leonid Il'ich stated, it is not trying to create a "military advantage" over the NATO countries, since "we do not want war, and we are not preparing for war," and consequently we entertain no notions of "making a first strike,"** as they are imputing of us in the West. "The Soviet Union is truly a powerful state, powerful in political, economic, and military respects. But the Soviet Union is a peaceful state. Its love of peace issues forth from the very nature of our society, the greatest goal of which, declared in the laws and decisions of the highest political levels of authority, is concern for continued growth of the material welfare and culture of the people. There is not a single objective which we intend to reach by military means."*** The CPSU Central Committee Plenum held in November 1979, in which CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev gave a speech, and the Second Session, Ninth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet once again persuasively demonstrated the peaceful nature of the intentions of the Country of the Soviets.

The real threat to peace and the security of nations, mainly the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity, comes from American imperialism and its NATO allies, with whom Beijing hegemonists are now collaborating in preparation for world war.

With the sanction of the government, back in spring 1945 American military circles began work on the first plans for an attack upon the USSR, based on

---

* See ZA RUBEZHOM, No 32, 1979, p 11.
** Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 306-308.
*** Ibid., p 309.

the use of atomic bombs in mass attacks against 20 Soviet cities. The plans foresaw that the United States would make a "first strike" against the USSR--that is, it would initiate a preventive atomic war with the hope of foiling restoration of the Soviet economy, broken by the fascist invasion, and in the end forcing the USSR to its knees. Directive No 1496/2 of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 18 September 1945 stated the following in this regard: "Our government must...quickly make a political decision and concurrently make all preparations so that if need be, we would be able to make a first strike."

But matters did not rest with this. New plans for annihilation of the Soviet state and enslaving the people by expanding the resources of massed attacks came into being one after the other in the subsoil of the USA's military and diplomatic services. The official documents of this era, which have recently come to light, contained different versions of a "decisive defeat of the USSR," spelled out cold-bloodedly and with Jesuit sophistication. One of them, the report "American Policy in Relation to the Soviet Union," prepared for President Truman and his special assistant C. Clifford in September 1946, offered the following recommendation: "...in order to maintain our power at a level capable of restraining the Soviet Union, the USA must be ready to conduct atomic and bacteriological war...."

Anti-Soviet agitation in the ruling summit of the USA encouraged it to create, within the framework of the state machinery, new executive organs to complete the tasks associated with preparing for aggression against the USSR and its allies. Thus at the end of 1947 the National Security Council (NSC) came into being; its purpose was to discuss the most important issues of war and peace under the president's chairmanship.

Among the first documents of the NSC, Document No 20/1, approved 18 August 1948, is interesting. It foresaw implementation of measures aimed at "overthrowing the Soviet government" with the help of extensive subversive activities. At the same time war was not excluded as a means for reaching this goal. It was planned to start unexpectedly, considering that, as was stated in a special directive of the NSC approved in November 1948 by President Truman, "The Soviet government is presently not planning any sort of military activities intended to bring the USA into conflict."

By the time that the NSC directive was signed by Truman, the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already prepared a concrete plan of war against the Soviet Union under the code name "Charioteer." It foresaw nuclear strikes against 70 cities in the USSR in the very first month of the war. In this case the plan called for dropping 133 atomic bombs, to include 8 on Moscow and 7 on Leningrad. It was recognized that even after this, the USSR would still have enough strength to occupy Europe. But until the end of the war--it was to last 2 years--another 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs were to be dropped in various regions of the Soviet Union. According to the designs of the plan's authors, after the USSR received such a "working-over" from the air it should admit defeat.

By 1 September 1948 the "Fleetwood" plan--a guide for compiling operational documents to be implemented prior to 1 April 1949--was sent out to the formation staffs. The intent of "Fleetwood" did not differ from that of the "Charioteer" plan.

But neither of the plans was implemented owing to the fact that the trans-oceanic atomic maniacs were forced to reckon with the tremendous difficulties which the USA would inevitably encounter in a war against the USSR, which would transform into a world war, for which the USA was not prepared at that time. Noted among these difficulties were the courage and patriotism of the Russian people, their faithfulness to socialism, the well organized administrative mechanism of the Soviet government, which was capable of mobilizing the people to the country's defense, the inevitable explosion of anger among the Soviet people elicited by the atomic bombings, which would multiply its will to fight, the possibility the Soviet Union had for implementing maximum retaliatory measures, and so on. All of this forced the Washington administration to postpone an attack upon the USSR to a later time. And the word is postpone, not abandon in general.

Appearance of an atomic weapon in the Soviet Union, the successful testing of which was publicized by TASS in a communique on 25 December 1949, elicited a new rash of anti-Sovietism in the appropriate circles of the USA having a part in military planning. The fear also arose that they might be too late to defeat the USSR, inasmuch as its economic and war potentials were quickly growing stronger, and consequently its capability for making a retaliatory strike was increasing. Under these conditions the thoughts of initiating a preventive war against the Soviet Union and its allies arose once again.

American misanthropes hastened with all their strength to achieve their final reckoning with the Soviet state. It was precisely at that time, in the late 1940's, that big monopolistic capital in the USA initiated activities of unprecedented scale, attempting to crush West Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America beneath itself. This goal was served by the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshal Plan," the creation of aggressive military blocs under Washington's protection in different regions of the globe, and creation of a ring of military bases around the Soviet Union. Intense preparations were made for war against the USSR. Because of the change in the situation elicited by the causes described above, the American military leadership felt it necessary to correct its previous war plan. As a result a new plan appeared in 1949--"Trojan"--which suggested beginning the war against our state on 1 January 1950. This time its initiators intended to bomb 100 Soviet cities in the first 3 months of the war--practically all of the territory of the USSR, from Leningrad in the west to Vladivostok in the east, and from Arkhangel'sk in the north to the Caucasus and Central Asia in the south. About 300 atomic and 20,000 tons of conventional bombs were now to be dropped. However, careful estimates of the real capabilities of American strategic aviation on one hand and of the USSR's potentials for not only surviving after American bombings but also conducting active operations with Soviet troops on the other forced the White House to recognize victory over the Soviet Union to be unrealistic once again.

Thus the "Trojan" plan remained on paper alone. The American strategy of the USSR's annihilation was once again found to be unfounded. The USA clearly did not have enough of its own forces to achieve its main strategic intent. This encouraged the Pentagon to begin planning an armed attack on the USSR by the combined forces of the USA and its allies in the North Atlantic bloc, hammered together on the initiative and under the sponsorship of the USA in April 1949. In this same year the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a new plan. It was given the code name "Dropshot". Combat activities by the combined NATO armies against the USSR and its allies were to begin on 1 January 1957.

The strategic concept embodied within the "Dropshot" plan consisted of the following: First, all NATO countries were to participate in the war; Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel, Iran, India, and Pakistan were to initially remain neutral, and in the event they were attacked or a serious threat of attack arose, they were to enter the war on the side of NATO. The total strength of armed forces for the anti-Soviet war was 20 million men.

Second, the combined forces of the USA and its allies were to initiate an offensive against the Soviet Union along a vast front extending through all of West Europe and the western part of Asia, with the Soviet troops being contained selectively in a number of sectors, and with a strategic defense being maintained in the Far East.

Third, the offensive by the ground troops was to be preceded by an air offensive (Diagram 1), during which more than 300 atomic and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs were to be dropped on the Soviet Union with the goal of destroying ground, naval, and air forces, as well as industrial facilities, with the hopes of knocking 85 percent of Soviet industry out of commission.

Fourth, after the air offensive, 164 divisions of the NATO bloc, 69 of them American, were to go over to the offensive (Diagram 2); 114 divisions were to advance from the west, and 50 others were to come up from the south, landing on the northwest shore of the Black Sea. Their mission was to annihilate Soviet troops deployed in countries of East and Southeast Europe. The goal of the naval forces was to establish control over sea and ocean lines of communication.

According to the concepts of the authors of the "Dropshot" plan, actions by ground and naval forces combined with massed bombings of Soviet territory were to force the USSR and its allies to end their resistance, and surrender.

The "Dropshot" plan rested on the USA's superiority in nuclear weapons over the USSR, presence of forward military bases created near the border of the Soviet Union, and initiation of a preventive nuclear strike against Soviet cities. The plan's success rested on the probability of precluding a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike against US territory, while a nuclear strike by the USSR against US allies in Europe was left out of consideration.



Diagram 1

Key:

1.

Alaska	D	D+6
Medium bomber groups	1	1
Strategic reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3

2.

Labrador-Spain	D	D+6
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3

3.

Great Britain	D	D+6
Heavy bomber groups	1	1
Medium bomber groups	15*	15
Strategic reconnaissance groups	3**	3

4.

USA	D	D+6
Heavy bomber groups	4	4*

5.

Azors, Burmuda Islands	D	D+6
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3

6.

Cairo, Suez, Aden	D	D+6
Medium bomber groups	3	3
Strategic reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3

7.

Okinawa	D	D+6
Medium bomber groups	2	2
Strategic reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3

8.

Guam	D	D+6
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	1/3	1/3

9.

Total	D	D+6
Heavy bomber groups	5	5
Medium bomber groups	21*	21
Strategic reconnaissance groups	4**	4
Meteorological reconnaissance groups	2	2

10. Legend
11. Range of medium bombers
12. Range of heavy bombers
13. Note
14. Seven equivalent groups provided by Great Britain
15. One equivalent group provided by Great Britain
16. Greenland
17. Scandanavia
18. USSR
19. Moscow
20. London
21. Europe
22. Canada
23. USA
24. Near East
25. China
26. Japan
27. Tokyo
28. Hawaiian Islands
29. Southeast Asia
30. Singapore
31. Indonesia
32. Pacific Ocean
33. Australia
34. Indian Ocean
35. Africa
36. Atlantic Ocean
37. South America
38. Central America

The political concept behind the "Dropshot" plan had a clearly outlined class nature. This can be clearly seen mainly in the content of the goals of the war against the USSR, which involved, as was emphasized in the plan, "imposing our military goals upon the Soviet Union in interaction with our allies...", inasmuch as "the very nature of the socialist structure... presents the greatest threat to the national security of the USA." Thus annihilation of the Soviet state and the socialist achievements of the Soviet people was the objective. A similar fate was prepared for the peoples of other socialist countries as well. This would have cleared the way for American imperialism and established its unshared supremacy in the world.

Initiation of a psychological and economic war and of subversive activities against the USSR in both peacetime and in the course of military actions



Diagram 2

Key:

1. Total forces required for a strategic counteroffensive in Europe: divisions--164, air groups--110 (about 7,400 warplanes), escort aviation--24
2. Total forces required for an offensive operation in West Europe: divisions--114, air groups--169 (about 4,800 warplanes), escort aviation--12
3. Breakthrough forces: divisions--78, air groups--52
4. Total forces required for an offensive operation in the south: divisions--50, air groups--41 (about 2,600 planes), escort aviation--12. The total requirement is less than the overall combat strength for the two phases of the operation, since part of the forces are reused
5. Forces required for the second phase of the offensive operation in the south: divisions--30, air groups--26, escort aviation--12
6. Forces required for the first phase of the offensive operation in the south: divisions--27, air groups--25, escort aviation--12

was foreseen as a means for achieving such a reactionary design. But occupation of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries by NATO troops was to play the main role in attainment of the political goals of the American aggressors. Thirty-eight divisions with a total strength of 1 million enlisted men and officers were earmarked for this purpose, of which 23 divisions were to occupy the USSR, to include 2 divisions to take Moscow, and 1 each for Leningrad, Minsk, Murmansk, Gor'kiy, Kiev, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and other major administrative centers. Four out

of five air armies were also to deploy on USSR territory. An operational carrier formation was to be present on the Baltic and the Black seas. The invaders planned to divide all USSR territory into four "regions of responsibility", which was to put an end to the existence of a unified state organism, and facilitate the plunder of the wealth of our country.

Had it been implemented, for practical purposes the "Dropshot" plan would have meant initiation of World War III, and a new attempt by international counterrevolution to organize a general campaign against socialism. The very fact of the existence of such a plan in the United States of America is persuasive evidence that American imperialism transformed into the main reactionary force of modern times following World War II.

The "Dropshot" plan also sheds light on another unique feature of American military strategy--the USA's desire to make war on foreign soil, and predominantly with foreign hands. In its designs, the USA intentionally placed its allies in the line of fire, because it knew that by this time, the Soviet Union already possessed nuclear weapons and could make a retaliatory nuclear strike against military bases and springboards located on the territory of countries allied to the USA.

The reactionary nature of the "Dropshot" plan reveals itself with special force in that, similarly as with Hitler's "Barbarossa Plan", it was aimed against the greatest achievement of all revolutionary forces--the world's first socialist state, the Soviet Union, which had become the bulwark of socialism and social progress on Earth. Both plans foresaw destruction of the Soviet state, fated the peoples of our country to extermination or permanent bondage, and pursued the goal of liquidating socialism wherever it had consolidated itself. Just this circumstance alone fated the "Dropshot" plan to the same inevitable and shameful failure that was suffered by the "Barbarossa Plan".

The "Dropshot" plan was not fated to come into being not because American imperialism changed its aggressive reactionary course in relation to the USSR and countries of the socialist fraternity. From the moment the "Dropshot" plan was approved, the United States prepared intensively for war to begin in 1957, covering up these preparations by Pharisaic declarations of its desire for peace, its "faithfulness to the ideals of liberty," while at the same time intensifying its "psychological war" against the USSR and other socialist countries. In these years the military expenditures grew continuously, the arms race mushroomed, the network of American military bases near the borders of the socialist world expanded, the aggressive CENTO and SEATO blocs came into being as branches of NATO in the Near and Middle East and in Asia, and intense militarization of the FRG went on. In a word, the USA "stood balanced on the brink of war."

Nevertheless the "Dropshot" plan was not implemented either in 1957 or in subsequent years. And this was mainly because the balance of forces in the world continued to change more and more in favor of socialism. The USSR's

successes in strengthening its economic and military power were especially obvious. The Soviet Union tested hydrogen weapons before the USA. The world socialist system grew stronger as well. Cooperation, including military, among socialist countries entered a new stage after the signing of the Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in May 1955. The movement of national liberation grew broader. Many countries of Asia, upon which the authors of the "Dropshot" plan laid their hopes as potential allies of the USA in a war against the Soviet Union, declared an anti-imperialist course of nonalliance in foreign policy (India, Egypt, Syria, etc.). By the moment the "Dropshot" plan was to go into effect, American military circles lost their confidence in the USA's possibility for conquering the USSR. By the late 1950's they were aware of the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces were armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Their fear of the probability of popular turmoil in countries allied to the USA also had its effect.

Thus the "Dropshot" remained on paper, but the very fact that it had been written, together with other war plans discussed above, and the concrete actions of the USA in the international arena throughout the entire post-war period again and again remind all honorable people on Earth of the source of the real direct threat to universal peace--American and all international imperialism. The truth of history cannot be silenced. And no false cries of a "Soviet military threat" to imperialism and its present Chinese allies can hide from history those who are really responsible for inspiring the "cold war" and raising sentiment against relaxation of tension.

The course toward war preparations that manifested itself as the "Dropshot" plan is for practical purposes still being followed by the United States of America today. The 2,500 American military bases located in 114 countries (in 39 countries in 1949) are a serious danger to peace in all the world, and a threat to the countries of socialism. More than 500,000 servicemen of the 2.1 million in the American army are located at these bases. In recent years the USA has been intensifying its military presence at the approaches to the borders of the USSR and other socialist countries. Just in West Europe alone the USA has more than 330,000 American soldiers (their strength grew by 16,800 men in 1978). The USA maintains a tremendous number of nuclear resources at bases abroad. Just in Europe alone there are more than 8,000 units of them, and more than 3,000 delivery systems.

The events of the last months of 1979 in Iran attest to the danger presented by American forces located at various points of the world. Under the guise of protecting Americans in the US Embassy in Teheran, which was seized by Iranian students, Washington initiated real military preparations, concentrating more than 20 warships in the Arabian Sea, to include several aircraft carriers. The USA capitalizes upon any situation to increase American military power not only in the Near and Middle East but also in other regions of the globe.

The USA is the main force of NATO, and for practical purposes it determines its policy and strategy, which are once again extremely aggressive. NATO

today possesses more than 80 divisions, 17,000 tanks, 8,000 warplanes (to include more than 200 nuclear weapon carriers), and almost 1,500 warships.

All mankind is alarmed by the tremendous military expenditures of the USA and NATO countries. Between 1949 and 1978 they totaled $2.6 trillion, and another $1 trillion are to be spent in 1978-1983. The total spent by the USA for military purposes in the postwar years was $2.2 trillion, to include almost $900 billion after 1969.

After signing the SALT ONE Treaty in June 1979 with the USSR, the US government did not slow down its arms race. Paying lip service to relaxation it in fact continues to charge the atmosphere with fear, and to conduct military preparations. The plan now is to insure the military superiority of NATO over the Warsaw Pact countries by the mid-1980's. As US Secretary of Defense H. Brown declared, this means nuclear superiority, which should provide for Washington "the potential of guaranteed annihilation." Discussion of making a "preventive strike under certain circumstances" has begun anew in the USA.

In order to achieve these designs, a program of creating the MX system, a system of mobile missile complexes, has been initiated, strategic submarines are now being outfitted with the "Trident" system, and they have been prepared to take on cruise missiles with a range of 2,600 km. A NATO session held in December 1979 decided to deploy, in some countries of West Europe, about 600 cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles intended for strikes against the USSR and socialist countries allied to it.

The Soviet Union decisively condemned these plans. In his statement on 6 October 1979 in Berlin, L. I. Brezhnev said directly that in Europe, "There are thoughts of placing a bomb beneath the edifice of peace, beneath its very foundation."* Our country and its Warsaw Pact allies cannot allow the strategic situation on the continent to change significantly in favor of the NATO militarists, since this would aggravate the situation not only in Europe but also in the entire world as a whole.

A program of real consolidation of military security in Europe was propsed by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev in his speech in Berlin, and in his interview by a PRAVDA reporter in November 1979. It foresees a complex of measures, implementation of which would be in the interests of all European countries and peoples. The USSR declared its readiness to reduce, in comparison with the present level, the quantity of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in its western regions on the condition that no more medium-range nuclear weapons are deployed in West Europe. Moreover, on agreement with

* "Vizit v GDR sovetskoy partiyno-pravitel'stvennoy delegatsii vo glave s tovarishchem L. I. Brezhnevym po sluchayu 30-letiya obrazovaniya Germanskoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki" [Visit to the GDR by a Soviet Party-Government Delegation Headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the German Democratic Republic], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 44.

the GDR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union decided to unilaterally withdraw 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks, and a certain quantity of other military equipment from the territory of the GDR. On 5 December 1979 the first military formations of Soviet troops, totaling 1,500 men together with tanks and other combat equipment, abandoned the GDR and entered USSR territory.

The firm and, concurrently, sensible position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is meeting the support of the social circles of West Europe. Evidence of this can be found in the December Helsinki international conference on initiating an effort to prevent deployment of the new American missiles on European soil. The national council of the French movement for peace appealed to the French government to support the idea of holding immediate negotiations, proposed by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko on 23 November at a press conference in Bonn. This point of view has also been met with understanding among sober-thinking officials, to include those of NATO countries--Denmark, Holland, and Norway.

Unfortunately the Soviet initiative, which received active support from world society, was not given a favorable assessment in the USA, England, the FRG, and other NATO allies. At Washington's request West Europe selected a course of increasing its military potential under the guise of its "modernization," which is not in fact true at all, since the real objective is to deploy fundamentally new weapons in Europe that had not been there before.

Mutual relationships among states must develop in a different way if we want to be certain of the future of mankind. "The Soviet Union is confidently traveling the road of peace," emphasizes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "We speak out actively and persistently for resolving the dispute between socialism and capitalism not on the battlefield and not on the arms conveyors, but in the sphere of peaceful labor. Our wish is to have the boundary dividing these two worlds crossed not by the trajectories of missiles carrying nuclear warheads, but rather threads of broad and diversified cooperation for the good of all mankind. Consistently implementing this policy, we are fulfilling one of the main slogans of October and Lenin's commandments: Peace to the People!"*

* Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom", Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 597.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

MAN AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT RELATIONSHIP DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 72-77

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Docent and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Engr-Col A. Pupko: "The Role of Leninist Ideas on the Relationship of Man and Military Equipment for Soviet Military Organizational Development"]

[Text] The relationship of man and equipment in an armed conflict is one of the most important problems concerning development of the armed forces, inasmuch as the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the latter and the military power of the state depend upon its solution in many ways. A truly scientific solution to this problem would insure the fullest utilization of the creative capabilities of the citizen-soldier, effective use of the available equipment and weapons, an optimum structure of the armed forces, prediction of possible changes in development of the mutual relationships among different arms and branches of the armed forces, and so on.

Interaction of man and military equipment is a complex process; it is governed by a number of factors, to include specifically technical, psychological, ergonomic, physiological, and so on, requiring comprehensive examination on a scientific and a practical basis. The success of the analysis depends in many ways on the degree to which the methods are developed for analyzing the system of ties andrelationships arising between man and military equipment in an armed conflict.

V. I. Lenin approached solution of this problem from truly scientific positions. Relying upon the works of the founders of Marxism, who stated that it is precisely the unity of man and military equipment that is responsible for the attributes of the army of a given society, that the entire organization of armies and the means of warfare they adopt and, together with this, their victories and defeats, are dependent upon the human material we are working with and upon the weapons,[1] Vladimir Il'ich developed the military-theoretical legacy of Marx and Engels further in application to the new tasks facing the victorious proletariat.

He developed an entire methodology based on recognition of the organic unity, mutual relationship, and mutual dependence of man and military equipment, together with his dominant role in performance of missions.

Examining the problems associated with creating the army of the victorious proletariat, V. I. Lenin pointed out the need for sensibly combining the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses with the latest achievements in military equipment. Thus, speaking at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), he stated that one of the main tasks of Soviet military development is "to solve the problem of combining the enthusiasm and the new revolutionary creativity of the oppressed with utilization of that reserve of bourgeois science and technology of militarism in its worst forms, without which it would be unable to master modern equipment and modern means of warfare...."[2] In this regard the leader's references to the need for arming the army of the victorious proletariat with all types of military equipment to protect the revolutionary achievements have extremely important significance in this respect.

The dialectical unity of man and military equipment in an armed conflict makes up the "man--military equipment" system, which can be defined as a certain quantitative and qualitative combination of personnel and the military equipment they service, forming a single whole intended for particular missions. At the same time we can conclude from the positions of Leninist methodology that the components of a "man--military equipment" system are not equivalent in rights and value. Man is the leading, dominant element in relation to any type of military equipment at any level of its development. This conclusion may be based on V. I. Lenin's assertion that the effectiveness of any army would be low "in the absence of people capable of knowledgeably utilizing the latest improvements of military equipment."[3]

In fact, the dominant role of man within the "man--military equipment" system is a product of the sociopolitical essence of war, which is a collision of people seeking certain political goals with the help of the corresponding types of weapons and military equipment. The objective of using weapons to complete a concretemission is suggested by man, and it is he who utilizes the end results of this process. And no matter what level of development typifies the military equipment, it will always remain an implement of human activity, a resource created by man for reaching his objective in a specific area of military affairs. This is why effective use of military equipment depends on the moral-political qualities and the military-technical training of the human soldier.

But recognition of the human soldier's leading, dominant role in relation to military equipment does not mean understatement of the latter's role in an armed conflict. On the contrary V. I. Lenin himself cautioned us decisively: "The very best army, people most wholly devoted to the revolution would be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food, and trained."[4]

V. I. Lenin's ideas on the relationship of man and military equipment in an armed conflict enjoyed further development as the Soviet military developed. From the first years of the existence of the Soviet Armed Forces, their fighting power developed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideas concerning sensible combination of man and military equipment, with a consideration for the nature of warfare.

The desire to embody, in concrete forms, Lenin's directives concerning the mutual relationship and mutual dependence of man and military equipment in an armed conflict has always been typical of Soviet military thought. The works of M. V. Frunze deserve special attention in this regard. This outstanding military leader examines the tasks of the Red Army's rearmament in full correspondence with Lenin's premises, which reject the metaphysical opposition of man and military equipment. Analyzing the role of equipment in general mechanization of the army, which began following World War I, M. V. Frunze noted: "We must not forget, when we look at the enemy's technical power, that by itself equipment is still lifeless, and only man, through his will, energy, and wisdom, is capable of imparting to it one direction or another."[5] Army personnel were trained in our country on the basis of Lenin's premises immediately before the Great Patriotic War.

Lenin's ideas concerning the need for the personnel to master modern military equipment were placed at the basis of military training given to soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. Thus an order of Peoples Commissar of Defense, Supreme Commander in Chief of the USSR Armed Forces I. V. Stalin, published 1 May 1942, posed the following mission to personnel of the army and navy: "...study your weapons to perfection, become proficient in your areas, and learn how to fight the probable enemy."[6]

Soviet military-theoretical thought was also based on these ideas in the postwar years, when as a result of the policy of "atomic blackmail" followed by the USA and its allies in the aggressive NATO bloc some bourgeois military theorists imparted an absolute role to the atomic bomb in armed conflict, and diminished the role of man. Analyzing such assertions, the prominent Soviet military leader Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov wrote: "Given all of the significance of missiles and atomic weapons, irrespective of the scale, nature, and means of war, man has played, plays, and will continue to play the main role in it."[7]

As we know, military equipment underwent a major step in qualitative improvement as a result of the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs following the war. Soviet military theorists were faced by the problem of developing Lenin's military theoretical legacy further, and mainly his premises concerning the relationship of man and military equipment, with a consideration for the latest achievements of science and technology, the real economic potential of the country, the training level of the personnel, the possible nature of combat activities, the state of the enemy's armed forces, and so on.

The importance of finding a truly scientific solution to this problem to maintenance of our motherland's and the entire socialist fraternity's high defensive power rested upon the constantly growing complexity of modern weapons and, together with this, upon the need for reducing the time of their development, series production, and introduction into the troops, and all-out acceleration of their mastery by the personnel, their competent operation in peacetime and in combat conditions, their maintenance in a state of high combat readiness, and so on.

The truly scientific, Leninist ideas concerning the dialectical mutual relationship and mutual dependence of man and military equipment in an armed conflict are important to the methodological basis for solving this problem today. First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, chief of general staff of the armed forces, writes the following in this connection: "Organized development of the armed forces is proceeding on the basis of a strictly scientific, dialectical understanding of the role and place of man and equipment in war."[8]

The most important principle of Soviet military development is that of keeping the country and its armed forces ready to repel aggression, to defend the socialist achievements of the laborers. It expresses itself in the constant concern displayed by the party, government, and all the people for outfitting the army with the latest military equipment, for raising the ideological-political maturity and the moral-combat qualities of our soldiers, and for nurturing them in the spirit of high aggressiveness, constant alertness, and the readiness to fulfill the motherland's assignments. In the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "All of these years, the party has given due attention to strengthening the defense capabilities of our country and improving the armed forces. We can now report to the congress that we have done a great deal in this area. The availability of modern weapons and combat equipment to the armed forces has improved, and the quality of combat training and the ideological maturity of the personnel has risen. In general, comrades, the Soviet people may be assured that the fruits of their creative labor are being dependably protected."[9]

Lenin's premise concerning man's decisive role in relation to military equipment at all levels of its development has never been truer. "...the communist party...has always felt and feels now that weapons could be a powerful resource of the country's defense only in the event that the personnel of the army and navy," states USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "deeply recognize their ultimate responsibility to the motherland, gain perfect mastery of their weapons, and understand that these weapons would be used in the name of the just goals of defending the socialist achievements of the people."[10]

Lenin's ideas concerning the relationship between man and military equipment in armed conflict lie at the basis of the training and indoctrination of Soviet Armed Forces personnel, inasmuch as the constant growth in the complexity of military equipment and the means of its application is raising the requirements upon the technical and military knowledge and the level of military-professional training of the soldiers, and upon their moral-political qualities. This is why personnel training in the Soviet Army consists of an entire complex of disciplines, to include party-political, moral-psychological, tactical, fire, technical, and other forms of training.

It should be noted that the complexity of the problem concerning man's relationship to equipment and the great practical significance of this problem to military affairs were responsible for the huge struggle centering on the ways and means of solving this problem between the adherents of Marxism-Leninism and the bourgeois military ideologists. The latter separate man from military equipment and place one in opposition to the other. This metaphysical approach makes the role of military equipment absolute and diminishes that of man and the popular masses in war. As an example J. Fuller, one of the prominent Western military theorists, worded the fundamental premises of this concep[illegible]s follows: "Were they simply to meet the needs of the situation, the [illegible]ements of war, or weapons, would make up 99 percent of victory. Strategy, command and control, bravery, discipline, supply, organization, and all of the moral and physcial attributes of war are negligible in comparison with a superiority in weapons; at best, they make up 1 percent."[11]

Such viewpoints achieved [illegible]pecially broad recognition among bourgeois military ideologists in connection with the modern scientific-technical revolution, which has been responsible for automation of various processes in military affairs. They have generated the illusion of a possibility for creating "electronic troop commanders," "cybernetic strategists," and so on, waging war on fully automated battlefields. "I envision," said the American General Westmoreland, "battlefields and entire regions of combat activity that are under vigilant electronic observation at all times of the day and night; I envision the enemy dying on these battlefields in the face of the all-annihilating effects of our firepower, which goes into action immediately and automatically at the first sign of his detection."[12]

Such theoretical ideas lie at the basis of the preparations being made by the NATO military machine for war against the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist fraternity. Thus one of the American sources states: "The army leadership is trying to create electronic warfare systems in the European theater. The battlefield of the future in Europe will be serviced by countless quantities of hidden sensors relaying the information they collect to computer centers, where the parameters required for maintaining fire would be determined in seconds; computers will aim and automatically fire the weapons."[13]

What such statements really do is diminish the role of the popular masses in historical events, particularly in war, elevate the blind force of military equipment, justify the supposed inevitability of spiritual degradation of the human soldier before the face of powerful technology, emphasize his insignificance in modern armed conflict in comparison with that of military equipment, and thus prove the inevitability of transforming man into an appendage of military-technical systems. The social aspect of these conceptions, meanwhile, was revealed in its time by V. I. Lenin, who wrote that "Following the great imperialist massacre, all governments of the world began to fear the all-peoples army...."[14]

Reaching beyond the framework of pure theory, the viewpoints of bourgeois military theorists are being materialized in the practice of military development in capitalist states. Thus, having lost the war in Vietnam, American ideologists do not wish to recognize the bankruptcy of imperialism's aggressive policy to be the cause of the defeat, finding their excuses elsewhere. As we know, the US government has now decided to increase its military power further by perpetuating the arms race. Thus the Senate approved a resolution calling for an annual 5 percent increase in the military budget, as a result of which it will be not less than $163.3 billion by the 1981/1982 fiscal year. The lion's share of these assets will be spent to modernize the existing ground-based ballistic missiles, and to build and deploy the new MX missile system--the most expensive in American history, which will cost the people of the USA $35-40 billion.[15]

The arms race is also being preached in the plan for modernizing the NATO armed forces, which together with the USA spent $218 billion for these purposes in just 1979 alone. As we know, Washington is presently seeking permission to deploy, by 1983 in certain countries of West Europe, 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing-2 missiles outfitted with nuclear warheads and capable of striking targets deep within USSR territory. Next year the Trident-1 submarine missile system will be deployed; it has a range of 4,500 nautical miles, and it is capable of carrying eight nuclear warheads with a payload of 100,000 tons each. Under the cover of a "Soviet military threat" the Pentagon has already increased the NATO arsenals by 47,000 anti-tanks guided missiles, having transferred several squadrons of heavy helicopters and other combat equipment.

As we know, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev announced in his recent visit to the GDR the unilateral reduction of Soviet troops in the GDR by 20,000 servicemen, 1,000 tanks, and a certain quantity of other equipment. Moreover he stated a readiness to reduce medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western regions of our country on the condition that no more American missiles would be deployed in West Europe. This initiative by the Soviet Union opened up the possibility for preventing a new spiral in the arms race and permits us to assume a road of real disarmament. However, contrary to common sense NATO decided to deploy new American nuclear missile weapons in West Europe.

The armies of capitalist states are making unprecedented use of the methods of moral bewitchment of the soldiers, and transformation of the army into a caste of military professionals and soulless murderers separated apart from society. Modern bourgeois ideologists lay special hopes in this area on the fact that constant growth in the complexity of military equipment would elicit change in the nature of a soldier's activities, and in the end lead to creation of a so-called "technological soldier" typified by blind fulfillment of technological functions in the service of combat equipment, and transformation of man into an appendage of military-technical systems.

The essence of the relationship between man and military equipment in an armed conflict is also distorted in the military-theoretical conceptions of modern revisionism, and mainly Maoism, which makes the significance of man absolute and belittles the role of equipment in modern warfare. Once again metaphysical opposition of man and military equipment is allowed, the true role of military equipment in modern warfare is distorted, and the potentials of this equipment are ignored.

It is no accident that the official Chinese propaganda promoted assertions such as "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger," and "a soldier armed with the ideas of Mao will always win over a soldier with an atomic bomb." Preaching the inevitability of a third world war, the Maoists are trying to diminish the consequences of using modern weapons, including nuclear weapons in such a war. Thus a handbook on military affairs published for the population of the Peoples Republic of China in December 1974 asserts that a nuclear missile war presents nothing terrifying to the Chinese, inasmuch as nuclear resources were invented by people, and they could invent the appropriate protective resources.

But what do we in fact observe in Beijing's actions today? Having initiated unprecedented militarization in all spheres of social life, implementing an anti-Marxist, anti-socialist course, and preparing the country for war against the USSR, the Maoists leadership is utilizing all possibilities for purchasing arms and for developing its nuclear missile potential. Thus according to reports in the foreign press, presently 62-65 percent of all scientific explorations and experiments in China are aimed at improving weapons and military equipment; 73.5 percent of the imports are equipment for war industry; moreover such trade is being conducted with England, France, and FRG, and other capitalist countries, and more than 40 percent of the state budget is being spent on this.[16]

Thus only Lenin's directives concerning the dialectical nature of the mutual relationship of man and military equipment, with man playing the dominant role, can serve as a fruitful methodological base for solving the problems associated with the relationship of man and military equipment in the present stage of socialist military development. Relying upon this base, commanders and political workers must direct their practical activities, associated with troop combat and political training, at imparting an ability to deal with the design features of military equipment and utilize it to the fullest in a complex combat situation. The personnel must be taught to maintain a careful attitude toward military equipment, viewing it as a special form of socialist property. An unshakeable confidence in the dependability and power of military equipment and its superiority over the weapons of the probable enemy must be nurtured in the enlisted men and officers. More room should be given in military-technical propaganda in the units and subunits to the struggle for maintaining military equipment in constant combat readiness, and for improving the modes and means of its use in combat, such as to insure hitting the target with the first shot, the first round, and the first launch, in all combat situations.

Thus only Lenin's ideas concerning the relationship of man and military equipment are a true scientific basis for elevating the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and for insuring the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the peoples of fraternal socialist states.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 20, p 175.

2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 139.

3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 9, p 156.

4. Ibid., Vol 35, p 408.

5. Frunze, M. V., "Sobr. soch." [Collected Works], Vol 1, Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1929, p 248.

6. Stalin, I. V., "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1953, p 57.

7. Zhukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Memoirs and Deliberations], Moscow, Izd-vo ATN, 1969, p 750.

8. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 February 1979.

9. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 83.

10. Ustinov, D., "The Guardsman of Peaceful Labor, the Bulwark of Universal Peace," KOMMUNIST. No 3, 1977, p 18.

11. Fuller, Dzh., "Tanki v velikoy voyne 1914-1918 gg." [Tanks in the Great War of 1914-1918], Voyenizdat, 1923, p 253.

12. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT , 15 December 1975, p 13.

13. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 15 June 1974, p 903.

14. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 41, p 195.

15. PRAVDA, 21 September 1979.

16. For more detail, see "Militarizm v ideologii i praktike maoizma" [Militarism in the Ideology and Practice of Maoism], Voyenizdat, 1976, pp 154,177.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY: RUMYANTSEV'S PRINCIPLES REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 77-81

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col (Ret) V. Ivanov: "P. A. Rumyantsev - the Founder of Decisive Offensive Strategy for Regular Armies"]

[Text] Field Marshal Petr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev entered military history as the outstanding troop commander of the second half of the 18th century. P. A. Rumyantsev's brilliant victories over strong opponents brought him deserved world fame, and they demonstrated the inviolable power of the Russian regular army. His progressive reforms in all areas of military affairs enjoyed broad support in the country. "Rumyantsev was remarkable," his biographer writes, "because having been called to combat activities at the highest levels, he was the first to display, both in the theaters of war and on the battlefields, creativity in all of the main subdivisions of the art of war, and because he influenced the development of Russian military affairs by simple, graphical example. His combat activities were a school for all others...."[1]

Petr Aleksandrovich was the first Russian troop commander after Svyatoslav to not only secure a position for his troops on the shores of the Danube, but also to cross it. Rumyantsev's successes were marked by presentation of the honorary title Zadunayskiy [Trans-Danube](1775).

Out of the entire diversity of military activities and military-theoretical legacy of P. A. Rumyantsev, this article briefly examines only one problem--his development of the fundamentals of a decisive offensive strategy, which was doubtlessly the most important contribution of the troop commander to development of the art of war.

P. A. Rumyantsev boldly discarded the canons of the strategy of maneuver and cordons dominant at that time in the West, siding with the proponents of the most decisive means of warfare: Seeking rather than avoiding engagements with the goal of defeating the opposing army; concentrating forces for a strike, rather than dispersing them, in the theater of war and in an engagement; operating offensively at every possibility. P. A. Rumyantsev adhered to

these rules constantly throughout all of his military career, though the situation in which he had to command the troops far from always favored this. He developed a glorious ages-old tradition of Russian art of war--beginning a decisive engagement with aggressive defensive actions, and then going over to the offensive, as had been done by his outstanding predecessors: Aleksandr Nevskiy in the ice battle of 1242, Dmitriy Donskoy of the Battle of Kulikovo (1380), Peter I in the Poltava engagement (1709), Saltykov in the engagements at Pal'tsig and Kunersdorf (1759). When Rumyantsev encountered the enemy, he tried to attack him immediately, tuning his actions closely to the situation.

As D. F. Maslovskiy noted in his time, "The active rudiments of Russian strategy and tactics received their serious development" with the first steps of the troop commander's combat activities.[2] The actions of the future general-field marshal were permeated by a spirit of decisive offensive as early as in the battle of Gross-Egersdorf (1757), with which he began his victorious road in the Seven-Years' War of 1756-1763. Commanding a reserve infantry brigade, at a critical moment in the engagement P. A. Rumyantsev attacked the flank of the Prussian troops on his own initiative and put them to flight with an irresistible bayonet strike.

Subsequent events of the Seven Years' War fully confirmed the great effectiveness of Rumyantsev's actions; owing to his military capabilities and talents, he rose to the level of the most distinguished Russian officers, especially after successful independently conducted operations against Kol'berg. Having been persuaded many times in his combat experience as to the doubtless advantage of offensive strategy and tactics, he asserted: "I have been and will always be of the opinion that the attacker always thinks about winning until the very end, while the defender always harbors a fear commensurate with the effort exerted upon him."[3]

Rumyantsev's offensive strategy revealed itself most clearly in the campaign of 1770 (in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774). The 1st Army, which was commanded by P. A. Rumyantsev, had a secondary mission--covering the seige of the fortress of Bendery on the Danube side. However, it performed this "passive" role by a decisive offensive against the main forces of the Great Vizier. Attracting subordinates with his bold strategic designs, Rumyantsev appealed to them in a council of war. "...our glory and honor," he said, "cannot tolerate the presence of a foe before our eyes unattacked."[4]

In 1 month P. A. Rumyantsev's army (38,000 men, 149 guns) attacked Turkish troops three times at Ryabaya Mogila on 17 (28) June, on the Larga River on 7 (18) July, and on the Kagul River on 21 July (1 August). Although its strength was half that of the enemy in the first two engagements and only a fourth in the third, the main Turkish army (150,000 men, not counting Crimean Tartars--up to 80,000 men and 130-180,000 guns) was defeated. Contrary to the plans of Petersburg, the 1st Army carried the entire brunt of the conflict on land in the campaign of 1770 alone, and through its victories it altered the strategic situation in this theater of war. With the defeat

of the enemy's main army, all of his fortresses on the north bank of the Danube fell. Rumyantsev's design, which basically required a decisive offensive between the Prut and Siret rivers, was successfully achieved.

The outstanding Russian troop commander saw the offensive as the main means for defeating the enemy even in the face of temporary failures and forced retreat, when the situation in the theater was unfavorable. He raised the notion of a form of strategic offensive that had been forgotten in that time--the counteroffensive. In actions "against large numbers...," the troop commander wrote, "the enemy could sometimes be let in, so that he might be chased out later with greater harm to him...."[5] This is precisely the tactic that one of Rumyantsev's most highly talented students--M. I. Kutuzov--employed to defeat the enemy in the Patriotic War of 1812.

In his functions as a troop commander P. A. Rumyantsev faithfully followed the principle of acting with concentrated forces both in defense and in offense. In 1768, when he was commander in chief of the Ukrainian army, he organized defense of Russia's southern border in a new way. Only small garrisons were left in fortified points along the Ukrainian border, and the main forces were concentrated behind it as three strong detachments on the flanks and in the center. In the event that enemy troops attack, the detachments closest to that point were to envelop the enemy's flank in coordination with each other, cut off his retreat, and annihilate him. This aggressive border defense was employed successfully to repel a Tartar invasion in 1769. Only a few detachments that had broken into the Ukraine made it back to the Crimea. This was the last invasion by Crimean Tartars.

Rumyantsev employed the same principle of action in 1769 when organizing defense of Moldavia, and then the Danube. In 1771 his small army (45,000 men) not only contained the 120,000-strong Turkish army by aggressive defensive actions and held the north bank of the Danube, but also disorganized enemy troops along the entire front by concentrated strikes in separate sectors, and defeated his large 50,000-strong grouping at the lower reaches of the Danube. Attacking with strong detachments beyond the Danube in 1774, P. A. Rumyantsev isolated the forces of the Osman empire opposing him and, placing them in an untenable position, he forced Turkey to sign the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhiysk treaty to Russia's advantage (1774).

Actions by concentrated forces were always combined with artful maneuver in the theater of war and on the battlefield. Prior to this time, armies were usually moved as single masses. Rumyantsev, meanwhile, moved the troops as separate groups, which in the course of maneuver concentrated for a joint attack on the enemy. Each group had its particular mission, but in their sum total they had one goal--attacking and defeating the enemy army. Rumyantsev demanded that they always be ready "for joint action in the aid of others."[6] We can clearly see here the rudiments of a new principle of the art of war ("advance separately, fight together"), the first application of which is recognized by military historiography in the second half of the 19th century.

This action became most typical of the campaign of 1770. At the end of May P. A. Rumyantsev, who was with his army in Khotin, established the main Turkish forces were preparing to cross to the north bank of the Danube in the vicinity of Isaccea for an offensive against the Russian troops. To avoid defeat of his individual units, he immediately ordered Repnin's forward corps, which occupied Moldavia, to withdraw to the north, to the area of Ryabaya Magila. Then he began advancing his main forces out of Khotin to this same place, toward the enemy. The maneuver involved seven separate columns, ready to assume combat formation quickly. The army was concentrated at the place of encounter with the enemy by movements from different directions. Despite the great distances involved (the main forces traveled more than 200 km) and the communication difficulties, P. A. Rumyantsev achieved considerable coordination in the actions of separate corps in time and place, as well as covertness of their concentration.

The troops maneuvered just as artfully on the battlefield. Rumyantsev's army attacked as four separate, isolated groups (detachments) which made simultaneous strikes from the north, the northwest, and the northeast, interacting efficiently with one another (a concentric attack). This tactic was new to that time. Its application was a major step forward in comparison with the rules of obsolete linear tactics.

Following the victory at Ryabaya Magila Rumyantsev's army continued to advance toward the Danube, once again as four groups, along both banks of the Prut: three strong advance guards in front (commanded by Potemkin, Bauer, and Repnin), and behind them the main forces. Discovering a major concentration of Turkish troops on the Larga River, Rumyantsev once again quickly concentrated all of his army in the area of the forthcoming battle, leaving just a small detachment on the west bank of the Prut to cover the bridges. He employed the same tactic against the main forces of the Turkish army on the Kagul River. As at Ryabaya Magila, in these engagements his troops advanced as several groups, attacking the enemy from different directions and enveloping his flanks.

Attaching tremendous significance to the mobility of an army, P. A. Rumyantsev trained the troops entrusted to him with the most fabulous persistence and indefatigability. He often conducted long marches, and he taught the personnel to maneuver into new formations quickly and to use their weapons proficiently. Troop training also included river crossings, simulated attacks, defense of fortified points, joint actions by the army and navy, and so on. Always present at the exercises, the troop commander demanded that "every undertaking of the troops proceed before the eyes of the main commander, and be artfully comprehensible and explainable by him."[7]

Rumyantsev's outstanding victories, especially in the campaign of 1770, were mainly the result of purposeful actions, where, in his words, "The troop commander...has one main thing in his mind, and it is toward it that he works with all of his effort, since by attaining this objective he reaches all others secondary to it."[8]



Encounter at the Kagul River on 21 July (1 August) 1770

Key:

1. Kagul
2. Siret
3. Prut
4. Danube
5. Izmail
6. Black Sea
7. Isaccea
8. Tulcea
9. Repnin
10. Bryus
11. Rumyantsev
12. Saltykov
13. Olits
14. Plemyannikov
15. Grizeshti
16. Dolgorukov
17. Turyanov rampart
18. Battle begins about 0500 hours
19. Bauer
20. Khalil'-pasha

[Key continued on following page]

21. Vulkaneshti
22. Battle ends, 0930 hours
23. Formation of troops in a battalion carre (basic diagram)
24. Russian troops
25. Battalion carre with artillery
26. Cavalry
27. Turkish troops
28. Infantry
29. Cavalry
30. Directions of attacks by Russian troops
31. Counterattacks and flight by Turkish troops
32. Turkish fortifications (rampart)

Napoleon Bonaparte, who gained fame for defeating the stronger Austrian army in parts i.. the Italian campaign of 1796-1797, was simply a successor of Rumyantsev, and almost three decades later he simply repeated the idea, stated by the Russian troop commander, of purposeful action being one of the most decisive prerequisites of his victories.

Pursuit of the enemy after his defeat on the battlefield until his complete destruction became an inseparable part of Rumyantsev's offensive strategy, and a new phenomenon in the art of war of the second half of the 18th century. "Never lose track of the enemy," the troop commander asserted.[9] Following defeat of the Turkish army at the Kagul River he pursued the fleeing troops all the way to the Danube. To prevent their crossing to the other bank, Bauer's and Repnin's advance guards conducted their pursuit in the direction of the Turkish crossings of the river at Isaccea and Izmail. They captured the Turkish wagon trains, sunk many enemy enlisted men and officers on the crossings, and captured 100 prisoners, 30 guns, and tremendous reserves of materiel. As a result the fortresses of Izmail and Kiliya were taken on the move, as were subsequently all other Turkish fortified points along the lower Danube.

P. A. Rumyantsev brilliantly demonstrated the undoubted advantages of his offensive strategy on the battlefields. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that almost all of his victories involved smaller numbers of troops, and always less bloodshed. For example in the battles of the Larga and Kagul the Russians lost, respectively, 100 killed an captured in comparison to the enemy's 3,000, and about 1,500 opposite the enemy's 20,000.[10]

One of the main prerequisites of P. A. Rumyantsev's success as a troop commander was his deep understanding of the national character and combat qualities of the Russian soldier. In distinction from Western military doctrines, which treated the army as a soulless machine, Rumyantsev, as well as his brilliant successors A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov, viewed the soldiers as dependable defenders of the fatherland, and he believed in their titanic strength, selflessness, and valor. Following the Kagul encounter, he said to his soldiers: "I marched across all of the steppes from the banks of the Danube, felling the numerically superior enemy standing before me..., opposing the uncountable foes by simply your courage and good will, which made up an insurmountable wall."[11]

P. A. Rumyantsev's principles of a decisive offensive strategy laid the basis for a new stage in the development of the art of war of regular armies, and they had a great influence on the art of war of the West. Conclusively formed, developed further, and broadly introduced into the combat practice of the Russian troops by A. V. Suvorov, and in West Europe by Napoleon I, they stood at the apex of the art of war for an entire century. Having received his baptism of fire in Rumyantsev's troops at Kol'berg, and subsequently serving under his command in many military campaigns, Suvorov received a high assessment from his teacher. "He has no equals..." he declared. "Suvorov is a student of Rumyantsev."[12]

Despite the fundamental changes that have occurred in the nature of modern wars and in the forms of armed conflict, the principles of offensive strategy examined here are still significant today.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Entsiklopediya voyennykh i morskikh nauk" [Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences], Vol 6, St. Petersburg, 1893, p 602.

2. "Zapiski po istorii voyennogo iskusstva v Rossii, vyp. 11-y, 1-ya chast'. 1762-1771 god" [Notes on the History of the Art of War in Russia, 11th Edition, Part 1, 1762-1771], St. Petersburg, 1894, p 33.

3. "Prisoyedineniye Kryma k Rossii. Reskripty, pis'ma, relyatsii i doneseniya" [Annexation of the Crimea to Russia. Correspondence, Letters, Reports, and Messages], Vol 1, St. Petersburg, 1885, p 832.

4. "Voyna Rossii s Turtsiyeyi pol'skimi konfederatami s 1769 po 1774 god" [Russia's War With Turkey and Polish Confederates From 1769 to 1774], Vol 2, St. Petersburg, 1866, p 111.

5. Rumyantsev, P. A., "Dokumenty" [Documents], Vol 2, Moscow, 1953, p 432.

6. "Entsiklopediya voyennykh i morskikh nauk," Vol 6, St. Petersburg, 1893, p 600.

7. Korobkov, N., "Fel'dmarshal P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy" [Field Marshal P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1944, p 51.

8. Rumyantsev, P. A., "Dokumenty", Vol 2, p 429.

9. Klokman, Yu. R., "Fel'dmarshal Rumyantsev v period russko-turetskoy voyny 1768-1774 gg." [Field Marshal Rumyantsev in the Period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774], Moscow, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1951, p 184.

10. See "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 4, Voyenizdat, 1977, pp 21, 573; Pruntsov, V. V., "Polkovodets P. A. Rumyantsev" [Troop Commander P. A. Rumyantsev], Voyenizdat, 1946, p 64, 71.

11. Korobkov, N., "Fel'dmarshal P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy", p 57.

12. Klokman, Yu. R., "P. A. Rumyantsev i A. V. Suvorov. Suvorovskiy sbornik" [P. A. Rumyantsev and A. V. Suvorov. The Suvorov Collection], Moscow, 1951, p 87.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

PERIODICAL PRESS AS A HISTORICAL SOURCE DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 82-83

[Article by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col N. Kayushin: "The Periodical Press of the War Years - One of the Sources of History"]

[Text] Newspapers of the war years contain a great deal of information on the CP 's activities concerned with leading the armed conflict of the Soviet ple against German fascism, on the situation at the fronts of the eat Patriotic War, on party-political work, on the events and facts of the times, on the courage and heroism of the Soviet people, on dissemination of combat experience, and on many other topics.

Frontal, district, army, corps, and divisional newspapers brought extensive and diverse information to the troops in the war years. In 1943, 18 frontal, 12 district, 185 army and corps, and 635 divisional and divisional strength newspapers were published.* In 1945, 18 frontal, 18 district, 270 army and corps, 700 divisional newspapers were published. In addition the navy published 143 newspapers.**

The entire diversity of materials in the periodical press are being used more and more extensively not only in the writing of monographs, dissertations, training aids, essays, and articles, but also in major multivolume works ("Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945]). This can be explained by the chronological nature and the diversity of the information contained in the newspapers, which reflected the basic problems associated with politics, economics, the combat activities of the troops, and the activities of the communist party and Soviet people to mobilize the country's forces and resources for victory over the enemy.

The newspapers systematically discussed the main events at the front and in the rear, and they published official documents, lead articles, editorials,

---

* Petrov, Yu. P., "Stroitel'stvo politorganov, partiynykh i komsomol'skikh organizatsiy armii i flota" [Development of the Political Organs and the Party and Komsomol Organizations of the Army and Navy], Voyenizdat, 1968, p 365.
** Ibid., p 364-365.

propaganda articles, essays, newsbriefs, photographs, and statements by foreign state , public, and military officials. This is what is attracting increasingly larger numbers of researchers, who are using various methods for analyzing the materials in these periodicals.

Integrated study of periodical press together with other sources has achieved widespread application. This method is readily employed by the authors of major works and memoirs, scholars, writers, researchers, and compilers of collections of documents and materials devoted to the comprehensive assistance rendered to the front by local councils and social organizations.

The sampling method, which affords a possibility of concentrating the attention upon particular newspaper publications on a problem under analysis, is used in historical studies. This method provides new or additional information on major engagements of the past war, on the completion of concrete national economic tasks, and on the work done by political organs and by party and Komsomol organizations to implement decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars, and the State Defense Committee, and orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief and the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

Historians often turn to the method of comparing materials in periodical press with other sources. They use this method when they must determine the names of particular population centers, many partisan heroes, and underground fighters whose names were not revealed during wartime.

Many authors compare materials from frontal, army, and divisional newspapers with archival documents (the log books of units and formations, combat and political reports, awards lists). Researchers of the history of the past war also frequently compare materials in the Soviet Union's periodical press with newspaper reports in bourgeois press. This method helps to reveal the facts about the inconsistent policy of bourgeois parties and their leaders, and all of the varieties of the falsifiers of history.

Authors searching for statistics in periodical press often use the technique of statistical observation of individual facts and objectives to permit a conclusion on the entire set of facts as a whole (the object of observation itself predetermines the analysis program). As an example the statistical unit of observation in the work "Molodezh' v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Young People in the Great Patriotic War] by V. G. Yeremin and P. F. Isakov became the wartime Komsomol member, while that in V. S. Murmantseva's "Sovetskiye zhenshchiny v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Soviet Women in the Great Patriotic War] the unit of observation was the woman--the mother, the laborer, the activist, and the warrior.

A number of scholars used a statistical grouping method in application to periodical publications of the Great Patriotic War. When larger numbers of facts are grouped together, the significant correlations reveal themselves

better. Other historians and economists prefer comparative treatment of statistical data from periodical press and other sources.

Historians studying newspaper materials resort to statistical averages significantly rarer. This can be explained by the fact that in wartime, the periodical press was unable to publish many economic characteristics of the military-technical and sociopolitical factors of the life of our country.

The content analysis method--that is, translation of textual information into quantitative characteristics--is beginning to enter into historical research practice in relation to periodical press. This method is used by authors having newspapers of the war years as one of their main historical sources.

Memoir writers often turn to newspapers of the past war to find photographs, since many newspaper photographs have become unique. As an example photographer-reporter V. M. Kalashnikov took General Panfilov's picture a few hours prior to his death, while S. Strunnikov left us a photograph of stirring force--the execution of Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya by the fascists. V. Temin had the fortune of photographing the Banner of Victory above the Reichstag. A number of other photographs published at the time of the events have become textbook examples. These photographs are used to make conclusions about the days long ago.

Newspaper photographs have documented the most vivid episodes of combat life, and the group and individual portraits of war heroes. Many snapshots have entered monographs, history textbooks, memoirs, and books describing the combat history of formations and units.

Examining some methods of historical research practice, we should note that historians do make use of other ways of studying periodical press, to include selection of newspaper materials for exhibition in museums, study of letters to editors, and so on.

Thus the periodical press of 1941-1945 earned deserved recognition from researchers of the Great Patriotic War. The technique of selecting and studying newspaper materials, which has evolved in the practical activities of historians, is significantly broadening the historical science base. [8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

BOOK REVIEW: JAPAN'S POSTWAR POLICY IN ASIA AND CHINA

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 84-85

[Reviewer: Doctor of Historical Sciences Col A. Savin]

[Text] Soviet historiography has been supplemented by a new monograph devoted to the postwar policy of Japan in Asia, and to its mutual relationship with China.[1] It examines, from a wide historical perspective, the main directions of Japan's policy in East and Southeast Asia, and it analyzes the way this policy was influenced by the struggle for power in China, and the major turning points in its foreign policy following acceptance of its "extraordinary course" in the early 1960's.

Development of Japan's policy in Asia and its relationship with China and other countries of the region proceeded during the time of persistent attempts by the Chinese leadership to find ways to approach Japanese and international reaction more closely with the goal of creating an alliance directed against the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity. "The policy of its present leaders," said L. I. Brezhnev during the 25th CPSU Congress in a discussion on relations with China, "...is fully in line with the position of the most extreme reaction in all the world.... This policy is not only entirely alien to socialist principles and ideals, but it has also essentially become an important reserve of imperialism in its struggle against socialism."[2] The correctness of this conclusion was proven by China's aggression against socialist Vietnam. Reports on direct contact between military circles of Japan and China attest to the desire of influential forces in Tokyo to use Beijing's anti-Sovietism to exert pressure upon the Soviet Union in Soviet-Japanese relations, and particularly in regard to the so-called problem of the northern territories (page 6).

The author shows that the imperialist ruling circles of Japan did not grow closer together with the nationalist leadership of China by accident or right away. By as early as in the mid-1950's the sides were already making their first serious steps to clarify the possibilities of finding contact on both an economic and a racial, "pan-Asiatic" basis. In the second half of the 1950's Mao's group aired plans for an alliance with Japan. In talks with representatives of the Japanese business circles of the monopolist bourgeoisie

and with war veterans, Mao and Chou indicated the national, "Eastern" nature of communism in China and made references to the "dependable foundation" of friendship and mutual assistance between China and Japan, which possess an identical culture and which "belong to the same race" (page 84). In 1956 Mao Tse-tung proposed for the first time, in a reception for a delegation of highly-placed servicemen of the former imperialist army, the idea of a Japanese-Chinese alliance, which was supposedly necessary as a means for expelling a "common enemy--the United States of America"--from Asia. But the situation changed. Beijing leaders now began proposing an alliance with Japanese imperialists on an anti-Soviet basis. In January 1974, during a reception for a delegation from the Liberal-Democratic Party (the party representing major capital in Japan), (Den Syaopin) accused the Soviet Union of "imperialism" and declared that Japan and China must "prepare, hand in hand, to oppose the North." At the same time he had good things to say about the Japanese-American "agreement of security," for reason of which "Japan was ready to repel a threat from without."[4]

The support given by China's Maoist leadership doubtlessly made it easier for Japan's ruling circles to militarize the country. Between 1974 and 1977 Japan's military expenditures increased from $3.8 billion to $5.5 billion (page 75). In December 1977 the National Defense Council decided to purchase, from the USA, 100 of the latest F-15 fighter-bombers and 45 P-3C antisubmarine airplanes for a price of $4.5 billion,[5] and the license for their production. Speaking in Parliament in 1978, the chief of the legal bureau under Sonoda's government noted that the purchase of these airplanes was evidence that Japan was arming itself not only with defensive but also offensive weapons.[6]

The author thoroughly examines development of Japanese-Soviet relationships and reveals how the Chinese hegemonists interfered in them. Beijing's opposition to improving Japanese-Soviet relations became especially intense following restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Peoples Republic of China. On 22 January 1973, in a talk with Japanese Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry Nakasone, Chou En-lai "decisively cautioned" him against strengthening trade and economic ties between Japan and the Soviet Union. "Let us help Southeast Asia instead," he said. "China in the area of agriculture and light industry, and Japan in the area of heavy industry."[7] Chou's proposal was a poorly camouflaged invitation for joint economic expansion. The Maoist leadership did everything it could to support the Japanese "hawks" who were unjustifiably demanding the "return" of four southern Kuril Islands to Japan (Urup, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup). Chinese propaganda asserts that the USSR "continues to occupy the northern territories of Japan so that Soviet naval forces could pass through the Sea of Japan to the Pacific and establish a dominance there."[9]

An analysis of the events of recent years, which are not reflected in the book reviewed here, would show that militarization of social life is continuing in Japan, extraordinary legislation to cover the event of war is being drafted, the military budget is growing, the armament of the "self-

defense forces" is improving, and military contacts with the United States of America are growing stronger. Japan's navy is preparing for its first major postwar exercises jointly with naval forces of the aggressive NATO and ANZUS military blocs, to be held in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands in spring 1980.

Japanese ruling circles are continuing their course toward a military-political alliance with the Chinese leadership. A Japanese-Chinese treaty having an anti-Soviet orientation was signed and ratified in 1978. A number of economic agreements intended to raise the military power of China have been signed. Military delegations have conducted mutual visits with the goal of strengthening the ties between the Japanese and Chinese armed forces. There is obviously an effort to create a military alliance between the USA, Japan, and China.

It should be noted that the author was able to illuminate the basic directions of Japanese policy in Asia and make the correct conclusion about the problem as a whole. But unfortunately this good scientific work is not devoid of certain shortcomings. Frequent repetition of general premises is painfully obvious. The author does not go into sufficient detail on the disposition of political forces in Japan and China in the periods of history he examines, or their influence upon the foreign policy courses of the governments. The book does not always reveal the mutual relationship existing between the phenomena and processes occurring in these countries. In my opinion the author should have dwelled in greater detail on the Japanese-American relations of the 1970's. However, these shortcomings do not in any way diminish the merits of the work under review.

FOOTNOTES

1. Markov, A. P., "Poslevoyennaya politika Yaponii v Azii i Kitay. 1945-1977" [The Postwar Policy of Japan in Asia and China. 1945-1977], Moscow, Izd-vo Nauka, 1979, 278 pp.

2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 10.

4. ASAKHI, 14 January 1974; ZHEN'MIN' ZHIBAO, 12 January 1974.

5. PRAVDA, 30 December 1977

6. JAPAN TIMES, 31 January 1978.

7. ASAKHI, 22 January 1973.

9. INFORMATSIONNYY BYULLETEN' AGENTSTVA SIN'KHUA (IBAS), 15 August 1975, pp 7-9.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

EDITORIAL MAILBAG FOR 1979 REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 86-89

[Unattributed article: "The Journal's Editorial Mail in 1979"]

[Text] More than 500 articles, notes, and responses, and more than 1,000 letters were sent to the editorial board of this journal in 1979 in regard to various problems of military history and the art of war.

The authors of the submitted articles examine the progressive nature of Soviet military science, V. I. Lenin's military-theoretical legacy, and the guiding role of the CPSU in development of the Soviet Armed Forces, reveal various aspects of the art of war, criticize bourgeois falsifiers of history, review the principal recently published works of military theory in detail, describe the experience of military-patriotic work and the techniques for teaching military history, and so on.

Timely articles in which the authors managed to deeply reveal the content of a particular topic and present it in good literary language were published by the editorial board last year. Some of the materials were prepared for later publication, and some had been included in the subjects planned for 1980.

However, it is naturally impossible to use all submitted articles in the journal, and thus some of the materials had to be rejected as not satisfying the requirements of the journal. The authors of these articles are as a rule given concrete recommendations and advice on developing their topics further. The following are the main shortcomings of rejected articles.

Writing their articles, some authors limit themselves to well-intended rewriting of various premises of previously published scientific works, textbooks, books, and periodical articles without contributing anything new to the problem under examination. Topics in the articles are often revealed too generally, or their text is not a logically bound single whole. As a rule such articles do not seriously analyze the facts or offer scientific conclusions. They lose a great deal due to absence of a scientific approach--that is, new facts and figures are not confirmed by the authors with archival or other official sources.

Authors of articles for the "Criticism and Bibliography" department sometimes limit themselves to retelling the content of the work under review, listing the noted errata, and stating the minor shortcomings and inaccuracies. Such reviews are descriptive, not analytical. As a result the book and its author are not in fact reviewed. Certain reviews lose their meaningfulness because critical analysis of the book's content is extremely limited or entirely absent. The authors of such reviews are not following the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Literary and Art Criticism" (January 1972).

It should be considered that the editorial board publishes reviews of only new books published in the past or current year. Some authors, meanwhile, submit reviews of books published from 2 to 5 years ago and more, ones which have already been reviewed in other periodical publications. It should be kept in mind that a scientific-theoretical journal is not concerned with analysis of historical novels and stories published by literary and other publishing houses.

The editorial board responds to letters personally or in the "You Ask--We Answer" department. It has been found that certain readers pose numerous questions in their letters (often not even associated with the journal's subject matter) which would require special scientific investigation. The editorial board does not possess the possibilities for such investigations, nor does it have its own archives. It recommends to such correspondents that they refer to the appropriate archives and other scientific institutions, or it refers them to previously published scientific works, textbooks, or training aids.

The subject matter of letters sent to the journal is extremely diverse. Here are excerpts from some of them.

Former soldier A. T. Gashi.ov (Sal'zny, Azerbaijan SSR) read D. Muriyev's article "The 50th Rifle Division in the Defensive Battles at Moscow" with great interest. "The army taught me a great deal, and I still feel as if I am a part of it. I am deeply grateful for all of this to the formation commanders and political workers. I would like to see an article in the journal about the combat experience of my 148th Rifle Regiment."

"My father," writes V. Kas'yanov (Novosibirsk), "fought at Moscow. He retired into the reserves as a master sergeant. He and I are very interested in military history and military literature, and we subscribe to many military periodicals. Please devote more room in the journal to the deeds of the heroes of the Civil War, and illustrate the articles with photographs more often."

D. D. Zherebov , a student at Leningrad State University, was interested in a letter from V. M. Zhdanov, a veteran of the Volkhov Front (No 3, 1979, p 86). "The shortcomings I found in the description of the Volkhov Front's role in penetration of the Leningrad blockade, given in Leningrad

radio and television broadcasts and in Leningrad newspapers," he writes, "are a serious oversight which I think will soon be corrected. At the same time the author of the letter emphasizes that much has been done and is presently being done by the Leningrad Publishing House in this regard; it has published and plans to publish a large number of books on the Volkhov Front. Thus," D. D. Zherebov points out, "those who follow not only the newspaper, radio and television but also the artistic, memoir, and military-historical literature published in Leningrad do not arrive at the same impression reached by V. M. Zhdanov."

The article "Frontal Tank Repair Industry" by S. Lipatov and V. Kolomiyts (No 2, 1979) produced numerous responses. Thus Engineer-Colonel (Reserve) B. A. Kubyshkin (Balashikha, Moscow Oblast) notes that the authors managed to describe the history of the PTARZ [mobile repair shop for tank components] and technical support to the combat activities of the armored troops briefly and extremely thoroughly. Considering the possibilities both the armed forces and the national economy now have for overhauling equipment in the field, the war veteran emphasizes, it would be suitable to publicize the experience of tank repairmen more extensively.

Veterans of PTARZ No 7 living in Kirovograd sent a collective letter--fitter V. F. Kirichenko, electric welder G. T. Didenko, turner G. F. Pshenichnyy, electrician V. I. Kislov, and engineer G. A. Osnitskiy. They report that their plant not only overhauled tanks and combat equipment units but also manufactured extremely scarce complex tools, worm mills, broaches, models, stamps, and measuring and cutting tools. The tank repairmen helped restore damaged plants and electric power plants, to include in Romania and Czechoslovakia. The experience of the PTARZ, the former soldiers point out, must be introduced more broadly today--at the construction projects of Tyumen', Kazakhstan, and the Baykal-Amur Rail Trunkline, which make use of many combines, cranes, tractors, bulldozers, and other equipment.

Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) I. Ya. Deminov (Leningrad) writes that PTARZ's made a tremendous contribution to the victory over Hitler's Germany. Publication of the article "Frontal Tank Repair Industry" is also valuable because it broadens the outlook of the young, deepening their knowledge about all of the resources with which victory was forged. The article's authors, the officer emphasizes, were unable to reveal the multi-faceted tasks of the PTARZ's in such a short article. He feels that Voyenizdat should plan publication of a book on repair of armored equipment, one which would describe the specifics of the organization of PTARZ's and other repair plants, the processes employed, the way the repair plants were controlled, their interaction with the troops, and the heroic labor of the soldier-repairmen.

Candidate of Technical Sciences G. A. Lopato (Saratov), former section process engineer in PTARZ No 7, writes that the notion of overhauling equipment in the field still has value today. After all, the same difficulties are encountered even today in the repair of a tremendous quantity

of agricultural, transport, construction, road building, and other equipment. For the moment the reigning idea at the construction sites is centralized equipment overhaul in major administrative centers thousands of kilometers from the areas in which the equipment works and breaks down. It would be suitable to make use of the equipment repair system developed during the war in peacetime at the country's major construction sites and on its fields. Here as well we must create mobile machine repair plants.

"I am sincerely grateful to the authors and editorial board of the journal for publishing the article 'Frontal Tank Repair Industry'," writes Technical-Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) Candidate of Technical Sciences V. S. Prusenko (Moscow). "The topic is timely, and not only military but also civilian specialists involved in the repair of equipment in the field should be interested in it."

Engineer-Colonel (Reserve) Z. Ya. Psakhis (Moscow), former deputy chief of a troop tank and self-propelled gun repair and evacuation directorate, stated disagreement, not entirely valid, with the article's evaluation of the state of troop tank repair at the beginning of the war, and he reviewed the work of other mobile tank repair units and central permanent armored repair plants.

"I have been interested in military history since childhood," writes turner V. Ye. Popov (Serov, Sverdlovskaya Oblast). "The main thing I do is collect materials about our military leaders, and about the history of units, formations, institutions, and military schools. My personal card library contains more than 1,700 names."

"I would like VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL to publish materials about the military district which, following reorganization, merged into the composition of other districts, for example Orel, Northern, Tavricheskiy, Khar'kov, and Southern Ural."

"I have managed to collect a great deal of material about the Decemberists," reports engineer A. A. Kleyn (Bryansk). "I have put it together in an album 'Young Navigators of the Future Storm'. I hope to end the album with a chapter titled 'The Offspring of the Decemberists--Our Contemporaries'. The journal did talk about one of them a while back--Ye. A. Iskritskom ('News Items, Facts, Findings'; M. Kharchenko, No 2, 1976, pp 121, 122)." A. A. Kleyn writes further that he also possesses information about the grandson of the Decemberist Ivashev. The research he has carried out led him to the conclusion that heroes of the Soviet Union brothers Boris and Dmitriy Glinki are descendants of the Decemberist F. N. Glinki. The author of the letter asks the editorial board and readers of the journal to help him in his search for information.

Reader V. A. Vorontsov (Engel's, Saratovskaya Oblast) is interested in the heroic past of the motherland. He suggests introducing a new department into the journal, "The Long-Forgotten in the Life of the Russian State and Army", and regularly publishing the most interesting articles from old journals, or excerpts from books.

Such proposals would hardly be acceptable: It is not always suitable to reprint previously published articles. The only possibility would be to republish books, but this is already the function of many other publishing houses, and not one of this journal's editorial board.

A large number of letters requested help in acquiring books on military history. Let us recall once again that this is within the responsibility of the Book Marketing Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Trade, and of the "Voyennaya Kniga--Pochtoy" and "Voyennaya Kniga" stores.

Lieutenant Colonel of Intendant Service B. V. Kurtov, chief of the Book Marketing Directorate, reported to the editorial board that the directorate is taking tentative orders from readers for books to be published by the Military Publishing House in 1980. The book list may be inspected at "Voyennaya Kniga" stores, where tentative orders may be filled out. Military literature may also be ordered from the nearest "Voyennaya Kniga--Pochtoy" section.

Submission of tentative orders for military and military-historical literature would greatly facilitate acquisition of books of interest to the readers.

"While in the army, I served in the unit commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Stepan Fedotovich Shtan'ko," reports Sergeant (Reserve) I. A. Filipchuk (Novovolynsk, Volynskaya Oblast). "This was a heroic commander. All enlisted men, sergeants, and officers loved and respected him very much. Were such a commander ever placed in a position of danger, any one of us would have shielded him with our bodies. Please publish more materials about such valorous commanders."

Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel (Reserve) T. G. Kin (Moscow) is working in the TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army] on combat use of armored trains in the Eastern Front. "While in the archives," he writes, "I came across an interesting document--a piece of correspondence from the political section of the military council of the 3d Army dated 2 September 1919 revealing one of the first pages in the service of future Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev in units of the operating Red Army. The order states: 'On receipt of this order, Comrade Konev, Ivan is directed to immediately travel to the disposition of Armored Forces Commissar Comrade Suvorov to serve as commissar of the armored train being formed by the Armored Forces Inspection currently with the Artillery Inspection'."

I. S. Konev was appointed commissar of armored train No 102, formed in Yekaterinburg. This armored train was often referred to in correspondence as "Armeyskiy liter A" and the people called it the "Groznyy" (TsGASA, f. 176, op. 3, d. 635, l. 6).

V. B. Dzhangiryan (Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakhskaya Autonomous Oblast), chief of the children's and young adult military-patriotic school "Yunyy Patriot-Internatsionalist", reports that the students are searching for hometown heroes, and that they are asking the editorial board and readers of the journal to help them in their quest.

"The army was and is my home to me," writes Captain (Reserve) N. G. Koval'chuk (Krasnaya Yaruga, Belgorodskaya Oblast), the chief mechanic at a sugar plant. "I would very much like to see the journal cover the actions of my 314th Guards Rifle Regiment, 102d Guards Rifle Division." War and labor veteran I. Ya. Bedusenko (Stakhanov, Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast) requests information about the combat history of the 850th Rifle Regiment, 277th Rifle Division, while former frontline soldier V. P. Bobkov (Dzerzhinsk, Gor'kovskaya Oblast) would like the journal to write about the courage and heroism of personnel of the 159th Rifle Division.

Agronomist T. K. Chekuchan (Anapa, Krasnodarskiy Kray) raises an important issue in his letter. The deeds of heroes of the Soviet Union should be immortalized not only at their homes but also at the places where they fought and performed their acts of heroism. Unfortunately, he writes, this form of military-patriotic work is often forgotten here and there, particularly in our region.

Many readers find their own names or the names of relatives and fellow servicemen in the journal's articles, and they naturally request copies of particular journal issues from the editorial board as mementos. Thus in the November, 1978 issue of the journal the editorial board carried the article "A Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment's Fight Against Enemy Tanks and Infantry" by Colonel (Reserve) N. Rumyantsev in the "Proficiency and Heroism" department. A little later the editorial board received letters from the former commanders of the 3d and 5th batteries of this regiment, G. O. Khachaturyan (Shamkhor, Azerbaijan SSR) and P. P. Pugovskiy (Leningrad), who participated in the battle of Malaya Tokmachka described in the article. They do not themselves subscribe to the journal, but friends and fellow servicemen told them of the article's appearance. Great Patriotic War veteran P. N. Shpachkov (Tallin) learned, long after the fact, that the February 1977 issue of the journal carried an article about his father, N. D. Yershov, in the "Heroes of the Civil War" department, and he immediately asked the editorial board to please send this issue to his family as a keepsake. Similar correspondence has been received from other readers as well.

The following should be noted in connection with such letters and requests. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL is available only on a subscription basis, and it is not sold on the market. The printing office of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which publishes this journal, prints enough copies to cover the subscription volume. Therefore it is rather difficult to obtain a particular issue of the journal after it has gone to the printing presses. Readers and institutions should promptly submit correctly filled out subscriptions to the journal so as not to miss out on it.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004

CSO: 8144/0817

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MARSHAL AGAL'TSOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 90-91

[Article, published under the heading "News Items, Facts, Findings," by HSU Col Gen Avn A. Medvedev (Moscow): "Marshal of Aviation F. A. Agal'tsov"]

[Text] In January 1980 Marshal of Aviation Filipp Aleksandrovich Agal'tsov, a prominent air commander, celebrated his 80th birthday. He has been serving in the ranks of the glorious defenders of the motherland for more than 60 years.

Filipp Aleksandrovich was born 8 (20) January 1900 in the village of Soldatskoye, Yefremovskiy District, Tula Province in a peasant family. He began his life of labor early--he first worked as a hired hand in the village, and then as a laborer at the Obukhovskiy Plant in Petrograd, where in August 1919 he was accepted into the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). In that same year, following his graduation from machinegunner school, he volunteered for the front. Filipp Agal'tsov participated in combat activities on the Polish Front and in the defeat of Makhno's band with the 1st Special Communist Battalion.

Following the war he remained in the Red Army as a political worker. In 1925 he graduated from the Kiev Military-Political School, and in 1932 he finished the Military-Political Academy Imeni V. I. Lenin, after which he was assigned to political work in the air force. Serving as deputy commander for political affairs in an air regiment, and as the deputy chief of the political section of an air brigade, he worked fruitfully to indoctrinate and train personnel of the air units, and to insure quality fulfillment of the combat and political training tasks. Concurrently Filipp Aleksandrovich persistently worked toward a coveted goal--becoming a military pilot. In 1934 he graduated from pilot courses at the Kachinsk Aviation School.

In 1937-1938 F. A. Agal'tsov fought on the side of republican air forces in Spain. Following his return to the motherland, Filipp Aleksandrovich became a member of the Workers and Peasants Red Army Air Force Military

Council. By personal request, in January 1941 he was transferred to a line unit, being appointed commander of a high-speed bomber air regiment. He began the Great Patriotic War in this regiment, and he participated in the combat activities within the composition of the Baltic Front's air forces. Serving as chief of an aviation school, Colonel Agal'tsov trained flight personnel for the front for some time.

In February 1943 Filipp Aleksandrovich was sent to the front as commander of the 292d Ground-Attack Air Division (the 9th Guards Ground-Attack Air Division as of April 1944). In May 1943 F. A. Agal'tsov was promoted to the rank of major general of aviation. The division commanded by Filipp Aleksandrovich Agal'tsov took part in the battle of Kursk, in the crossing of the Dniepr, and in the Korsun'-Shevchenko and L'vov-Sandomierz operations (the Voronezh, Steppe, and 2d Ukrainian fronts).

F. A. Agal'tsov not only competently organized the combat activities of the division, but he also himself flew dozens of combat sorties, inspiring the personnel to military heroism.

At the end of 1944 General Agal'tsov was appointed commander of the Polish I Mixed Air Corps, which participated in the Berlin operation.

In the postwar period Filipp Aleksandrovich served in command positions. He took an active part in the development of the air force as deputy commander in chief of the air force (1958-1962), transmitting his rich experience of managing combat units and formations to young commanders. In April 1962 he was awarded the rank of marshal of aviation.

In 1962 F. A. Agal'tsov was appointed commander of long-range aviation, and member of the air force military council. He made a major contribution to the testing and introduction of new aviation equipment, and he devoted a great deal of attention to problems concerned with the use of long-range bomber aviation.

From 1969 to the present Filipp Aleksandrovich Agal'tsov has been an inspector-advisor for the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Throughout his many years of service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, Filipp Aleksandrovich was typified by traits such as purposefulness, persistence, and resourcefulness. His good knowledge of military affairs permitted him to orient himself correctly in complex combat situations, and to take an active part in peacetime development of the air force. He required his subordinates to be organized, to work together well, and to make thoughtful and grounded decisions.

The motherland gave a high assessment to the deeds of Filipp Aleksandrovich Agal'tsov, a faithful son of the Communist Party. He was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, and he has received three orders of Lenin, five

orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov (2d Degree), the Order of Kutuzov (2d Degree), the Order of the Great Patriotic War (1st Degree), the Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" (3d Degree), many medals, and foreign orders and medals.

Filipp Aleksandrovich's fellow servicemen and friends warmly and sincerely congratulate him on his 80th birthday, wish him an energetic and active life, and hope he would successfully continue his activities aimed at strengthening the power of the armed forces, at the good of our motherland. [8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON COLONEL-GENERAL SMIRNOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 91-92

[Article, published under the heading "News Items, Facts, Findings," by Maj Med Serv Ye. Yengovatykh (Aral'sk): "Eminent Figure of Soviet Public Health"]

[Text] Hero of Socialist Labor, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Academician, Professor, Colonel General of Medical Service Yefim Ivanovich Smirnov celebrated his 75th birthday on 10 October 1979. The son of a glass plant worker, he learned the hardships of child labor in his early years. The Great October Socialist Revolution opened up broad possibilities before the children of workers and peasants for acquiring an education. In 1928 Ye. I. Smirnov graduated from a workers high school, in 1932 he finished the Military-Medical Academy, and in 1938 he graduated from the evening department of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, after which he was appointed chief of the military medical section of the Leningrad Military District. In May 1939 he took command of the Red Army Military Medical Directorate.

Yefim Ivanovich constantly combined his intense activities as chief of the Red Army medical service with scientific work. He stubbornly studied the works of the classicists of military medicine, and the experience of medical support in recent wars. On his initiative the Scientific Medical Council was created in 1940 under the chief of the Military Medical Directorate. It was staffed by prominent scientists conducting research in various areas of medicine. The decisions of this organ promoted swift introduction of the latest achievements of medical science into medical practice, professional growth of military physicians, and generalization of the combat experience of the Red Army's medical service.

In his scientific works (1940-1941) Division Surgeon Ye. I. Smirnov proposed a number of original ideas on improving the organization of the military medical service, for example on rendering specialized medical care, on concentrating men and equipment in the hands of a superior medical chief with the goal of permitting their timely maneuver, and on establishing consistency in the actions of medical workers in different evacuation stages, and so on.

In the hard years of the Great Patriotic War the Main Military Medical Directorate did a great deal of work in providing medical support to the troops under the leadership of Lieutenant General of Medical Service Ye. I. Smirnov. In short time a large number of medical institutions and control organs were created, a vast hospital network was established, evacuation of hospitals from the west to the east and their re-evacuation were organized, and uninterrupted medical support to the fronts was established. All of this required tremendous effort and a great deal of work from military physicians, and personally Ye. I. Smirnov.

The system for medical and antiepidemic support to the troops developed under his guidance insured the epidemic well-being of the standing army. He theoretically justified and practically introduced a system of specialized medical care to casualties and patients; this system insured the return of 72.3 percent of the casualties and 90.6 percent of the patients to active service.

A prominent specialist in the history of military medicine, Ye. I. Smirnov initiated the creation of the Military Medical Museum (1942), he served for a long period of time (1940-1947) as the editor in chief of VOYENNO-MEDITSINSKIY ZHURNAL, and he took an active part in the work of the medical tactics department of the Central Institute for the Advanced Training of Physicians (1943-1947).

The Communist Party and the Soviet government showed high trust in Ye. I. Smirnov, promoting him to the post of USSR minister of public health in 1947. In 1953 Colonel General of Medical Service Ye. I. Smirnov returned to important positions in the Soviet Army: He was given charge of the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov and the Main Military Medical Directorate, and he was assigned to important posts in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Ye. I. Smirnov's principal works are devoted to the organization and tactics of the military medical service, and to the history of military medicine. His book "Voyna i voyennaya meditsina. Mysli i vospominaniya. 1939-1945 gg." [War and Military Medicine. Thoughts and Memoirs. 1939-1945] and others are fundamental scientific studies revealing the principles behind development of the military medical service and organization of the management of medical support to strategic operations.

This prominent official of Soviet public health is well known not only in our country but also abroad. He is an honorary member of the Surgical Society imeni N. I. Pirogov, the Royal Medical Society of Great Britain, and the Medical Surgical Society of Canada.

The Communist Party and Soviet government gave a high evaluation to Ye. I. Smirnov's work, awarding the Hero of Socialist Labor title to him in 1978. He has earned seven orders of Lenin, three orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Kutuzov (1st Degree), two orders of the Red Star, and many medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.
[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON WEAPONS DESIGNER DEGTYAREV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 94-96

[Article, published under the heading "Military-Historical Dates," by Engr-Col V. Botin: "Designer of Small Arms Weapons"]

[Text] Vasiliy Alekseyevich Degtyarev (2 January 1880--16 January 1949) occupies a prominent place within the glorious community of Soviet weapon designers. He was born to the family of generations of Tula weapon manufacturers. He began work at the plant at an age of eleven, and he was already an experienced fitter by the age of seventeen. In 1901 he was called into military service, taking a position in an arms workshop at the officers rifle school in Oraniyenbaum. After serving his time, in 1906 he remained with the service as an employee. Working under V. G. Fedorov, the founder of the Russian school of automatic weapons, Vasiliy Degtyarev participated in the manufacture of the Fedorov automatic rifle, and then he independently developed an automatic carbine, which earned a high evaluation. In his very first invention V. A. Degtyarev managed to embody his newly discovered design elements, which he invariably capitalized upon in the future.

Following Great October Degtyarev became director of an experimental workshop at an arms plant. During the years of the intervention and the Civil War he took part in the organization of the production of Fedorov automatic rifles.

Working in the planning and design office of automatic small arms organized by V. G. Fedorov, Vasiliy Alekseyevich and his teacher spent several years standardizing automatic weapon models for infantry, aviation, and tanks. They designed several machineguns: a light machinegun with air and water cooling, single, double, and triple-barreled aircraft machineguns, and a double barreled tank machinegun.

Receiving an assignment from M. V. Frunze, Degtyarev began work in 1924 on a light machinegun that was adopted in 1927 by the Red Army (the DP 7.62-mm light machinegun). It was distinguished from others by its original design, lower weight, simple layout, operating dependability, and excellent grouping.

The DP machinegun earned considerable popularity owing to its good accuracy and grouping, high rate of fire, use of a disc magazine, and the ease of disassembly, assembly, and barrel replacement. From the moment it was adopted and until the end of the Great Patriotic War, it continued to be the main automatic weapon of rifle detachments intended to annihilate group and important single targets at ranges up to 800 meters. The DP machinegun was improved in 1944 on the basis of the experience of its combat application. In 1945 it was adopted by the Red Army as the DPM (Degtyarev, infantry, modernized) light machinegun.

V. A. Degtyarev used the DP machinegun as the basis for developing the DA aircraft machinegun (1928) and the DA-2 (1930), as well as the DT tank machinegun (1929). Concurrently he planned an automatic rifle which passed the proving ground tests successfully.

The designer also developed a few submachine guns. The best of them was adopted in 1934. It was distinguished by simplicity of design, good viability, convenience of use, and dependable operation, and it was superior in its combat qualities to all similar systems existing at that time. Following its modernization, it came to be called the 1940 model submachine gun (PPD). In all, 81,118 submachine guns were manufactured in 1940.*

With the appearance of all-metal airplanes that were armored-plated in their most vulnerable areas, and after the armies became equipped with tanks and armored vehicles against which guns of conventional caliber were found to be ineffective, a need for heavy machineguns came into being. Vasiliy Alekseyevich created the first 12.7-mm machinegun for the ground troops in 1930, and 3 years later it was put into production as the DK (Degtyarev, heavy). Armor piercing and armor piercing-incendiary bullets were developed for it. The mount developed for it by designer I. N. Kolesnikov permitted use of the machinegun against both aerial and ground targets. But it did have one major shortcoming--a low rate of fire (360 rounds per minute). To increase its rate of fire, designer G. S. Shpagin created a belt-fed drum feed block for the 12.7-mm machinegun. In February 1939 the modernized Degtyarev-Shpagin modernized machinegun was adopted by the Red Army as the "DShK 1938 model 12.7-mm medium machinegun."

During the Great Patriotic War this machinegun enjoyed broad use as a powerful weapon (in the ground troops and in the navy) capable of firing at ground, water, and air targets.

Following the war the machinegun was once again modernized and renamed the "DShKM 1938/46 model 12.7-mm heavy machinegun."

In July 1941 V. A. Degtyarev began work on antitank rifles in response to a request by the Soviet government. By as early as 29 August of that same

---

* TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 81, op. 12076, d. 2, l. 215.

year the State Defense Committee adopted a decree accepting the Degtyarev 14.5-mm single-loading rifle (PTRD). The simplicity of its layout and the great ease of its manufacture made it possible to begin production quickly, and to increase it constantly. Thus while in 1941 17,688 Degtyarev antitank rifles were manufactured, in 1942 the figure climbed to 184,800.* Powerful rounds using bullets with a steel hardened or powder metal core and exhibiting good armor piercing capability and incendiary action were developed for the PTR.

Antitank rifles became one of the resources for combatting enemy tanks and armored transporters. This is confirmed by a telegram sent to the designer at the end of 1941: "In your sector of the front, the enemy is conducting continuous counterattacks with major tank forces. In these battles, the soldiers of our major formation have hit about 200 tanks in the last 10 days, and about half of them were knocked out of action by antitank gunners armed with antitank rifles. The editorial board of the army newspaper ARMEYSKAYA PRAVDA urgently requests you to submit to us, by telephone, an article on the topic 'For the Soviet Antitank Gunners' describing the most effective way to use the antitank rifle in combat. Please accept our thanks in advance. With a comrade's regards. ARMEYSKAYA PRAVDA Editor Avdyushin."

The designer responded to this request and wrote the article. His advice was highly beneficial to the warriors.

Vasiliy Alekseyevich possessed enviable organizational capabilities. While serving as chief of an experimental workshop and later an experimental design office, he confidently relied upon his helpers, and he boldly trusted his young workers to solve complex technical problems. He always listened attentively to the remarks and proposals of his fellow workers. Possessing the highly valuable quality of always wanting better, he constantly improved his systems. Working indefatigably, V. A. Degtyarev did everything he could to encourage the creative initiative of assistants exhibiting a capacity for invention, and to whom he generously transmitted his experience.

Despite his busy schedule, Vasiliy Alekseyevich always found the time for public affairs. He was elected deputy to the first and second convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The contribution made to strengthening the defense capabilities of our motherland by this communist and patriot, this successor to generations of Tula arms designers, was given a high evaluation by the party and government. Major General of Engineering-Artillery Service V. A. Degtyarev was one of the first to be awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor title for his outstanding design activity. He received the State Prize four times, and he was awarded the academic degree of Doctor of Technical Sciences. V. A. Degtyarev was awarded three orders of Lenin, the Order of Suvorov (1st and 2d Degree), the Order of the Red Labor Banner, the Order of the Red Star, and many medals.

---

* TsAMO SSSR, f. 81, op. 12076, d. 2, l. 215.

[8144/0817-11004]

11004
CSO: 8144/0817

END
124

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

1 May 1980

DD